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Summary in Danish  
 
Ved moderne demokratisk stemmeafgivelse foregår 
borgernes afstemning i hemmelighed. Borgere er frie til at stemme på 
deres foretrukne politiske kandidater, partier eller specifikke 
lovændringer, uden at deres stemmevalg offentliggøres. Mange opfatter 
desuden deres stemmevalg som en privatsag, som andre ikke har krav 
på at være informeret om. Denne afhandling foretager en kritisk 
undersøgelse af dette grundlæggende demokratiske princip. Denne 
undersøgelse er funderet i politisk filosofi og omhandler derved de 
principelle, teoretiske og etiske spørgsmål og dimensioner, som 
hemmelig stemmeafgivelse indeholder. Mest grundlæggende står 
opdelingen mellem folkevalgte politikere og borgere. Det forventes, at 
politikere opererer i åbenhed, og at deres stemmevalg ved lovgivning 
offentliggøres – men hvorfor er borgere undtaget lignende 
forventninger? Bør vi ikke også kunne stille borgere til ansvar for deres 
politiske handlinger? Denne afhandling problematiserer den skarpe 
opdeling mellem politikeres og borgeres forpligtelser og derved også 
opdelingen mellem offentlig og hemmelig stemmeafgivelse.  
Der analyseres derudover også en række andre 
omstændigheder ved denne form for stemmeafgivelse. Hvis borgere 
kan holdes ansvarlige, kan det så have en positiv effekt på 
vælgeropførslen? Gør borgere mere for at informere sig selv vedrørende 
politiske spørgsmål – og er den åbne stemmehandling overhovedet en 
legitim måde at påvirke borgere på? Slutteligt undersøges også 
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spørgsmål, som er presserende grundet moderne teknologisk udvikling. 
Store mængder af dataindsamling gør det nemmere at udregne og 
kalkulere borgeres politiske præferencer – hvor meget af denne type 
data bør indsamles, og hvilke problemer rejser dette for hemmelig 
stemmeafgivelse?  
Disse spørgsmål rækker dybt ned i filosofiske 
forestillinger om, hvordan demokratiet bør fungere, om, hvad der er 
legitimt for borgere at ’holde for dem selv’, og hvad der er værdifuldt 
ved valgdeltagelse. Ved at fremhæve disse centrale filosofiske 
perspektiver, så står det mere klart, hvorfor og hvornår hemmelig 
valgdeltagelse er værdifuld, men også hvornår og hvorfor det er 
problematisk. 
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Summary in English  
 
Citizens participate in democratic elections by voting in 
secret. They are free to vote for their preferred political candidates or 
party. Some citizens regard their voting-choice as a private issue that 
others are not entitled to know about. This dissertation examines this 
foundational democratic principle. It looks into the principled, 
theoretical, and ethical questions and dimensions that secret voting 
entails. One foundational issue concerns the separation between 
political representatives and citizens. When representatives decide on 
policy issues their vote is public – but why are citizens exempt from 
this practice? Should we not also hold citizens accountable for their 
political decisions? This dissertation problematizes the sharp division 
between representatives and citizens and their respective ways of 
voting. It also examines a range of other circumstances relating to the 
issue of secret and public voting. If it is possible to hold citizens 
accountable for their voting-choices, might this have a beneficial effect 
on voter behavior? Will voters take steps to inform themselves on 
political issues if they are required to reveal their voting-choices – and 
is this even a legitimate way of influencing electors? Finally, the 
dissertation also looks into pressing issues that relate to technological 
developments. Huge amounts of data-collection are making it easier to 
calculate what the political preferences of citizens are – how much of 
this type of data is it permissible to collect and how does this relate to 
the institution of the secret ballot?  
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These issues concern, fundamentally, different 
philosophical conceptions of how democracies should function, about 
what is legitimately private and what is valuable about democratic 
participation. By looking into these central philosophical perspectives 
it becomes clear why and when voting in secret is valuable but also 
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            When we think of modern democracies, certain principles seem 
fundamental. One such principle is that electors cast their vote in secret. 
Since this is the standard practice when citizens participate in elections, 
it seems like a natural and entirely appropriate feature of democratic 
participation. Indeed, some electors are bound to feel that their voting-
choices are nobody else’s business. It is a choice, an important one for 
many people, that they make, and their reasons for making it – good or 
bad – are not something that others can appropriately demand that they 
make public. Feeling this way is neither unintelligible nor strange. 
Since citizens are accustomed to this form of voting – and accustomed, 
perhaps, to think of their vote choices as legitimate objects of privacy – 
this reaction is foreseeable.  
 
             To say that political elections are important is almost too 
obvious to deserve mentioning. The reason why it still deserves 
mentioning is not that people are ignorant of it, but rather, because 
saying it reacquaints us with the moral force of this statement. The 
outcomes of elections (typically) lead to legislative decisions, the 
transfer of resources, and the restructuring of institutions. They also 
often lead to the altering, and potentially the harming, of the legal 
standing of certain social, religious or cultural groups. Election 
outcomes sometimes also harm the collective ability to effectively 
combat serious challenges like climate change. To say these are matters 
AN OPEN DEMOCRACY 
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of moral importance is an understatement. For these reasons, elections 
and referendums are highly important. Yet, when citizens choose their 
representatives or authorize decisions directly, they do so anonymously. 
They can do so without making their choices or their reasons public.  
 
            This dissertation explores the issue of electors deciding their 
vote in secret. First, it engages with a normative evaluation of how the 
secret ballot aligns with the principles and values expressed in 
democratic theory. The guiding questions are here: how do (certain) 
ideals posited in democratic theory relate to the secret ballot? Does the 
practice of secret voting fulfill or run counter to the normatively 
desirable forms of behavior and institutional arrangements posited in 
the academic literature? In addition, which lessons can we learn from 
how other groups of political agents, such as representatives, must act? 
Since they act under conditions of publicity, why should these 
conditions not also apply to electors? The answers to these questions 
constitute the normative background against which other, more 
concrete issues are dealt with. One such issue concerns voter 
knowledge. If electors had to vote in public, would they not take some 
fundamental steps to inform themselves on the issues on which they are 
voting? If not, why not?2 The second issue concerns the arguments for 
having the secret ballot for citizens. The central objective here is to 
carefully scrutinize those arguments and consider which (if any) of 
                                                          
2 As it stands, this is an empirical question. In arguing for the possible epistemic 
benefits of public voting, I review some of the empirical literature while also making 
the theoretical arguments clear. 
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these arguments are persuasive. Undermining these arguments does not, 
by itself, constitute an argument for publicity – rather, it calls for a re-
examining of the kinds of arguments that are given for the practice. The 
last part of the dissertation ties the secret ballot together with some 
issues that arise because of recent technological developments. These 
kinds of developments concern the possibility of inferring which kinds 
of political preferences citizens have based on massive amounts of data. 
This is an issue that arises specifically due to technological 




1.1 THE CENTRAL ISSUES OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
            The central philosophical issue about public and secret voting 
concerns conceiving the role of the elector in a new light. By 
implementing public voting for citizens, their role as electors becomes 
closer to that of a lawmaker or a representative.3 This has a range of 
implications concerning the split between representatives and electors, 
their respective epistemic and normative obligations, and what others 
are entitled to demand of them. John Stuart Mill provides the historical 
                                                          
3 Lopez-Guerra 2014, 40.  
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context for a discussion of this in political philosophy.4 His writings 
also focused on conceiving the elector in a new light. Mill wrote:  
 
In any political election, even by universal suffrage (and still 
more obviously in the case of a restricted suffrage), the voter is 
under an absolute moral obligation to consider the interest of the 
public, not his private advantage, and give his vote, to the best 
of his judgment, exactly as he would be bound to do if he were 
the sole voter and the election depended upon him alone. This 
being admitted, it is at least a prima facie consequence that the 
duty of voting, like any other public duty, should be performed 
under the eye and criticism of the public; every one of whom 
has not only an interest in its performance, but a good title to 
consider himself wronged if it is performed otherwise than 
honestly and carefully. (Mill 1994, 325-6)  
 
            Mill understood the voter to be under ‘an absolute moral 
obligation’ to consider the public interests that are being voted on. 
Electors should not use the franchise for their own pleasure or benefit, 
but exercise it with the public interest in mind. Their role is not unlike 
that of public officials, who are also under obligations to vote with the 
public interest in mind. It is because citizens take on a decidedly public 
role when voting that their decision becomes a legitimate object of 
                                                          
4 Mill discussed this in: Considerations on Representative Government, chapter 10: 
On the Mode of Voting. 
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criticism and discussion for others. Nadia Urbinati is not exaggerating 
when she suggests that public voting served a transformative purpose 
for Mill.5 Public voting, in this sense, is suggestive of thinking of 
individual electors in a different light. It is suggestive, at least for Mill, 
of understanding the use of the franchise to be acting in a public role 
with a duty towards the public.6  
 
            It is not just the conception of the obligations of voters that is 
connected with public voting; different (large-scale) views of 
democratic decision-making are also connected with it. To see this, 
consider Will Kymlicka’s characterization. He suggests that there has 
been a shift from a ‘vote-centric’ to a ‘talk-centric’ conception of 
democratic decision-making.7 The vote-centric model sees voting as a 
process in which (previously existing) individual political preferences 
are aggregated and translated into public policy. In this model, there is 
little room for the practice of deliberative engagements with the views 
and claims of others. The talk-centric model, on the other hand, views 
the political process as a public endeavor in which citizens are to 
substantiate and justify their ideas and claims to others. The deliberative 
phase of policy-making aims at changing and challenging the political 
preferences of citizens such that public policy is not the mere end-result 
of the aggregation of political views that citizens hold prior to 
                                                          
5 Urbinati 2002, 113. 
6 We can also reverse the causal chain here: because the use of the franchise is a public 
responsibility, we ought to have electors vote publicly.  
7 Kymlicka 2002, 290-1. 
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voting.8 Similar arguments appear in the literature on the ethics of 
voting. For example, according to some scholars, electors have 
obligations to vote on behalf of the common good or to abstain if they 
are uninformed or irrational.9 Both the development of the talk-centric 
model and the issue concerning the (moral) obligations of electors are 
(implicitly) connected to the issues of public and private voting. These 
different normative frameworks for understanding democratic decision-
making have different implications for the institution of secret voting.  
 
            Consider, for example, the vote-centric view, according to 
which voting is little more than a mechanism for aggregating the 
political preferences of citizens. If this is all that is required, 
normatively, for democratic decision-making then secrecy seems 
(more) normatively appropriate. This is so because secrecy allows for 
the registration of political preference without incentivizing discursive 
engagement between citizens. Electors can vote without having justify 
themselves or withstand scrutiny from others.10 The point here is merely 
that if voting is supposed to do little more than to, simply stated, count 
heads, then it is less obvious what might be wrong with private voting. 
If, on the other hand, we assume a talk-centric stance, then our 
evaluation of voting as private changes. If the voting-choices of citizens 
are to reflect public deliberation on policy issues, then this is, prima 
                                                          
8 Kymlicka 2002, 290-1. 
9 Brennan 2009; Freeman 2000.  
10 I am here speaking only about the voting-system itself. Whether or not electors 
welcome either scrutiny or the practice of justification can happen independently of 
the way in which voting is done.  
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facie, more suggestive of viewing voting as a public endeavor. Voting 
in public would make citizens interpersonally accountable for their 
voting-choices and make the act of voting more influenced by the 
arguments and views of others. In this normative framework, it 
becomes more obvious why voting in private might be troubling. 
Similarly, if electors have moral obligations – for example, to vote for 
the common good – then this can also help ground normative criticisms 
of private voting.11 If electors are under duties to consider the common 
good, then it becomes clearer why it is improper that electors can vote 
in ways in which there is little pressure or incentive to consider the 
interests of others. These different normative starting-points are 
suggestive of different prima facie evaluations of public and private 
voting. These normative views of democratic decision-making do not, 
by themselves, advocate the implementation of public voting.12 Rather, 
they constitute the normative basis on which one can think about these 
issues. Philosophical thinking on this issue, then, is about conceiving 
democratic participation in a new and different light. It is about 
formulating and justifying a view of democracy in which public voting 
                                                          
11 There is an additional issue here concerning how one conceives of the cognitive 
content of political ‘beliefs.’ If such ‘beliefs’ are mere political preferences and they 
therefore resemble, for example, personal preferences in taste, then political 
preferences might be improper objects of public discussion and justification. On the 
other hand, public voting implies, prima facie, that voting can, appropriately, be 
scrutinized, criticized, or judged on public grounds. 
12 This might be due to several different reasons. First, it might be that under further 
examination neither public nor secret voting is not in tension with any of these 
normative frameworks. Secondly, there can be overriding practical concerns about 
public voting that make implementation undesirable.  
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is a fitting and normatively appropriate form of democratic 
participation.  
 
            This text is structured in the following way: in the next section, 
I describe the theoretical issues that are discussed in the literature. 
Second, I briefly consider some methodological issues pertaining to this 
dissertation. Third, I summarize the six papers that comprise this 
dissertation. Fourth, I present summarized conclusions from the papers. 
Lastly, I describe some further questions and issues that have arisen 
from the writing of this dissertation.   
   
21 
2 THEORETICAL ISSUES  
 
            It is safe to say that relatively little attention has been given to 
the issue of public and secret voting from the vantage point of modern 
political theory or moral philosophy.13 Jon Elster writes: 
             
Today, the normative question of secret versus public 
voting in national elections seems settled in favor of 
secrecy. (Elster 2015, 11)  
 
            This has unfortunately resulted in a somewhat scattered 
discussion involving different distinct themes and arguments, 
seemingly to the detriment of a systematic development of central 
normative positions and ensuing public academic discussions. The 
somewhat scattered nature of the discussion has had an impact on the 
way this dissertation has been conducted. If a public discussion has 
progressed, it usually results in the emergence of several distinguished 
positions that have been defended against various objections. One 
obvious way to contribute to such a discussion is by arguing that certain 
positions are untenable while others are not. If there is little ongoing 
discussion of these issues, then this form of intervention is more 
difficult. This has meant that my approach has been, mainly, to identify 
                                                          
13 In his recent survey of these issues in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Axel Gosseries writes: “… except for Brennan & Pettit’s (1990) paper, there is not 
much debate today anymore about the suitability of secret ballot.” (Gosseries 2017) 
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certain key concepts in the literature and try to develop and combine 
these into self-standing arguments. This obviously also involves 
arguing that some positions are tenable while others are not, but it 
requires more effort in terms of building and constructing these 
positions, since there is less of a readily available spectrum of positions 
to criticize and expand upon. To give a couple of brief illustrations, I 
have located and put together some of the arguments pertaining to the 
epistemic potential of public voting in order to make a more sustained 
epistemic case for public voting.14 The same goes for the value of 
privacy as it relates to democratic participation. Several authors have 
discussed these issues, but it was necessary to combine a range of views 
into more self-standing positions concerning the value of privacy and 
how this value attaches to the secret ballot.15  
  
            With that being said, I now proceed to an overview of some of 
the central themes that philosophers and political scientists appeal to in 
their published writings on this issue. They include, mostly, issues of 
political representation, obligations of electors, and issues of privacy.  
 
            I will mention how and when these different themes tie in with 
the papers collected in this dissertation. My approach has been to mirror 
the conceptual usage of these scholars, so that when they attribute some 
                                                          
14 This is done in: “Who Let the Votes Out?”  
15 This is done in: “Voting, Privacy, and Electoral Autonomy”  
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concern to privacy, secrecy or representation, I similarly express 
concerns using these concepts.16 
 
Before moving on to this, however, I will describe some 
preliminary conceptual distinctions and clarifications. This is done 
relatively informally, intended mostly to give some basic sense of the 
terms used. Although there certainly are themes and concepts that recur 
throughout this dissertation that are worth clarifying, the six different 
papers all use the concepts deployed by scholars in the literature, 
whether these concepts are secrecy, privacy, anonymity, representation 
or something else. Moreover, the papers contain self-standing 
arguments that relate to different discussions, and there is, therefore, no 
single, overarching conceptual framework that they all refer back to. 
This structure should make the terms relatively self-explanatory within 
the specific contexts of the papers.  
 
2.1             SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF SECRECY  
 
Jon Elster suggests that an act, such as voting in a national 
election, is secret if only one person knows about it, and this is, when 
talking about acts, always the person herself.17 An act is minimally 
public if at least one other person knows about the act.18 While this 
captures something important, it does not neatly map onto the notion of 
                                                          
16 Unless there are substantial problems with the way these terms are used.  
17 Elster 2015, 2.  
18 Elster 2015, 3. 
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the secret ballot. Imagine that political parties have distinct voting-
booths so that the voting-choice of each elector is publicly observable. 
If A has to vote in this way, but there is nobody to observe her, we 
would still say that A has utilized public voting, even though the only 
agent that knows of the voting-choice is A.19  
 
Consider a second scenario in which there is a publicly 
accessible list of how each elector has voted. Anyone can access this 
list. If nobody checks up on how A has voted, only A will know how 
she has voted. It would nonetheless be strange to say that A has voted 
in secret. Again, what matters here is that it is possible for others to 
know of A’s voting-choice, not whether they in fact know of it.20 This 
speaks to two further features of a secretive voting system. One 
concerns the way in which others can know of A’s voting-choice. As 
Elster notes, secrecy is ensured when it is impossible for “… an agent 
to communicate credibly to others how she acted, and thus impossible 
for others to shape her behavior.” (Elster 2015, 7). It seems that Elster 
thinks of ‘credible’ as something akin to verifiable. It must be possible 
for other agents to verify that A has voted in a particular way. 
Understanding ‘credible’ in a different epistemic sense can have some 
strange implications. Imagine that B is a true and reliable friend of A. 
B feels an enormous moral obligation to always tell the truth, even when 
                                                          
19 For the remainder of this paragraph, ‘A’ will play the role of the voter.  
20 It is worth explicating that ‘possible’ here must mean that voting-choices are readily 
available somehow. It is physically possible to acquire knowledge about voting-
choices even if electors participate in secret. One can demand that they photograph 
their ballot, for example.   
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it is to B’s own detriment. B tells A that she has voted for X. There is 
seemingly no reason to distrust B in this situation and A accepts that B 
has voted for X. Under these circumstances, B is a credible agent and 
A seems to have prima facie reasons to believe her. This (obviously) 
does not entail that B has engaged in public voting of any sort. For it to 
be public, A must have the possibility of knowing of B’s voting-choice 
in some verifiable way. Now this issue quickly ventures into 
complicated epistemic matters of verifiability, degrees of certainty, 
knowledge etc. I do not rely on contentious views about what 
constitutes secrecy or publicity in the papers and while these issues 
might be interesting, they play no large part in this dissertation.21 I will 
therefore not expand on these epistemic concerns any further.  
 
The second feature that is central to the issue of someone other 
than A knowing is that a secretive system is structured in such a way 
such that others cannot know. As Hubertus Buchstein suggests, this 
typically means that secrecy is mandatory and that “… electoral 
authorities have to take care to create and safeguard secrecy.” 
(Buchstein 2015, 16). This, again, speaks to how others can come to 
know of B’s voting-choice. If secrecy is upheld, it is very difficult for 
A to credibly, or verifiably, know of B’s vote. The mandatory status of 
                                                          
21 One of the papers of this dissertation goes into the epistemic territory of 
understanding what constitutes secrecy and how secrecy can be undermined. This is 
the paper: “Not So Secret After All: How Big Data Threatens the Secret Ballot and 
What (not) To Do About It.” There are also some potentially epistemic issues 
surrounding whether to categorize mail-in ballots as part of a secretive, partly 
secretive or public system.   
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secrecy means that electors cannot themselves choose to vote in public. 
If they are afforded such an opportunity, the illicit practices of coercion, 
threats and bribery would still be viable, since coercers could force A 
to ‘choose’ to vote in public.22 
 
Also worth mentioning is that publicity can take different forms. 
As Elster suggests, there are both internal and external forms of 
publicity. Voting-choices can be internally public within a single group 
by only revealing voting-choices to the members of that group. Imagine 
that a group of jurors consisting of ten members must vote on charges 
of guilty or non-guilty. They are able to reveal their voting-choices 
internally to the group without also having to reveal them to anyone 
outside the group. If they do so, they have an internally public, 
externally secretive form of voting. It is fully public if it is unveiled 
both internally to the group and externally to agents outside the group. 
Systems of public voting can also make voting-choices public at 
different times. A vote may be instantaneously public – consider, for 
example, voting by a show of hands in front of others. Voting-choices 
can also be revealed post-fact, by for example, registering voting-
choices and revealing them potentially years after the decision was 
made.  
 
                                                          
22 Buchstein 2015, 16.  
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2.2 REPRESENTATION AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF 
ELECTORS  
          I now move on to the different, theoretical themes that are 
important to this dissertation. One important part of the literature that 
deals with these issues is that of political representation. As mentioned, 
this was central to Mill’s thinking about public voting and it is an 
important theme in contemporary scholarship. Discussions of political 
representation are important for thinking about this issue because 
representatives are often obligated to reveal their votes. This provides 
an interesting separation between two groups of political actors: citizens 
that vote in secret and representatives that vote publicly. Some of the 
central issues emerge from the split: issues regarding why only the latter 
group votes in public and whether the reasons they do so apply to the 
former group. I will start by describing Annabelle Lever’s writings on 
the value of the secret ballot. This is one important and influential view 
that is not discussed center stage in the papers.23 It is a central part of 
the current literature on this topic and so it is highly important to include 
it in this section.24  
 
                                                          
23 We are currently working on a paper that is devoted entirely to a discussion of 
Lever’s views. This paper was at the time of submission not sufficiently finished to 
be included. It is entitled ‘On the Expressive Value of the Secret Ballot’.  
24 Her view could just as easily be put under ‘privacy issues’ as she links this to her 
democratic conception of privacy.  
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2.2.1 ANNABELLE LEVER’S THEORY  
Lever has influentially argued for what she calls a democratic 
conception of privacy.25 According to her view, private voting expresses 
and constitutes an egalitarian ideal of democratic participation (Lever 
2007; 2014). What is particularly interesting about this view is that it 
justifies the secret ballot on non-instrumental grounds. It is a view that 
argues for the intrinsic and constitutive value of the secret ballot.26 To 
gain an understanding of this view, consider first something that is 
important in Lever’s account, namely that citizens are afforded the right 
to vote in general elections and referendums on behalf of their 
citizenship. The right to vote entitles citizens to a say in the political 
dealings of their country, and they are extended this right on behalf of 
their citizenship. The right to vote is, then, what Lever calls a baseline-
right.27 Lever contrasts electors with a different group of political 
agents, namely democratic legislators.28 The reason why legislators are 
afforded the right to vote in assemblies is not because they have a right 
to become legislators – rather, they are entitled to vote in assemblies 
because they are authorized by their constituents or the public to act in 
their name. As such, their vote relies on whether they are approved to 
vote by their constituents. Their right to vote is not a baseline-right.  
                                                          
25 Her view is, as far as I know, the most sustained, published treatment of this in 
political philosophy. I reference this view throughout the six papers and deal with it 
more substantially in ‘Publicity and the Ethics of Political Representation’ pages 17-
8. 
26 It is constitutive of the proper democratic roles of both representatives and electors.  
27 Lever 2007 
28 Lever 2015, 174 
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According to Lever, this marks one central and important 
difference between electors and legislators. The right to vote and the 
voting-choices of electors do not, and should not, depend upon either 
the authorization or approval of others. If the vote of electors does 
depend on the approval of others, that would make citizens’ entitlement 
to vote be something other than a baseline-right. Their entitlement to 
vote would become dependent upon something more than their 
citizenship; it would become dependent upon the approval or 
authorization of others.29 Much like the voting of electors should not 
depend on being authorized by others, it also should not be dependent 
upon the personal characteristics of electors. It should not depend on 
whether electors can demonstrate “... special virtues, attributes or 
possessions.” Nor should it depend upon whether they “... are rich or 
poor, well-educated or not.” (Lever 2015, 175). Similarly, citizens 
should not “... have to ask permission, or to defer to the opinion of 
others, in order to participate in politics.” (Lever 2015, 176). This gives 
us two distinct circumstances that surround the voting of electors:  
(i) The voting of electors should not depend upon the 
approval or authorization of others. 
                                                          
29 Lever 2015, 175 
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(ii) The vote of electors should not be dependent upon 
personal characteristics such as education, intelligence, 
virtues, religion, psychological dispositions etc.30  
These two circumstances together comprise a normatively 
appropriate role for electors in Lever’ view. The important point here is 
that this role is expressed through the use of the secret ballot. This is so 
because by voting anonymously, citizens register their voting-choices 
in a way that pays no attention to any of their personal characteristics. 
The secret ballot registers only citizens’ votes while concealing their 
identities.31 To see this point more clearly, it is again instructive to 
consider the division between electors and legislators. In Lever’s view, 
the public voting of legislators is legitimate because such legislators are 
authorized by their constituents to vote in legislative assemblies. Their 
role when voting, therefore, involves deferring to or asking for the 
approval of their constituents. The constituents thus need to be able to 
know how the legislators vote on their behalf. This kind of role is 
inappropriate for electors. If electors voted in public, this would express 
that (a) the vote of electors depends upon the approval or authorization 
of others and (b) voting is dependent upon the personal characteristics 
                                                          
30 It is worth noting that Lever appeals to both the right to vote, and to the right to vote 
how one wants to. Therefore, when Lever for example suggests that the vote of 
electors should not be dependent upon personal characteristics, I take this to mean that 
neither their right to vote nor their voting-choice should be dependent upon personal 
characteristics. 
31 A similar point is made in Knight and Johnson 1997, 288. 
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of electors. These circumstances should apply to legislators, but they 
are inappropriate for citizens.  
Conversely, having electors vote in secret expresses that (i) the 
vote of electors does not depend upon the approval or authorization of 
others and that (ii) the vote of electors does not depend upon personal 
characteristics. Therefore, private voting for electors expresses a 
normatively appropriate role for citizens while public voting for 
electors expresses an inappropriate role for electors.32  
Daniel Sturgis also discusses the demarcation between electors 
and representatives. After noting that openness is generally an 
important value in the decision-making of representatives33, Sturgis 
suggests:   
Yet, presumably, it is because politicians are acting in the role 
as active decision-makers for the political community that we 
expect them to vote for the common good. When we vote, we 
are exercising the same authority. (Sturgis 2005, 23) 
            Sturgis here makes an argumentative move that is similar to 
Mill’s, namely arguing that both representatives and electors must vote 
on behalf of the common good. If electors have an obligation to vote on 
behalf of the common good, then it becomes important to have 
measures that allow for checking whether citizens live up to these 
                                                          
32 Lever is concerned both with what public voting expresses and with the in-
egalitarian outcomes of public voting.  
33 Sturgis 2005, 22.  
AN OPEN DEMOCRACY 
32 
obligations. This, for Sturgis, gives a principled reason why public 
voting for citizens is appropriate.34 I attend to these considerations in 
much more detail in ‘Publicity and the Ethics of Political 
Representation’, where I go through the basic normative framework of 
the accountability of representatives and then extend this framework to 
the electorate. This is a natural, further development of the Millian 
view. The issue of the obligations of electors is also central to the paper 
‘Deliberative Democracy and The Secret Ballot’, where I evaluate some 
of the core tenants of deliberative democracy and the practice of voting 
in secret.  
The requirements and obligations posited by the 
deliberative model of democracy are moral ones, but legal obligations 
are also important. The legal obligation of electors to show up on 
Election Day under systems of compulsory voting is the topic of 
‘Compulsion, Secrecy, and Paper: A Bad Combination When It Comes 
to Voting’.  
There is also an epistemic dimension related to the issues 
of publicity for representatives. By having the political discussion of 
representatives take place in public and by disclosing the voting-choices 
of representatives, a range of different epistemic effects might occur. 
Representatives are incentivized to discuss certain issues or to discuss 
issues in a certain way. By having to disclose their votes, they are 
pressured into thinking about what they can say in defense of their 
                                                          
34 Sturgis 2005, 22-23.  
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votes. There are also potential drawbacks of publicity. If representatives 
must deliberate in public, it is possible that they will be less willing to 
change their views in order to appear decisive in the eyes of the public.35 
Several authors appeal to these sorts of epistemic considerations. 
Brennan and Pettit suggest that conditions of publicity will incentivize 
electors to offer justifications for their votes that appeal to the common 
good.36 Engelen and Nys also suggest that selfish preferences are less 
likely to influence voting under conditions of publicity.37 While these 
epistemic considerations are not uncommon, there is, as far as I can tell, 
no comprehensive normative and empirical defense of the potential 
epistemic benefits of public voting for citizens.38 Presenting an 
explication of and an argument for these epistemic benefits is the central 
objective of ‘Who Let the Votes Out?’ In that paper, I bring together 
the central epistemic arguments made on behalf of public voting and 
further strengthen them. I then defend them against one important 
objection that suggests that public voting will lead to an epistemically 
troubling form of conformity amongst voters.  
This epistemic concern, although slightly different, is also 
present in ‘Not So Secret After All’. The objective in that paper is to 
think about the kind of threats that Big Data Analytics poses to the 
                                                          
35 Chambers 2004, 394.  
36 Brennan and Pettit 1990, 324. 
37 Engelen and Nys 2013, 495. 
38 By ‘normative’  and ‘empirical’ here I mean that there is no sustained argument for 
why public voting and the kind of ‘public-spirited’ form of voting it implies is 
normatively valuable and whether it is empirically likely that it will materialize 
because of public voting.  
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practice of secret voting. This is an interesting epistemic issue since 
knowledge of voting-choices is inferred from data sets rather than 
revealed directly.   
2.3 ISSUES OF PRIVACY 
Scholars apply and relate concerns of privacy to the issue of 
voting in different ways. In some cases, there is an explicit connection 
between the value of privacy to voting and to democratic participation 
more generally. This explicit connection is often that privacy is 
important for the kind of autonomy that is valuable for democratic 
ideals. In other cases, there is an implicit connection in the sense that 
issues of privacy are relevant for thinking about the issue of public 
voting. I describe both in the following.  
 
2.3.1 PRIVACY AND AUTONOMY  
 
One central dimension of privacy that authors often invoke in 
the context of political participation is that of autonomy. Ruth Gavison 
sums up this view succinctly: 
Privacy is also essential to democratic government 
because it fosters and encourages the moral autonomy of 
the citizen, a central requirement of a democracy. Part of 
the justification for majority rule and the right to vote is 
the assumption that individuals should participate in 
35 
political decisions by forming judgments and expressing 
preferences. (Gavison 1980, 455). 
Privacy, according to this view, is important because it helps to 
further the kind of autonomy that is valuable for democratic 
participation. This view takes different forms. Jeffrey Reiman has 
argued that privacy is important for autonomy because privacy shields 
individuals from external pressure and influence. Since meaningful 
democratic participation is premised on the notion of electors 
expressing their autonomous preferences, Reiman argues that privacy 
is important for democratic participation.39 Cohen argues, along similar 
lines, that the tracking of behavior and expression will heavily 
incentivize people to think and behave in ways that are entrenched in 
social conventions and public opinion. People will be less prone to 
engage in more idiosyncratic ways of living and thinking, and this will 
negatively influence political deliberation and participation.40  
  
I take Cohen’s epistemic concern here to be that the ability to 
critically evaluate or rethink social, political, or humanitarian issues 
depends, in part, on being able to see such concerns from, sometimes 
highly, different perspectives. It becomes increasingly difficult to 
develop such perspectives if people are more likely to think and behave 
in ways prescribed by public opinion.41 These are the issues I attend to 
in ‘Privacy, Voting, and Electoral Autonomy’. In that paper, I locate 
                                                          
39 Reiman 1995.  
40 Cohen 2000, 1425-6. 
41 I have labeled this the ‘epistemic worry for political participation.’ 
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both Reiman’s and Cohen’s view as being subsets of a larger view that 
posits a value between privacy and democracy. I criticize these different 
views on different grounds. Most importantly, I argue that the value of 
privacy for the personal lives of citizens cannot easily be applied to 
political decisions undertaken by citizens.  
 
There is also a link between decisional privacy and the issues 
related to voting. This connection does not play any substantial role in 
the thesis, so I will only briefly comment on it here. This connection is 
also described in the last section: Looking Forward.  
 
Decisional privacy usually denotes a sphere of action or 
decision that is outside the scope of interference by the state and civilian 
actors.42 In part, the notion of decisional privacy is about the normative 
framework for thinking about which decisions are in the legitimate 
interests of others. This connects with issues pertaining to the secret 
ballot since important questions arise as to who has a legitimate interest 
in knowing the voting-choices of electors. Decisional privacy, then, can 






                                                          
42 Brettschneider 2007, 71; Rossler 2005, 80; Koops et al. 2017. 
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3 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 
 
The aim of this chapter is to make explicit the methodological 
approach undertaken in this dissertation.  
 
3.1 NORMATIVE AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES  
   
       The questions and issues discussed in this dissertation are often 
closely related to empirical questions and issues. Consider the 
following, related questions that empirical science can help answer: 
 
(i) Empirical studies can show what the electoral effects 
are of implementing different voting-systems in 
different contexts – for example, whether it reduces 
turnout.  
(ii) Empirical studies can inform us about the 
psychological attitudes that citizens have (or will 
develop) if they have to engage with different kinds 
of voting systems. 
 
It is important to distinguish these empirical issues from the 
philosophical objective, which is to think through how important 
concepts and normative principles relate to these matters. This will 
include deploying prescriptive notions such as: voter obligations, how 
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voting ought to function, electoral autonomy, political representation, 
privacy, and legitimacy. In relation to the issues of public and private 
voting, what is needed – in part – are also considerations about what 
kind of justification there is for either practice and what kind of 
normative worries relate to either practice.  
 
            Let us consider the latter point first. Evaluating normative 
worries means in part evaluating whether a worry is instrumental or 
intrinsic. As an illustration, consider the issue of an equal distribution 
of voting power. Imagine that someone proposes to give more voting 
power to the well-educated. Call this the plural voting proposal. 
Somewhat simplified, someone might object to the plural voting 
proposal on instrumental grounds. They can object that formal 
inequality in the electoral process will lead to unacceptable outcomes – 
for example – that it will produce policies that favor well-off parts of 
society while being unresponsive to those who are materially 
disadvantaged. This objection only defeats the plural voting proposal if 
these outcomes actually occur or are likely to occur. Intrinsic objections 
are not amenable to empirical circumstances in the same way. If 
someone objects that plural voting disrespects those citizens who have 
less power, then this does not hinge on whether some empirical state of 
affairs obtain. It is not important, for this objection, what the (political 
or otherwise) outcomes are of distributing votes in this way.43  
                                                          
43 This should not be misunderstood as saying that principled objections are not 
related to the empirical world. If the empirical world were radically different, perhaps 
it would not be insulting or disrespectful to afford some individuals less voting-power. 
39 
            This same point applies to the issue of public and private voting, 
since either practice can be justified by a reference to intrinsic or 
instrumental worries.44 This kind of, rather basic, conceptual hygiene is 
important for understanding how any practice is justified. If the plural-
voting proposal is normatively improper for instrumental reasons, then 
it (can be) justified if instituted under empirical circumstances where 
the unwelcomed outcomes do not materialize. If it is improper for 
intrinsic reasons, then justifying the proposal will require something 
other than arguing that the harmful empirical outcomes will not be 
obtained. It will require, for example, showing that the intrinsic reasons 
are wrongheaded or that the practice, when properly analyzed, actually 
does not violate those principles.45  
 
            Thinking through how concepts and principles relate to these 
issues involves two distinct tasks. The conceptual work consists in 
identifying whether particular set of affairs or set of objects can be 
accurately described by certain concepts.46 For example, having an 
understanding of what the concept of democracy entails means that 
                                                          
The point here is rather that principled objections are not refuted by empirical data 
alone, not that the empirical world bears no relation to them. 
44 Annabelle Lever, for example, suggests that voting in secret is important for non-
empirical reasons. See Lever 2015.  
45 This is not exhaustive. It might also be that the practice is justified because the 
benefits override the principled objections.  
46 This obviously depends on which view one takes concerning concepts. It might be 
that they are merely useful rather than accurate.  
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political systems can be categorized as democratic or not democratic.47 
The application of principles is a different process. Normative 
principles have propositional content while concepts do not. Such 
normative content typically includes prescriptive statements like 
obligation, permissibility, legitimate, warranted, good or bad.48 As 
Christian List and Laura Valentini point out, concepts by themselves 
tell us little about whether that concept describes something that we 
should value or strive to realize. The concept of democracy is useful for 
evaluating whether a given form of government is structured 
democratically; it tells us nothing about whether this is important or not. 
To understand why we ought to organize political systems in a 
democratic manner requires normative evaluation.49 
 
This kind of normative work is central to this dissertation. For 
example, the two first papers, ‘Deliberative Democracy and the Secret 
Ballot’ and ‘Publicity and the Ethics of Political Representation’ apply 
normative considerations to secret democratic participation. The former 
suggests that some of the central ideals of deliberative democracy run 
counter to the practice of secretive voting. The latter argues that the 
                                                          
47 List & Valentini 2016. We do not mean to imply that this process is easy. 
Democracy is a difficult concept so it might not be straightforwardly easy to determine 
whether a political system is democratic or not.   
48 List & Valentini 2016, 10-11.  
49 This ‘ought’ can be cashed out in different ways. Proceduralism holds, roughly, that 
democratic procedures have intrinsic value and, as such, democracy is valuable 
regardless of the outcomes it tends to produce. Instrumentalism holds, roughly, that 
democratic decision-making is valuable because of the outcomes it tends to produce 
– for example: social stability, economic flourishment, the upholding of human rights 
etc.   
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normative conditions of accountability of representatives can be 
extended to include electors and this constitutes a prima facie reason 
for publicity on their behalf. Similarly, ‘Voting, Privacy, and Electoral 
Autonomy’ examines the link between privacy and democratic 
participation. These are central ways of articulating the normative 
foundation for the appropriateness of secrecy on behalf of citizens and 
they are ways of thinking through the implications of this for 
democratic participation.  
 
Likewise, the normative work also consists in evaluating what 
kind of justification there is for secrecy and the kind of potential harms 
public voting can cause. As mentioned, it is important to distinguish 
between intrinsic and instrumental forms of justification. In ‘Who Let 
The Votes Out’ I make the case that there is a potential epistemic upshot 
to public voting. By distinguishing between intrinsic and instrumental 
worries, we can separate the kinds of harms that are introduced by 
public voting. I argue in that paper that the worries about public voting 
are instrumental in nature, and, because of this, they will have to be 
weighed against the possible epistemic benefits of public voting.50 If 
there were strong intrinsic objections to public voting, then I would not 
be able to isolate the empirical variables and suggest that these variables 
are important for judging whether public voting is appropriate. I would 
                                                          
50 I cannot make the case here that there are no non-instrumental worries. In “Who 
Let the Votes Out” I also do not argue the case that there are no non-instrumental 
worries. Instead, I posit that the traditional and widespread worries often expressed 
are typically instrumental in nature.  
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have, as mentioned, to appeal to reasons why the intrinsic case is (also) 
flawed in some way.  
 
3.2  IDEAL VS NON-IDEAL THEORY  
 
            It is relevant here to briefly comment on the distinction between 
ideal and non-ideal theory. It is both tempting and sometimes necessary 
to abstract away or idealize certain circumstances to isolate and think 
though certain normative issues. This process is not without potential 
problems and it, in particular, raises the issue of whether normative 
theorizing becomes idealized in a problematic sense. Laura Valentini 
has suggested that at least three distinct issues are being pursued in the 
ideal vs non-ideal debate.51 First, ideal-theory may mean full 
compliance while non-ideal may concern partial compliance. If the 
ideal vs non-ideal debate is conceived in these terms, then the focus is 
on “… the question of what duties and obligations apply to us in 
situations of partial compliance as opposed to situations of full 
compliance.” (Valentini 2012, 654). Second, ideal and non-ideal may 
refer to utopian and realistic. Understanding the discussion in these 
terms means that the ideal and non-ideal debate concerns whether there 
are feasibility constraints on normative theorizing. Third, ideal and non-
ideal may be understood as ‘end-state’ and ‘transitional’ theory. This 
debate focuses “… on the question of whether a normative political 
theory should aim at identifying an ideal of societal perfection, or 
                                                          
51 Valentini 2012. 
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whether it should focus on transitional improvements without 
necessarily determining what the ‘optimum’ is.” (Valentini 2012, 654).  
 
The potential worry about idealization that I have described 
concerns the second issue listed here. If normative theorizing about this 
issue is utopian in a problematic sense, it becomes too far-removed 
from contemporary political and social reality to be feasible.  
 
While I obviously cannot do any justice to the substantial debate 
on ideal and non-ideal theory, let me briefly consider a couple of ways 
in which this issue relates to the specific argumentative structure of the 
papers.  One way to engage in idealization is to imagine Utopia. 
  
Utopia is a democracy that has succeeded in eliminating 
social and economic inequality. Utopia has very strong, 
well-functioning and well-funded public and civic 
institutions. Utopia also uses a public form of voting. In 
Utopia, public voting does not result in any widespread 
form of coercion, vote-buying or equivalent illicit activity.  
                  
            Here, Utopia is not a theory nor is it a normative principle. It is 
description of a hypothetical empirical situation. I use this scenario in 
‘Who Let the Votes Out’ in order to exclude a certain set of concerns. 
My objective there is, as mentioned, to consider the epistemic 
dimensions of public voting, and so I use Utopia to make explicit that I 
am not evaluating the potential harmful instrumental outcomes of 
AN OPEN DEMOCRACY 
44 
public voting. This form of ideal is not part of theory itself nor is it 
necessary that Utopia exist for public voting ever to viable.  
 
            We can add a normative justification for public voting that goes 
along with this scenario. Imagine that A argues that the interpersonal 
accountability that arises after voting in public is valuable. A proclaims 
that disclosing voting-choices and – in good faith – justifying one’s 
choice to others is a sign of respect for others and constitutive of a 
valuable form of political community.  Because of this, A believes that 
public voting should be implemented if the empirical circumstances are 
the same as they are in Utopia. Notice, then, that while the conditions 
of A’s justification are idealized, this does not imply that the normative 
principle itself is flawed. A may be right in identifying a value of the 
kind of interpersonal accountability and political community of 
electors. The fact that the empirical conditions are idealized does not 
imply that the value or principle itself is wrongheaded. Part of the 
objective of this dissertation concerns thinking about the values and 
principles that relate to these issues. While the specific empirical 
circumstances that relate to these issues are certainly important, their 
idealization does not undermine the principles themselves.  
 
            There are further possible specifications of what is actually 
problematic about ideal theory. It is possible that the problem is not that 
theories of justice are too fact-insensitive, but that such theories do not 
include more fact-sensitive principles such as peace, security, 
45 
democracy etc.52 It is also possible that the problem is not that ideal 
theory is too far removed from contemporary political and social 
reality, but simply that too much political philosophy engages in ideal 
theory.53 These issues will venture far outside the context of the specific 









                                                          
52 Valentini 2012, 659. 
53 This is how Estlund understands Charles Mill’s criticism. Estlund suggests that 
Mill’s criticism is essentially that ideal theory plays too big a role in political 
philosophy. This has been to the exclusion of normative thinking that engages more 
directly with issues of inequality, racism, structural injustice etc. See Estlund 2019, 
16-7.  
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4.1 DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE SECRET BALLOT: 
CAN WE HAVE BOTH?  
 
The main objective of this paper is to evaluate whether the ideals 
of deliberative democracy are in tension with the practice of secret 
voting. This approach provides a normative framework for evaluating 
secret voting and it provides an overview of how normative theories of 
deliberative democracy connect with secret voting. I discuss three 
potential areas of tension. Each describes how some of the ideals of 
deliberative democracy are in tension with the practice of secret voting. 
The three areas are the following:  
 
a) The Justificatory Tension 
This area of tension concerns, on the one hand, the requirements 
of justification and accountability on behalf of citizens (and 
representatives) who make political decisions through voting – 
and, on the other hand, secretive voting, in which such 
justification and accountability is made more difficult. 
 
b) The Self-Regarding Tension 
One deliberative virtue is that of being deliberatively engaged 
with the views, arguments and preferences of others. Public 
voting is more conducive and in line with this view of 
democratic participation.  
 
c) Sincerity objection 
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Sincerity is a deliberative virtue. Being insincere can be a way 
of treating democratic deliberation in a self-serving and 
strategic way. This is in tension with the secret ballot, because 
there is little incentive for electors to vote on behalf of their 
expressed and publicly defended viewpoints. 
 
I argue that a) and b) spell out substantial areas of tension while 
c), in the end, does not. I then suggest that one way to minimize the 
tension described in a) and b) is to adopt an epistemic approach to 
deliberation. By doing so, the value of deliberation consists in 
producing epistemic benefits by having the (right kind) of deliberative 
interchange. If this is the goal, then the deliberative value of 
justification as expressed in a) and of incentivizing other-regarding 
voting expressed in b) is conducive to the deliberative ideal of 
democratic participation if they produce certain epistemic benefits. This 
means that a) and b) are only areas of tension insofar as the deliberation 
that precedes or follows from electors justifying themselves is 
epistemically beneficial. However, this implies that the (epistemic) 
deliberative case against the secret ballot is understated. What needs to 
argued is that not only is there an increase in deliberation, but that there 
is an increase in the right kind of deliberation.  
 
Lessening the tension in this way works by adopting an 
epistemic approach to the ideals of deliberative democracy. If the 
deliberative virtues of justification and other-regarding are thought to 
have non-epistemic value, then the tension persists.  
49 
4.2 PUBLICITY AND THE ETHICS OF POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION 
 
This paper lays out part of the central normative framework for 
thinking about the concept of public voting for citizens. Its fundamental 
aim is to argue that the demand for publicity of representatives also 
(although to a lesser degree) applies to the decision-making of citizens. 
I present a range of different conceptions of how representatives ought 
to act towards the public – the delegate view, the trustee view and the 
hybrid view. I then describe the normative grounding of these 
conceptions. Here I turn to Richard Mulgan and Mark Warren, who 
suggest that central to the reason why it is normatively important that 
representatives are accountable in this way is that they decide on 
collectively binding issues. This is what Mulgan calls the principle of 
affected rights.54 The paper then proceeds to argue that if this is central 
to why representatives must be publicly accountable, then the same 
rationale can be applied to citizens voting in referendums. In 
referendums, citizens are also directly involved in the process of 
deciding on collectively binding issues. I offer a few examples to think 
about. One of them is proposition eight, the California referendum that 
banned same-sex marriage. If decisions that affect or diminish interests 
or rights are central to the accountability of the decision-makers, then it 
seems, prima facie, that this also attaches to proposition eight.  
                                                          
54 Mulgan 2003, 12-13.  
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I then tackle two important objections. The first is the 
institutional objection, which states that accountability on behalf of the 
electorate is misconceived because there are no institutional channels 
in which accountability can be exercised. I argue that this objection 
relies on the false assumption that accountability must function through 
institutional channels. We often exercise a kind of informal deliberative 
accountability on citizens who offer and proclaim their political views. 
This same kind of informal accountability can arise based on how 
citizens vote as well. It needs to appeal to the same kind of 
accountability that citizens exercise towards representatives (primarily 
through elections.) I label the second objection the representative 
objection. Representatives have certain obligations because they are 
representatives. The public can hold them to these obligations because 
representatives play a certain role. This does not apply to citizens, and 
so therefore, public accountability on their behalf is improper. I argue 
that this objection fails to acknowledge that electors can be accountable 
in ways that do not involve them playing the same role as 
representatives. Importantly, their accountability concerns them being 
engaged in decisions that have the same normative circumstances as 







4.3 WHO LET THE VOTES OUT? AN EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT 
FOR PUBLIC VOTING  
 
This paper makes an argument for the epistemic benefits of 
publicity in voting. It does so by identifying the different scattered 
paragraphs on the potential epistemic benefits of publicity in voting and 
combining these into one sustained argument. This involves the 
conceptual work of theoretically structuring the argument while also 
drawing on some of the relevant empirical data.  
 
The epistemic argument for publicity (EAP) suggests, in short, 
that because electors will have their voting-choices revealed, they will 
take steps to inform themselves on electoral issues and to think through 
their voting-choices. I draw on both Geoffrey Brennan and Phillip Pettit 
(1990) and Bart Engelen and Thomas Nys (2013) in making this 
argument. I call this incentive the knowledge procurement incentive. 
This incentive has two parts to it. One is that publicity will incentivize 
electors to inform themselves and the second is that it will incentivize 
the giving of public reasons. This argument faces a significant objection 
that has not been sufficiently discussed in the literature. I call this the 
conformity objection. The objection states that publicity will create 
conformity to the epistemic and political norms of the social 
surroundings of the electors, and these surroundings are not likely to 
foster the kind of epistemic enhancement that is valuable.55 Although 
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this objection can be formulated in different ways, I refer to the 
argument given by Bernard Manin.56 
 
I offer several different responses to this worry. For example, I 
argue that the conformity objection must differentiate between 
incentivizing voting on behalf of the common good and incentivizing 
information gathering. Even if one of these outcomes are not realized 
because of the conformist tendencies of electors, it does not follow that 
the other one also will not be realized. In addition, I argue that the 
conformity objection (argued by Manin) does not have to rely solely on 
whether the surroundings of electors are of the right kind. There is an 
internal dimension that incentivizes information seeking that is – to 
some extent – independent of the external interchange between electors. 
Lastly, I pay some attention to institutional design as a way of solving 
the issue of conformity. Some limited forms of publicity, like Brennan’s 
and Pettit’s model, might induce the right kind of information-seeking 
incentive without creating the kind of neutral or harmful behavior that 
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4.4 VOTING, PRIVACY, AND ELECTORAL AUTONOMY: A 
CRITIQUE OF THE DEMOCRATIC VALUE OF PRIVACY 
 
In this paper, I criticize two separate views. I label these the 
democratic value view and the institutional value view, respectively. 
The first view holds that privacy is important for democracy decision-
making. Privacy is important because it fosters the kind of autonomy 
that is valuable for democratic decision-making.57 The second view 
holds that the institution of private voting – that is, voting in isolated 
voting-booths is justified because of, or reflects, the kind of autonomy 
that is important for democratic decision-making. Therefore, the first 
view concerns a normative value and the second view concerns 
institutionalizing this value. 
 
The central issue with the democratic value view is that there is 
a problematic inference from the value of privacy for the lives of 
citizens to privacy having the same (kind of) value for political 
participation. To illustrate, Reiman argues that privacy is important for 
creating and maintaining autonomy.58 However, when applied to the 
realm of voting and deliberation, it is not clear that this is by itself 
valuable. I argue this point by considering electors who vote 
autonomously but in an uninformed or morally arbitrary way. In 
addition, the value of privacy for citizens, according to this view, is that 
                                                          
57 Brettschneider 2007; Reiman 1995; Cohen 2013, 1912-8; Cohen 2000; Susser, 
Roessler, & Nissenbaum 2018, 3; Nissenbaum 2010, 177. 
58 Reiman 1995. 
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it allows for citizens to withdraw from public, social pressure. While 
public pressure can certainly diminish the actions of individuals in a 
problematic may, it does not follow that the same kind of pressure is – 
in the circumstances of democratic decision-making – also problematic. 
It might be that such public pressure will cause political actors to 
reconsider or withhold action.59  
 
I then argue that the institutional value view does little to justify 
the contemporary use of the secret ballot at all. I offer three arguments 
for this conclusion. The first argument is that there is no clear 
connection between autonomy and private voting. There are countless 
ways of protecting the autonomous preferences of citizens: why then 
should we adopt this form of voting rather than a host of other 
possibilities for protecting autonomy? Secondly, I argue that the 
institutional value view misconstrues privacy as anonymity. Acting in 
private is not identifiable with acting anonymously. I might retreat to 
the quiet countryside because I have to make an important decision and 
I want to make the decision uninfluenced. This does not entail that 
others do not know that it was me who made the decision. It is therefore 
difficult to argue that the value of privacy justifies or is reflected in 
secret voting. There can be public forms of voting (non-anonymity) 
with the voting taking place in private. Third, the institutional value 
                                                          
59 In the context of the paper, a political actor is someone who donates money to the 
controversial political cause of climate change denial. This example is called: “The 
Autonomous Climate-Change Denier.”  
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view does not justify that privacy is mandatory. A system with optional 
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4.5 COMPULSION, SECRECY, AND PAPER: A BAD 
COMBINATION WHEN IT COMES TO VOTING  
 (Jens Damgaard Thaysen, Rasmus Uhrenfeldt and Jørn Sønderholm)  
 
We argue in this paper that there is a moral issue with the 
combination of the three circumstances of voting: (i) it is compulsory, 
(i) it is secret, (iii) it utilizes paper ballots. A political system that 
incorporates these three is committed to unequal enforcement of one of 
its laws. Because the ballot is secret, officials cannot know whether 
electors have cast a valid vote. A compulsory, secret system can 
therefore penalize those who fail to show up at the polls and not 
penalize those who show up and who do not cast a valid vote. We argue 
that failing to show up at the polling booth and showing up but not 
casting a valid vote are, with respect to compulsory voting, morally 
comparable actions. Both of these fail to do the required actions of 
casting a valid vote. Since political systems with the features mentioned 
above only penalize the individuals who fail to show up, they enforce 
this law unequally. This is, furthermore, a guaranteed outcome. A 
system that is compulsory and secretive is designed in such a way that 
penalization is unequally distributed.  
 
We proceed to discuss three different possible solutions. One solution 
is to change the law such that it requires mandatory attendance rather 
than mandatory voting. While this is a promising solution, it would be 
a revision of both some of the claims of advocates of compulsory voting 
57 
and also a revision of the law in some of the countries that have a 
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4.6 NOT SO SECRET AFTER ALL: HOW BIG DATA 
THREATENS THE SECRET BALLOT AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 
(Jakob Mainz, Rasmus Uhrenfeldt)  
 
In this paper, we look into some of the implications that data 
collection has for the possibility of voting in secret. Specifically, we 
argue that big data threatens the secret ballot because it makes it 
possible to make probabilistic inferences about past electoral choices 
with high degrees of certainty. We then discuss three different policy 
proposals that might accommodate this problem.60 What is interesting 
about this issue is, in part, the fact that voting-choices are inferred 
probabilistically rather than revealed directly. In the paper, we illustrate 
this difference in the following way: imagine that Billy looks into 
Smith’s private medical records and notices that Smith has diabetes. By 
doing this, Billy has directly come to know of Smith’s condition. 
Imagine instead that Billy has thousands of data-points on Smith and, 
from these, he infers that Smith has diabetes. The unveiling of votes 
through Big Data Analytics is analogous to the second way in which 
Billy comes to ‘know’ of Smith’s condition. Importantly, we argue in 
the paper that probabilistic inference is still a threat to the secret ballot, 
even though voting-choices are not revealed directly. One potential 
reason for holding the view that there is a relevant difference between 
these cases is that there is an element of plausible deniability when 
                                                          
60 We aim to remain agnostic throughout the paper about whether the worries about 
public voting are legitimate worries.   
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something is inferred rather than directly observed. Even though Billy 
has inferred that Smith has diabetes, Smith is able to deny that this is 
so. Smith is not able to deny it if Billy has seen Smith’s medical records. 
We argue, however, that plausible deniability does not settle the issue. 
For example, if there is a video camera located in the voting-booths that 
shows a false recording 30% of the time, every elector will have 
plausible deniability. Each can claim that their voting-choice was not 
observed because their footage is the fake footage. Even though these 
electors have plausible deniability, it seems that the secret ballot in this 
instance is not just threatened but also violated.  
 
        We then proceed to discuss three policy proposals that might 
combat this threat to the secret ballot: (i) prohibition of data sharing, (ii) 
prohibition of certain algorithms, (iii) prohibition of for-profit use. We 
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5 SOME GENERAL CONCLUDING 
REMARKS  
 
        The different papers have common themes but each paper has a 
distinct topic. They each have specific conclusions concerning their 
specific topics. Instead of merely describing each of these six specific 
conclusions, I want here to describe some more general conclusions that 
pertain to all the papers.  
 
         One general conclusion that these papers point to is that the 
normative literature on democratic decision-making has substantial 
resources that can be applied to the issue of public voting for citizens. 
These resources include views on the obligations of electors and 
representatives, epistemic benefits of publicity, and views on privacy.  
These can be extended to the issue of public voting in order to 
conceptualize and justify one coherent philosophical picture of this 
form of democratic participation. This picture can function as part of a 
normative starting-point or basis concerning reasons for publicity on 
behalf of electors. I have been careful throughout this dissertation not 
to recommend the practical implementation of any such system since 
its justifiability will also rely on the instrumental outcomes it produces. 
Making the claim that public voting is, all things considered, justified 
would have to involve a delineation of the harmfulness of the 
instrumental outcomes. It would have to say something to the effect that 
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the instrumental outcomes are not serious enough or that the 
instrumental outcomes do not result in the kind of harm that can justify 
the secret ballot. Although I have discussed these issues, the overall 
objective of dissertation has not been to conceptualize the different 
kinds of instrumental outcomes and render a verdict when they are 
sufficiently harmful to warrant the practice of secret voting.   
 
Another general conclusion worth mentioning is that public voting 
is deserving of even more academic attention. In the papers, I present 
some normative challenges to the secret ballot and I also argue that 
some of the justifications for the value of secrecy suffer some issues.61 
There is room for improving these justifications and room for 
expanding and improving the normative challenges to secrecy. This will 




                                                          
61 The normative challenges appear in: “Deliberative Democracy and the Secret 
Ballot” and “Publicity and the Ethics of Political Representation”. I discuss some of 
the weaknesses in the justifications for the practice in: “Privacy, Voting, And 
Electoral Autonomy” and “Compulsion, Secrecy and Paper: A Bad Combination 
When it Comes to Voting.” 
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6 LOOKING AHEAD 
  
It is inevitable that a dissertation like this leaves some issues and 
questions unexamined and unanswered. Part of the process of 
understanding an issue is recognizing how much there is still to 
consider. Here I briefly mention two areas that call for further research. 
The first area concerns the issues that spring directly from this 
dissertation and that warrant further investigation. They are issues that, 
if answered, would tell us something important about the themes of this 
dissertation and could help answer the questions raised by this 
dissertation. The second area concerns further, separate issues that bear 
an indirect relation to the themes of this dissertation.  
 
6.1 DECISIONAL PRIVACY  
One interesting way of approaching these issue is to apply the 
act of voting (and comparable political actions) to the notion of 
decisional privacy. Decisional privacy typically designates a sphere of 
decision-making that is free from oversight and scrutiny from both the 
state and the public.62 Relegating some actions or behaviors to the realm 
of decisional privacy entails that “... no further explanations are owed 
to other people concerning these decisions or modes of behavior.” 
(Roessler 2005, 80). We can apply the issue of voting to the notion of 
decisional privacy in two ways. First, there is the question of whether 
                                                          
62 Brettschneider 2007, 71; Rossler 2005, 80; Koops et al. 2017. 
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electors owe others (and whom) a justification of their voting-choices. 
If they do, then their voting-choices should not be seen as belonging to 
the realm of decisional privacy. Second, if A’s voting is within A’s 
decisional privacy, then unveiling A’s vote (by use of public voting) 
with the intention of making A accountable to B, is an intrusion into 
A’s decisional privacy. A could rightly claim that it is none of B’s 
business.  
 
The first issue concerns the obligations of voters and the second 
issue concerns the institution of public voting. In this way, the issues of 
decisional privacy revolve around a normative issue – designating 
which acts and decisions are in the legitimate interests of others – that 
is centrally important to the discussion of public voting. When thinking 
about the issue of voting within the context of decisional privacy, the 
guiding question becomes who is entitled, and why, to know of the 
voting-choices of citizens, and who is entitled to have voting-choices 
justified to them. Put differently, the issue is when the voting of A is 
anyone else’s legitimate business. Philosophers and political scientists 
alike have discussed these issues, although such discussions are not 
always explicitly described as an issue of decisional privacy.63 The 
notion of decisional privacy can potentially be helpful for evaluating 
whether (and when) voting should fall under this category.  
                                                          
63 Urbinati 2002, 110; Yack 2012, 167. Waldron also holds a view that has some 
similarities with this. He writes: “… as a general rule, transparency is required, and 
people are entitled to insist on it. We are not required (or permitted) to subject each 
other to this scrutiny, but we are permitted to apply it to our rulers.”  (Waldron 2010, 
194) 
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6.2 FURTHER ISSUES  
 
6.2.1  PRIVACY AND POLITICAL BELIEFS 
 
One larger issue that is of both philosophical and practical 
interest is the relation between privacy and the political lives of 
citizens.64 One potentially interesting connection is to think about how 
claims to privacy might be instrumentally useful for avoiding political 
polarization. If politics comes to play a divisive role in society and 
communication across political lines becomes highly difficult, being 
able to keep one’s political life private might become increasingly 
valuable. Robert Talisse has recently argued that part of the value of 
democratic decision-making is that citizens are also able to lead non-
political lives and engage in non-political relations.65 It seems prima 
facie plausible that privacy can be helpful for such objectives. Being 
able to control who (and perhaps whether) others can know of one’s 
political beliefs might be a way of reducing polarization and keeping 
politics from consuming and infiltrating non-political activities. It 
might prove useful for cultivating and creating non-political relations. 
The larger connection between the political life of citizens and the value 
of privacy and the specific connection between political polarization 
and privacy is one that warrants further examination. As mentioned, 
                                                          
64 ‘Political lives’ here refers to the political activities and the political beliefs of 
citizens.  
65 Talisse 2020.  
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while this is of philosophical interest, it is of utmost relevance in the 
current political climate and is likely to remain so in the near future.  
 
6.2.2 NEW CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY  
 
New conceptions of democracy also involve issues of 
institutional design. Expanding the role of citizens in politics will 
involve not only the altering of traditional institutional political 
schemes but also the addition of new ones. These new institutional 
schemes can involve mini-public, citizen assemblies, deliberative 
polling or more deliberative voting-systems. The issue of publicity is 
important for thinking about the institutional design of these systems. 
That is, why and how are the political actors in these engagements to 
deliberate and vote in public – and which kinds of effects might this 
publicity have in these specific circumstances? It seems safe to say that 
any potential beneficial results will be dependent on the specific forum 
or the specific voting system. It becomes increasingly important to think 
about how publicity will contribute to the legitimacy of citizen rule or 
to the epistemic benefits of these (new) kinds of decision-making. I 
hope that parts of this dissertation can be extended to these areas and 
perhaps contribute some of the normative and conceptual framework 
required for discussing these issues.
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Both? Three Areas of Tension
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Abstract: Recently, Bart Engelen and Thomas Nys have offered an analysis of some of the non-
deliberative properties of the secret ballot. This marks an interesting theoretical approach that 
I will build upon in this paper. I do this by identifying and discussing three areas of tension 
between deliberative ideals and secretive voting. I divide these areas into three separate 
categories – which I label the justificatory tension, the self-regarding tension, and the sincerity 
tension. I argue that both the justificatory tension and the self-regarding tension signify 
substantial areas of tension between the current practice of secretive voting and some of the 
ideals within deliberative democracy. In the last section of the paper, I argue that one way to 
reduce the tension between the practice of secretive voting and deliberative ideals is to adopt 
an epistemic approach to deliberation.
Key words: deliberative democracy, secret ballot, public voting, ethics of voting. 
Thomas Nys and Bart Engelen have recently argued that the practice of secretive 
voting is in tension with some of the values often encouraged within the theory 
of deliberative democracy (2013). For reasons I will describe shortly, this is a very 
interesting approach to adopt when analyzing our current practice of secretive voting. 
The approach that Engelen and Nys take is, self-admittedly, not an attempt to develop an 
extensive comparison between the theory of deliberative democracy and the secret ballot. 
(2013, 495). Instead, they use deliberative principles as their starting point for a critical 
evaluation of voter secrecy. It is my objective in this paper to provide some of what they 
have omitted, namely, an in-depth and more theoretically specific discussion of the relation 
between the secret ballot and deliberative democracy. That is, I try to argue how certain 
specific commitments in the theory of deliberative democracy ought to make us skeptical 
of the process of secretive voting. This approach is interesting for several reasons. First of 
all, it is surprising that one of the universal institutional structures in liberal democracies 
– secretive voting – has not undergone any full-fledged, systematic normative analysis 
from the vantage point of the ideals of deliberative democracy. This is striking, in part, 
due to the individual importance of both deliberative democracy and the secret ballot. 
The secret ballot, as an institutional design, is enshrined in Article 21 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and is at the center of the procedural workings of modern 
democratic systems of voting for citizens. Article 21, (3) states: “The will of the people shall 
be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret 
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.” (Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948) Secondly, in the world of democratic theory, deliberative democracy is a major, 
and central, theoretical apparatus which commands the attention of several influential 
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scholars. (Elster, 2003; Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, 2004; Cohen, 1997; Bohman, 
2000.) If there is real tension between a major theoretical framework, such as deliberative 
democracy, and the widespread form of secretive voting, then this seems worth exploring 
– if nothing else, so as to lay bare the reasons why such a tension is currently to be accepted 
as a political reality.1
From here on, my approach is the following. First, I will shortly describe some of 
the core normative features of deliberative democracy. I then identify and discuss three 
areas of tension between deliberative democracy and the secret ballot. The first tension 
concerns voter justification, the second self-regarding voting, and the third sincerity in 
voting. After arguing that these three aspects are in tension with the practice of secretive 
voting, I proceed to discuss various objections to the existence of these tensions. I conclude 
that these objections fail for various reasons, but that one way to relieve the tension is to 
adopt an epistemic approach to deliberative democracy.
I. W H AT IS DELIBER ATI V E DEMOCR ACY? 
Deliberative democracy is a vast theoretical enterprise designating a multitude 
of normative positions and principles (Elster 2003; Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 
2004; Cohen 1997; Bohman 2000). On a fundamental level, it is a theoretical view that 
emphasizes the importance of justifying public policy with reasons acceptable to all who 
are bound by those policies. Justifying the exercise of political power is to be done on the 
basis of reasoning among free and equal citizens (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 52, 
Cohen 1997, 412).
One way to identify some of the values of the deliberative model is to contrast it with 
an aggregative model. On one influential understanding of these two models, voting is the 
mere aggregation of fixed preferences, while deliberation seeks to base political decisions 
on the collective and preference-altering nature of public deliberation (Elster 2003). That is, 
deliberation attends to the formation and justification of preferences, while aggregation 
compiles individual political preferences, typically through a voting process. 
In this paper, what I want to draw attention to is not the general relationship 
between voting and deliberation, but the secretive aspect of voting and its relationship with 
deliberation. Secrecy is a distinct feature of voting that adds to the normative worries 
highlighted by deliberative theorists. It is those worries to which I will soon turn. However, 
in order to gain some conceptual precision for the analysis to come, I will first describe 
two different conceptions of the value of deliberative democracy as this will become 
important in the latter part of this paper. The first concerns political legitimacy, and the 
second concerns epistemic benefits.2 For my purposes, this distinction between the 
1]  This is obviously not a tension felt by all, since not everybody ascribes to the principles of 
deliberative democracy.
2] This distinction does not imply that these two conceptions can always be kept separate. For 
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legitimacy approach and the epistemic approach to deliberative democracy is important. 
It is important because I will argue that the tension between the ideals of deliberative 
democracy and the secret ballot does not concern not a tension between an epistemic 
approach to deliberation and voter secrecy.
Legitimacy:
Joshua Cohen locates part of the central value of deliberation in the relation between 
the legitimacy of political outcomes and the deliberative activities of those who are bound 
by such outcomes. He writes: “In particular, outcomes are democratically legitimate if and 
only if they could be the object of a free and reasoned agreement among equals. The ideal 
deliberative procedure is a procedure that captures this principle.” (Cohen 1997, 73). The 
free exchange of reasons, in which citizens partake, aims to establish the legitimacy of the 
outcome of the democratic process. These outcomes are to result from the free exchange 
of ideas, arguments, and justifications about what constitutes the common good of a 
given society. Since political decisions are binding on all, the legitimacy of the outcomes 
should, therefore, consist of the deliberation of all (Manin 1987, 352). Another value 
that the deliberative approach emphasizes is the respect citizens are shown when they are 
afforded a fair hearing in the deliberative process both preceding and following policy-
formation. By letting people have their say in a deliberative interchange, their standing to 
make claims or offer reasons is acknowledged, and they are therefore being respected in a 
morally substantial way (Chambers 2017, 268). 
Epistemic Approach:
Some also locate the value of deliberation in the epistemic benefits it can provide. For 
example, if participants, through the giving of arguments and the weighing of evidence, 
produce more accurate beliefs, then this is an epistemic benefit of the deliberative 
interchange (Peter 2016, 142). On one view, the deliberative model can be seen as a 
truth-tracking procedure, which functions properly when it provides increasingly reliable 
information about the proper or morally right outcomes of democratic processes. Such a 
view entails, roughly, that there are right and wrong answers to some political questions, 
and public deliberation is one reliable way in which we can come to some approximation 
of these answers (Landemore 2017, 284). Deliberation might accomplish this on the basis 
of enlarging the pools of ideas and information, weeding out bad arguments and leading 
to consensus on the most reasonable outcome (Landemore 2012, 97). This, however, 
does not imply that consensus is thought of as a requirement in order for there to be an 
epistemic benefit to deliberative procedures. It might be that even if disagreement persists, 
the deliberative process sheds light on the reasons for the disagreement and therefore 
knowledge as to why the disagreement has yet to be solved. 
example, one can hold that political decisions are only legitimate insofar as they are, to a certain degree, 
epistemically justified.
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II. DELIBER ATION A N D (SECR ETI V E) VOTING
The relationship between the principles of deliberation and the existence of 
majoritarian decision-procedures (i.e., voting) is a complicated one. It is, however, not 
difficult to see why deliberative democrats may regard secretive voting as problematic. 
This may stem from a more fundamental uneasiness between deliberation and voting 
in general. Jeremy Waldron sums up quite nicely what such uneasiness can consist of: 
“Voting shifts us from the qualitative consideration of substance to sheer quantitative 
business of seeing which proposition enjoys the support of the greatest number.” 
(Waldron 1999, 212). 
If what we value is the substance of the public arguments and viewpoints that are put 
forward in the democratic dialogue, then voting may be seen as a rather crude form of 
decision-making. It collectivizes our individual preferences, giving no special attention 
to what these preferences are, how they are formed, and whether they’re justified. The 
crudeness of this aggregation of preferences consists, at least in part, in treating each 
and every input the same. The fact that voting is also secret only seems to add to this 
crudeness. Not only are individual preferences undifferentiated, but they are also tallied 
up anonymously – meaning that it is difficult to hold citizens accountable for their act of 
political influence, and to call upon them to justify themselves. If we are convinced that 
the exercise of power should be justified to the citizenry, that wielders of power should 
be accountable, and that choosing our leaders should be based on publicly debated 
reasons, then it is not initially difficult to see why we might be worried about with the 
non-deliberative and non-justificatory structure of voting secrecy.3
III. CL A R IF Y ING THE A RGU M ENT
As mentioned, I will structure the following discussion by building on some 
recent arguments and observations made by Bart Engelen and Thomas Nys (2013). 
To put their argument into context, it is important to note that they are not proposing 
that a commitment to deliberative principles implicates – in any form – the abolition 
of the secret ballot. Nys and Engelen discuss many substantial potential problems that 
accompany certain forms of public voting. For example, an open system will yield strong 
social pressure on those who are socially and economically least well off. This will lead 
to voter abstention, which will threaten the inclusive ideal of democratic participation 
(Engelen and Nys 2013, 501–2). Other worries include the possibility of citizens yielding 
to social conformity, or the possibility of an increase in political polarization, in which 
citizens become more staunch and unflinching in their political convictions (Engelen 
and Nys 2013, 501). I agree that these are considerable problems, which would need to 
3] Some praise the inclusive and egalitarian aspects of voting. (Mansbridge et al 2010, 85). This form 
of equal inclusivity – Mansbridge and others point out – “[...] makes a statement of equal respect parallel to, 
but qualitatively different from, the respect accorded by listening in deliberation.” (Mansbridge et al 2010, 85)
Rasmus Uhrenfeldt 31
be acknowledged if one is to make an argument for the practical implementation of some 
form of public voting. However, this paper is an analysis of how some of the ideals and 
principles of the deliberative model are in tension with the current and widespread form 
of secretive voting. In other words, the normative principles within deliberative theory 
should lead us to be very skeptical of the use of secretive voting.4 The fact that public 
voting may currently be infeasible does not defeat the purpose of such inquiry. One way 
of seeking out potential problems with our current institutions is by seeing how they fall 
short of normative ideals.5 Also, there are multiple circumstances relating to the process 
of voting, which might, potentially, be made more deliberative. Understanding how the 
current process of secretive voting holds up to the ideals of deliberative democracy is 
useful in exploring such circumstances. 
I V. THR EE A R E A S OF TENSION
4.1. The Justificatory Tension
So, in what sense are the principles of deliberative democracy in tension with the 
secret ballot? First, Engelen and Nys stress that one of the central normative commitments 
of deliberative theory concerns the justification of our public policies to those who are 
bound by them. They state, for example, that: “[...] it is not sheer numbers, but the views 
and arguments of citizens that should matter in a democracy. Democratic politics is about 
justifying the exercise of power by means of reasons that all citizens can reasonably be 
expected to endorse.” (Engelen and Nys 2013, 495). As Engelen and Nys point out, under 
a secretive system, voters experience little in terms of an incentive to justify or explain 
themselves. One of the problematic aspects of voter-secrecy, then, is that it helps to shield 
each voter from potential deliberative pressure of giving some explanation or justification 
for how they vote (Engelen and Nys 2013, 497). With no verifiable way to hold people to 
account for how they vote, they can cast their ballot however they like, for any reason they 
like. Now, this is obviously also possible in a non-secretive system, in which people can 
still vote for whatever reason they feel like. What seems to make up the central difference 
for Engelen and Nys is that secrecy denies us the possibility of actually knowing how people 
vote. If people actually were to know, they could hold others accountable for their choices 
in the voting booth. 
It is important to distinguish two ways in which this will increase the deliberative 
circumstances of voting. First, citizens can now engage each-other after elections, and 
they can demand a justification – they will be able to say: “You voted for x, explain 
4] There is a slight terminological clarification to be made here: when it is suggested that some 
principles are in tension with some practice, it does not mean that those principles are therefore themselves 
endorsed. It means, instead, that if one endorses those principles, then these areas of tension arise. 
5] Engelen and Nys also use it to show how demanding deliberative principles are for citizens. 
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yourself!” Such an interchange could, presumably, continue even after the election is 
over. Second, this will also create an increase in the internal deliberative workings of 
the voters before the election, since they now can reasonably expect to be asked to justify 
themselves. They will thus be faced with an incentive to think – from the perspectives of 
others – about how they will explain themselves, which will mark an increase in internal 
deliberation.6 What I want to do now is to explicate how this tension relates directly 
to some of the core commitments of deliberative theory, and to draw some important 
distinctions based on this. 
In order to do this, consider the following description of the notion of reciprocity 
from Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson: “Reciprocity holds that citizens owe one 
another justifications for the mutually binding laws and public policies they collectively 
enact.” (2004, 98). Importantly, they add that very few traditions give the notion of 
reciprocity the same central role as it is afforded in deliberative democracy. (Gutmann 
and Thompson 2004, 98). Now, as they are formulated here, reciprocity and secrecy are 
not at odds with each other. It is certainly possible for citizens to offer justifications and 
reasons in a deliberative interchange, and then – assuming that deliberation does not 
yield agreement – use a majoritarian and (secretive) decision-mechanism. In this sense, 
secrecy and reciprocal justification are certainly not conceptually incompatible. Instead, 
the deliberative worry about voter secrecy is that voting is part of the process in which we 
choose not only political representatives but also public policy.
It is, therefore, proper to make the circumstances of the voting process more 
deliberative. On this view then, deliberation and voting co-exist: voting is an inherently 
non-deliberative way of (temporarily) ending the preceding deliberative interchange. 
What the position entails, instead, is a commitment to making the circumstances and 
the process of voting more deliberative by creating a greater incentive for deliberative 
interchanges and accountability on behalf of voters. By making the voting process 
more open, we are approximating the deliberative ideal that citizens should stand in a 
justificatory, reciprocal relationship with each other. Again, we can distinguish two 
dimensions of this claim. First, openness is conducive to an increase in both internal 
and external deliberative pressure, which can increase the public deliberative pressure 
on voters before and after elections. Second, openness makes voters accountable to each 
other, such that they must offer justifications for their acts of political influence. It is 
also important to note here that the value of voter justification can also be understood 
in several different ways. Justification may be valuable because it is instrumental in 
creating a valuable form of a political community. This form of a political community is 
one in which citizens show respect for each other when each seeks to justify the political 
influence they exert through voting. Secondly, voter justification may be epistemically 
valuable because it is conducive to creating better input for political decisions. On this 
second view, the value of an increase in justificatory deliberation consists in getting 
6] On the notion of internal deliberation, see Goodin 2000. 
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citizens to vote on the basis of the substantial arguments that ‘survive’ the justificatory 
process. The justificatory process is the process of internal reflection that voters undergo, 
and the justificatory exchanges they partake in with each other, before and after 
elections. The value of this deliberative increase consists of creating the best epistemic 
circumstances for citizens to cast their vote. I will explore this distinction in the last 
section of the paper. 
Let me summarize this first area of tension: if what is normatively important is the 
substance of the reasons and justifications we give each other, then a system that makes 
it possible for citizens to offer no justifications at all, let alone reasons that all citizens 
can reasonably be expected to endorse, leaves much to be desired.7 Again, it is certainly 
possible to value both the process of justification and also value secrecy. The tension 
that Engelen and Nys pinpoint, as I see it, is that secrecy de-incentivizes and reduces 
deliberative aspects of the voting process. Comparably, then, public voting is more 
conducive to at least some of the ideals of deliberative democracy. This tension can be 
labeled the justificatory-tension with secrecy.
4.1.1 Objections to the justificatory tension
 One way to mount a general counter to the justificatory tension is to argue that 
there is a second-order deliberative justification for the non-deliberative circumstances of 
voting. (Mansbridge et al. 2010, 88) For example, if the procedure of voting has undergone 
proper public justification, then the process retains deliberative legitimacy – even if the 
individual votes can be cast without giving a justification. Similarly, it can be argued that 
secretive voting retains deliberative legitimacy because the process of secretive voting 
has undergone the proper public deliberative justification, even if the individual votes 
have not.8 However, I do not believe that this response gets at the essential issue. First, 
the potential deliberative worry about secrecy is that the votes themselves are not exposed 
too much justificatory pressure. This worry seems to persist even if the procedure has 
undergone proper public justification. A slightly different proceduralist response to the 
justificatory tension is to suggest that as long as the proper deliberation has taken place, 
the outcomes are legitimate (Christiano 1996, 35). Again, I do not think this response 
poses a solution to the justificatory tension with secrecy.9 This is because the justificatory 
tension does not assert that outcomes are to be deemed illegitimate because they have 
been chosen in secret. Rather, the point is that the secretive procedure limits important 
parts of the deliberative scheme: that of justification for, and accountability of, political 
actions that are collectively binding. 
7] The non-deliberative structure of secret voting is also noticed by Frederick Schauer (1999, 20). 
8] Whether or not this process has been publicly decided upon is an empirical question that I, at 
present, cannot attend to. 
9] Nor is it directly intended to in this context. It is merely used as a possible objection. 
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Lastly, even if we do accept the procedural response, it only shows that we can 
make the procedures more deliberately justified, but it is not clear why we should not 
also make the votes themselves more deliberately justified.10
Moving away from procedural responses, we can question the justificatory tension 
with secrecy on more fundamental grounds. For example, Russel Hardin has argued 
that it is only public officials who should be expected to give reasons for their decisions 
and not citizens. It is inherent in the political role of public officials that the public can 
demand justifications, while citizens do not have such public obligations. (Hardin 
1999, 221-2) If deliberative democracy concerns only the relationship between public 
officials and citizens, then claiming that citizens should justify themselves [and their 
votes] is surely an unwarranted extension of the principles of deliberation. However, 
Hardin’s description of the obligations of deliberative democracy seems too restrictive. 
Indeed, as he himself notes, most normative theories of democracy place obligations 
of justification and accountability on behalf of public officials – surely, deliberative 
democracy must entail more than just this (Hardin 1999, 221).11 On a very influential 
account, the task of justification is quite explicitly given to both officials and citizens 
(Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 52). Hardin is, of course, right in noticing that different 
obligations and demands of justification apply differently to citizens and public officials. 
However, citizens are most certainly to be included within the deliberative scheme, as 
it is their preferences, arguments, and proposals that the deliberative interchange seeks 
to establish and promote. 
Therefore, these objections are not successful in countering the tension between 
secrecy and deliberation. 
4.2. The Self-Regarding Tension
I will now turn to the second area of tension: the all-affecting nature of voting. 
How we act as a collective, especially in voting, is something that will impact the whole 
of society. We ought, therefore, to take into consideration the common good, instead 
of merely attending to our own personal preferences. This public-mindedness, also a 
virtue in deliberative democracy, is, according to Nys and Engelen – difficult to square 
with a secretive voting system. This is due to how secrecy makes voting a private act, 
while voting in public induces voters to attend to more public reasons for their vote 
(Engelen and Nys 2013, 496).
This privatization of motivation in voting runs counter to the public ideal of 
deliberation, in which citizens are to acknowledge and engage with other political 
actors to discover, or establish, what is of common interest to them. With an open vote, 
10]  This argument is similar to the argument Jonathan Quong  (2004) makes concerning the 
wide view of public reason.
11] Hardin leaves himself some room to ascribe obligations to citizens by saying ‘primarily’. Also, it is 
possible that deliberative democracy does entail more than this, but not more in terms of obligating citizens. 
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on the other hand, people can face inquiries, questions or demands for justification for 
how they vote. Since citizens can verifiably know how people vote under such a system, 
there will be a stronger incentive for voters to offer reasons that others can understand 
or acknowledge since purely self-regarding political preferences will be harder to defend 
publicly (Nys and Engelen 2013, 496).12 Due to this form of public deliberation, voters 
must think in terms of what other citizens are likely to appreciate or acknowledge. This 
pressures voters into adopting different viewpoints, enlarging the sense of what matters 
for the public good or society at large (Benhabib 1996, 72).
By making the voting process more deliberative in this way, there will be an increase 
in pressure to offer reasons in public, but also to offer reasons the content of which are 
public, in the sense of being acknowledged or understood by others. Obviously, there 
are empirical complexities that arise here. What if voters just conform to the prevailing 
social norms of their community? What if they cloak their essentially private interests 
as being ‘in the name of the common good’? These are important questions, but as of 
now, what is of interest is the claim that some of the principles of deliberative democracy 
are more aligned with that of giving other-regarding or common-good reasons. This 
can be labeled the self-regarding tension with voter secrecy.
4.2.1. Objections to the self-regarding tension
One principled response, then, is to question the role of these self-regarding 
reasons in deliberative democracy. Jane Mansbridge has, for example, argued that self-
interest has a legitimate place in democratic deliberation because it serves two important 
functions. By clarifying and exploring our private interests, we are identifying the 
different preferences that must be attended to when publicly deliberating on the common 
good – it thus helps to give us information about the particular interest that ‘go into’ the 
deliberative process. Second and more controversially, is the claim that self-interests are 
themselves justifications, and thus serve as reasons for implementing certain policies 
(Mansbridge et al. 2010, 73–74). Such an argument does not take us very far. The reason 
for this is that even if self-interest can play a legitimate deliberative role, they may continue 
to do so under public voting. So, even if we grant that self-interested reasons can serve as 
justifications, very little follows from this. The deliberative argument here must be that 
public voting is more conducive to the giving of public reasons – and this does not suggest 
that self-interested reasons can, or should, play no role in deliberative interchange.
There are, however, empirical reasons to be skeptical of the self-regarding tension. 
There is empirical data suggesting that citizens actually do not vote in self-regarding, or 
purely self-interested ways (Chong 2013, Funk 2000). Voting in secret, then, does not 
seem to purge us of altruistic or other-regarding concerns. This, however, only shows 
voters vote altruistically even when they do not vote publicly. This does not suggest that 
12]  See Brennan and Pettit 1990 for a similar argument. 
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public voting will not yield an increase in the public content of reasons and an increase in 
the amount of public discussion of voters.
4.3. The Sincerity Tension 
One last area of tension I want to highlight concerns sincerity. Engelen and Nys 
suggest that the secret ballot can be seen as a corrupting influence on democratic citizens, 
as there is something deceitful about keeping voting shrouded in secrecy ( 2013, 496). 
Although they do not explicate or develop this point much further, I believe that more 
can be said for it. I think we can elaborate on it by summarizing it as a concern about 
sincerity (Gardner 2010, 936). Under a secretive system, there is no way of knowing 
whether citizens actually ‘follow-through’ on their convictions, ideas or expressed 
standpoints. Secrecy, then, allows for voters to take a public stance, and then to vote for 
something completely different (Gardner 2011, 931-32). This, Gardner suggests, has 
implications for some normative conceptions of deliberation: 
“Deliberative theories tend strongly to disfavor insincerity because it is a form of 
strategic behavior that is thought to undermine true deliberative engagement and 
thus to impair the ability of deliberators to reach a genuine consensus.” (2011, 936) 
A similar concern has been expressed by Rawls, namely that “[...] public discourse 
runs the risks of being hypocritical: citizens talk before one another one way and vote 
another.” ( 2005, 215). 
How does insincerity pose a possible problem if we want to satisfy the conditions 
of deliberation? Prima facie, it is not difficult to initially see why sincerity is a deliberative 
virtue. If we want to have policies and legislative changes publicly justified to us, and have 
the arguments of citizens publically heard and acknowledged, then we need to know 
about the truthful opinions and real circumstances of the lives of citizens in order for 
the deliberative enterprise to establish or clarify the policies that should pertain to these 
citizens. Being insincere can be a way of treating the democratic forum as an opportunity 
to advance one’s interests on the basis of power or strategic manipulation, which runs 
counter to the normative ideal of trying to connect public policy to the outcomes of the 
honest argumentative back-and-forth of citizens. How, then, does insincerity pertain 
specifically to the question of secret voting? The worry, as stated above, is that secrecy 
allows for us to vote not on behalf of the preceding deliberative engagements, but for 
any reason – indeed, reasons that may run counter to our deliberative agreements or 
clarifications. Now, what does it mean to say that people can vote in a way that is not 
a continuation of the preceding deliberative interchange? I take it to mean that if we 
agree – through the use of public deliberation – that candidate A will best serve our 
interest, then the secrecy of the ballot allows for me to go vote for candidate B instead, 
thus not ‘carrying out’ the action that we agreed to be the best option. I have therefore 
been insincere in my public expressions of my support of candidate A, and this form of 
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insincerity is made possible because of the secrecy of the ballot.13 This can be labeled as 
the sincerity-tension with voter secrecy.
4.3.1. Objections to the sincerity tension
I do not think that sincerity presents as substantial a tension as either the 
justificatory or the self-regarding tension. I will here present some reasons why I believe 
this to be the case. 
First of all, it is not clear that it is voter secrecy that matters all that much in this 
instance. To better see this, contrast it with a public system. In a public system, you can, 
rightfully perhaps, impugn me for voting differently then what we publicly established 
to be the proper candidate. But, this does not show me to be insincere in the pre-voting 
process of the election. I may have come to realize that a different candidate is actually 
a better fit for the arguments and concerns we both deliberated on. Also, publicity in 
voting cannot – by itself – reveal what my reasons are for voting a certain way. They can 
only hide or publish how I vote. Open voting can only reveal that at least some of my reasons 
have changed, if my pre-election reasons included my desire to vote for A, and I ended up 
voting for B instead.  
Lastly, there is a question concerning the size of the group doing the deliberation. 
Following Gardner, what is worrisome about insincerity is the strategic element of it 
(Gardner 2011, 931-32). This seems like a legitimate worry in smaller-scale settings. To 
better see this, imagine a small group of people facing a decision on how to allocate some 
limited amount of resources. They start off by trying to allocate these resources by public 
deliberation, by a fair and respectful weighting of the concerns of the members of the 
group. After engaging in this process, they find out that they will not be able to distribute 
the resources merely on behalf of public argument, so the process ends with a vote. 
Imagine this vote to be secret. If the deliberative process has yielded some preliminary 
agreements, such as a decision on how to allocate at least some of the resources, then 
if someone votes contrary to this agreement, she is not acting on behalf of their public 
considerations of how to achieve the optimal outcome. She may be more interested in 
voting in ways that serve her strategic goals, rather than to vote on behalf of their public 
agreements. This seems to hurt the deliberative process in this scenario, because the 
deliberative process is not, in the right way, causing, or influencing, the outcome that was 
publically decided on.14 
Some problems arise when this strategic worry is applied to decisions in mass-
democracies. First, if one’s vote has limited causal power – such as in general elections 
in large democracies – then there are weaker reasons for one to vote strategically due 
to the diminishing returns of the vote. Second, it is not clear as to what constitutes 
13]  Assuming, of course, that I knew I wouldn’t vote for this candidate at the time of voicing 
my public support. 
14]  In this situation they only vote because of practical necessity. 
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the deliberative engagements that one must vote on behalf of in mass democracies. Is 
it troublesome to have citizens vote in a way that deviates from what was agreed on, 
or publicly argued for, in previous engagements with friends, family members or co-
workers? I doubt that we have very strong intuitions in the affirmative here. Also, such 
engagements seem too far from removed from any concrete political change to be 
properly deemed democratic deliberation. Therefore, there seems to be an ambiguity as to 
how we are to understand what it means to vote on ‘previous deliberative engagements’ 
in mass democratic societies. This does not show that strategic voting cannot be a 
legitimate worry as it relates to secrecy; it only shows that such a worry relates to the 
electoral scale that is under discussion, from general elections in mass democracies 
to decisions undertaken in smaller electoral contexts. For these reasons, the sincerity 
tension might apply to a small-scale deliberative setting, while it seems less significant in 
mass-scale democratic settings. Hence, the sincerity tension, as presently stated, presents 
less tension than the justificatory and self-regarding aspects. 
Let me take stock. So far, by attending to some of the comments by Engelen and 
Nys, I have identified three aspects of secretive voting which are in tension with some 
of the theoretical virtues of deliberative democracy. For the remainder of this paper, 
I suggest that an epistemic approach to deliberative democracy is one efficient way to 
relieve some of this tension. 
V. W H Y (SOM E) DELIBER ATI V E DEMOCR ATS M AY NOT FAVOR PUBLICIT Y 
At this point, I want to argue the three aspects of secretive voting under discussion 
are not in tension with some of the epistemic aspects of deliberative democracy. Simone 
Chambers has some very helpful distinctions relevant for this discussion. She points out 
that we may have reasons that are by their nature un-shareable, yet not selfish or purely 
self-regarding. These include, for example, comprehensive world-views that others, due 
to different metaphysical commitments, cannot accept (Chambers 2004). Likewise, she 
points out that the distinction between private and public reasons does not necessarily 
track any epistemic qualities. We can have well-reasoned, reflective forms of self-
regarding justifications and have poorly-reasoned or shallow forms of other-regarding 
justifications (Chambers 2004). Opening up deliberation to a wider public may yield 
an increase in the public reasons offered under some circumstances, but this does not 
mean that these public reasons are epistemically sound or well-thought-out positions. 
Chambers puts her point like this: 
“The problems associated with going public are not problems of private reasons but 
rather the problem of shallow public reason: wanting to please the largest number of 
people possible or wanting to appear firm and decisive in the public’s eye. Thus the 
appeal is general but the content is suspect.” (2004, 394). 
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By opening up a deliberative process to the general public, an incentive can be 
created to meet the discursive demands by giving shallow or superficial reasons, which 
threatens to flatten the discursive landscape. Chambers calls this plebiscitary reason, 
and it consists of the following well-known strategies: manipulation, pandering, image-
maintaining (2004, 398). Engelen and Nys are also aware of these potential epistemic 
pitfalls. They argue, for example, that public voting can lead to voters refusing to adjust 
or change their positions, due to not wanting to appear weak (Engelen and Nys 2013, 
500). With this in mind, consider the two strongest tensions once again. The first is 
the justificatory tension, which is the tension between the normative deliberative 
requirement of giving reasons and a secretive voting process in which reason-giving is 
de-incentivized. One reason why deliberative democrats ought, in principle, to favor 
publicity is that the process of justification yields an internal and external increase in 
voter deliberation. Ideally, such a process promotes voting based on the arguments 
and reasons that emerge, and are promoted, in the public political arena, which is to be 
preferred to a system in which voters can choose to vote for whatever reason they like, 
for no reasons, or for bad reasons. Following Chambers, however, there may be worries 
about the possible epistemic effects of this. For example, citizens may pander by offering 
reasons their social surroundings find acceptable, or citizens may vote a certain way 
to maintain or regain a public image. If we’re epistemic deliberative democrats, these 
circumstances are important. They are important because if the justificatory process 
is to yield epistemic benefits, then the process of voter justification must be exercised 
in the right way. Therefore, it is not sufficient that public voting induces both pre and 
post-electoral public deliberation by voters, because that deliberation may lack the 
prerequisite epistemic qualities. 
Consider, now, the self-regarding tension. The principled deliberative worry about 
secrecy in this respect is that secrecy runs counter to understanding political decisions 
as a public, collective enterprise. Public voting is more in line with the goal of offering 
public reasons that others can acknowledge. Again, following Chambers, there are 
epistemic worries present here. For example, it might be that the deliberative interchange 
between voters is not conducive to advancing the best arguments. Perhaps voters will 
give any justification that grants them social acceptance. This does not necessarily mean 
that public voting cannot be conducive to reaping epistemic benefits. It merely suggests 
that if we value democratic deliberation because it is conducive to reaching epistemically 
justified outcomes, then there are additional epistemic circumstances that need to be 
spelled out in order to show that deliberative democracy is principally opposed to secrecy. 
Expressed differently, epistemic deliberative democrats are only principally opposed to 
voter secrecy insofar as secrecy yields an epistemic deficit – and it is not obvious that this 
is the case.15 We need a richer description of the epistemic benefits of publicity to be able 
to argue that there is a principled discrepancy at work here. 
15]  That is: epistem ic del iberat ive democrats a re on ly opposed to secrec y qua being  epis-
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Some might find this claim puzzling. A skeptic might ask: If we are not in favor 
of increasing the deliberative circumstances of voting, because publicity may increase 
the risk of certain epistemic pitfalls, then is any deliberative claim being advanced 
at all? If the skeptic is right in claiming that no deliberative claim is made at all, then 
that is a problem for my argument. It is a problem because it would mean that I would 
be proposing to solve a tension between deliberative democracy and secret ballot by 
simply abandoning some central ideals in deliberative democracy – which is hardly 
a very satisfying solution.16 However, I do not think the skeptic is right about this. I 
agree that it does seem puzzling to suggest that deliberative democrats may have 
reasons not to make some circumstances more deliberative, but such a position is 
possible from within a deliberative viewpoint. It seems puzzling only if we assume 
that deliberative theorists are committed to making everything more deliberative, rather 
than judging everything by deliberative standards (Gutmann and Thompson 1999). If 
the assumption that deliberative theorists are committed to making everything more 
deliberative is dropped, the position I have sketched appears much less problematic. 
Another skeptical reply to my argument is to say that there is an epistemic uptake 
by virtue of there being an increase in justifications given, even if they are epistemically 
unsound, and as such, public voting is more conducive to the ideals of the epistemic 
approach to deliberation than secrecy. I partly agree with this reply. However, the 
strength of this reply would rest on the epistemic substance and the circumstances in 
which those justifications are given. It is not obvious that the increase in the giving of 
justifications equals an increase in epistemically qualified voter deliberation. Such a 
case would require additional argumentative support. 
Therefore, in order to properly analyze the process of secretive voting from the 
vantage-point of deliberative principles, it is important to distinguish between valuing 
justification and the giving of public reasons for epistemic or non-epistemic reasons. 
What I have suggested is that if we take an epistemic approach to deliberation, both the 
justificatory and the self-regarding tension lose substantial steam.17 
As mentioned, however, this is only true for the epistemic approach. The tension 
still exists, at least as I have argued, if we accept that justification and accountability 
are deliberative values which are not exhausted by their potential to yield epistemic 
benefits. For example, if we believe that justification and accountability have intrinsic 
value, then the mere fact that voters become accountable to each other, regardless of 
epistemic benefits, may have value within deliberative democracy. This area of tension 
tem ic del iberat ive democrats . 
16]  It is not unsatisfying because we necessarily should be adamant in upholding deliberative 
ideals. Rather, it is theoretically unsatisfying because my aim is to discuss the tension that exists when 
one wants to uphold values of deliberative democracy and the current practice of secretive voting. 
Simply abandoning either is not in any sense an interesting solution. 
17]  My argument does not warrant the conclusion that the tension is not there, but rather than 
there are insufficient reasons to believe that it is there. 
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between justification and secrecy is not dissolved by accepting the epistemic approach. 
The argument sketched here as to why epistemic deliberative democrats may not, 
principally, be opposed to secrecy, can vary in strength. A stronger version of this 
claim would be an argument showing that secrecy may, in fact, be epistemically superior 
to publicity in the context of voting. I have not defended this stronger version. I have 
instead raised some issues concerning some important distinctions between different 
versions of deliberative democracy and tried to show that there is insufficient ground 
for claiming there to be a principled discrepancy between secrecy and an epistemic 
version of deliberative democracy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I have discussed several parts of the relationship between deliberative democracy 
and the secret ballot. Voter secrecy has a multifaceted relationship with deliberative 
democracy. On the one hand, majority voting as an institutional design gives each 
political input the same weight. Each citizen that partakes in this process has an equal 
say. The secrecy of the ballot adds to this egalitarian inclusiveness by shielding voters 
from external social pressure. Each citizen partakes in the electoral process with no 
direct claim of justification or reason-giving required for this action, signaling that 
each adult can take part in the process, regardless of their reasons for doing so.18 
These inclusive aspects of secrecy also contain the non-justificatory elements – which 
I’ve suggested – are opposed to the ideals of deliberative democracy. Analyzing the 
relationship between secrecy and deliberation seems to bring out these different aspects 
– which I have outlined in three different ways – as the justificatory tension, the self-
regarding-tension, and the sincerity-tension. I’ve suggested that both the justificatory 
and the self-regarding tension are significant tensions, while the sincerity-tension 
remains, at present, unpersuasive as substantially worrisome from the viewpoint of 
deliberative democracy. Lastly, I’ve argued that there are insufficient reasons to suggest 
that epistemic deliberative democracy is in tension with voter secrecy. Needless to 
say, such conclusions are merely preliminary, I hope, however, that they provide some 
conceptual tools for further analysis and discussion.
ru@learning.aau.dk
18]  A nnabelle Lever has argued that this egalitarian aspect of the secret ballot signals the in-
herent democratic value of voter privacy. (2015) 
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Publicity and the Ethics of Political Representation 
  
 
In this paper, I challenge the division of secrecy and publicity as it 
pertains to representatives and citizens. I argue that some of the 
normative reasons why representatives vote publicly are 
transferable to similar normative reasons for why citizens should 
vote publicly in referendums. Specifically, I argue that if 
representatives vote publicly because they ought to be accountable 
for their exercise of political power, then the same reasoning 
applies to citizens voting in referendums. I advance this claim in 
two steps. First, I lay out the standard justification for publicity on 
behalf of representatives. Second, I argue how such justification 
ought also to include citizens. 
 
      I. Introduction 
There is a division of labor in most liberal democracies consisting of political 
representatives and citizens. Representatives legislate, deliberate, and structure laws, while citizens 
are usually confined to voting for representatives in elections.1 The relationship between 
representatives and citizens has been an ongoing topic of philosophical discussion.2 This 
democratic division of labor between representatives and citizens is usually accompanied by an 
asymmetry concerning secrecy and publicity. That is, representatives usually vote publicly while 
citizens usually vote secretly. I will refer to this as the asymmetry. There is surprisingly little 
discussion when it comes to relating the issues of democratic accountability to the question of the 
asymmetry between the secret ballot for citizens and public voting for representatives. It seems 
that the issue is, according to one influential commentator, normatively settled in favor of secrecy 
for citizens and publicity for representatives.3 In this paper, I argue that there are good reasons for 
challenging this division of secrecy and publicity. I will argue that if public voting for 
representatives is important due to accountability, then normatively similar reasons for publicity 
are ascribable to citizens as well. That is, some of the good reasons we have for wanting publicity 
                                               
1 Citizens also deliberate but rarely do their deliberations directly end up in actual large-scale political decisions. 
2 Mansbridge 2009, 2011; Young 2000; Christiano 1996; Urbinati and Warren 2008. See also Mill, Considerations on 
Representative Government Ch. 10.  




on behalf of representatives also constitute good reasons for wanting publicity on behalf of electors. 
Specifically, if representatives must vote publicly because they are accountable to the public for 
their enactment of collectively binding laws, the same reason applies to electors.  
 
It is important to note that different levels of policy-making employ different forms and 
degrees of secrecy. For example, the process of the European Council of Ministers is partly 
secretive, and the Council “... and its subordinate institutions debate largely in private and they 
often arrive at decisions without taking a formal vote.”4 Even though such empirical circumstances 
concerning secrecy and publicity vary, this is not crucial for my argument. There is a theoretical 
linkage between accountability and publicity, which is sufficient for my objectives in this paper, 
even if this theoretical linkage does not perfectly map onto the empirical world.  
 
Since my argument is conditional, it admits to differing scales of both publicity and 
accountability. For example, if publicity of representatives is warranted (partly) because 
representatives are directly engaged in the law-making process, then publicity is (partly) warranted 
for citizens when citizens are similarly directly engaged in law-making. This argument is consistent 
with publicity being less important for citizens than for representatives. In addition, there are strong 
reasons, both historical and contemporary, for the secrecy of the ballot.5 Therefore, what I offer 
are pro-tanto reasons, not all-things-considered reasons that warrant the practical implementation 
of public voting for citizens. Rather, the objective is to provide a substantial challenge to the 
normatively settled status of the asymmetry between representatives and citizens.  
 
II. Publicity and Secrecy 
Secrecy and publicity can manifest in different forms and serve different functions in 
political and judicial processes. In the deliberative stages of policy-formation, for example, public 
oversight may be conducive to the giving of public rather than private reasons or it might help to 
expose corruption or selfishness. The effects of publicity may also be harmful: it may lead to a 
downgrade in the epistemic quality of deliberation, because speakers, due to publicity, will care 
                                               
4 Stasavage 2006, 164. 
5 Manin 2015, 209  




mostly about pleasing the largest amount of people.6 Similarly, publicity might incentivize refusals 
to re-evaluate political beliefs because such refusals signal weaknesses.7 Publicity may also be ill-
advised in jury proceedings. The deliberation of jurors is often secretive, the main argument for 
which is the “... chilling effects on free deliberation that could occur if the jurors knew that their 
discussion might become public, the need for a finality of the verdict, and the legitimacy of the 
jury system.”8 The argument for publicity in jury proceedings, on the other hand, is that juries are 
“... prone to mistakes, because of incompetence, normative prejudices, or cognitive biases.”9 It is 
also an important factor whether someone is obligated to give reasons for their decision. Public 
oversight can help in assessing whether the proper arguments, or reasons, have been offered in 
support of some decision. If individuals or groups are under no obligation to give reasons, then, 
this may limit the need for publicity in the deliberative stages of some decision-making. Since 
juries do not give reasons for their decisions but render verdicts, this may reduce the need for 
publicity on their behalf. 10 I will consider how these issues relate to democratic representation.         
                                        
III. Democratic Accountability: Some Standard Views 
The role of representation carries with it different ethical duties of public office.11 
Deciding which, and to whom, representatives have such duties is a theoretically complicated and 
contentious issue. It is sufficient for my purposes merely to highlight the connection between the 
role of representation and publicity. That is, if citizens are to be able to exercise their demand for 
accountability, some amount of publicity in public governance is needed. This is due, in part, 
because publicity is supposed to discipline institutions and office-holders and to prevent and deter 
corruption.12 I will here describe several of the traditional views of representation to establish that 
publicity is important on most of these views. This overview is by no means exhaustive either in 
listing the different possible views or in the qualitative descriptions of them. It is, however, 
sufficient for present purposes.  
                                               
6 A slight terminological issue: in a certain sense, publicity does not cause anything. Those actors who behave   
differently due to publicity cause things. 
7 Chambers 2004, 391-94. 
8 Elster 2013, 126. 
9 Elster 2013, 126–27. 
10 Elster 2013, 13. 
11 Urbinati and Warren 2008, 400. 




    Agent-Principal:  
   One standard view of representation is the agent-principal relationship in which the 
principals (the public) elect agents (representatives) to act on their interests and opinions.13 On this 
standard view of representation, publicity is needed because the principals must be able to monitor 
the behavior of the agents.14 Such monitoring creates possibilities of either sanction or reward. On 
this view, the citizens “… have primacy; they are the ones to whom the legislators are 
responsible.”15 So, for example, in order to evaluate whether a candidate truly is fiscally 
conservative, it is important to know how the candidate has voted concerning public social 
spending. To know whether a candidate lives up to her campaign promise of being anti-
interventionist, the public needs to know how the candidate votes on issues of military spending 
and overseas military activities. As such, the Principal-Agent relation is conceived as one in which 
the principals must “... monitor the agent closely, rewarding the good behavior, and punishing the 
bad.”16 On the Agent-Principal view, citizens are to investigate whether or not their representatives 
are adequately advancing their interests, whether they fulfill their duties and responsibilities, and 
whether their actions match their publicly announced campaign promises. If representatives are 
seen to fail in any of these areas, citizens can choose to exercise their democratic prerogative and 
vote for different representatives or showcase their dissatisfaction in other ways. Conceptualizing 
political representation as the Agent-Principle relation, then, involves the notion of publicity on 
behalf of representatives due to their accountability to the public. 
 
    Trustee View:  
   Another view is the trustee view of representation. On this view, representatives are given 
more authorial independence, and as such, citizens are less required to exercise their judgment 
concerning the political behavior of representatives.17 Therefore, the form of publicity that enables 
citizens to judge and direct their representatives is less urgent on the trustee view. However, this 
reduces only one incentive to have the vote of representatives be public. There are other reasons 
                                               
13 Urbinati and Warren 2008, 389. 
14 Mansbridge 2009, 369. 
15 Christiano 1996, 208. 
16 Mansbridge 2009, 369. 




for publicity on behalf of representatives. For example, publicity is important in order to judge 
whether or not some individual representative is morally accountable for the enactment of some 
law or whether the voting of a candidate is suggestive of her acting on special interest, or under 
the influence of bribery or corruption. Such measures of public accountability are still relevant, 
even if the role of representatives is to formulate and enact policy proposals without too much 
public interference or oversight. Perhaps a more far-reaching trustee-view which sees 
representatives as political actors with high degrees of moral and epistemic qualities, will leave 
less room for public accountability in the form of public voting. It might be suggested that if we 
can get such political actors to act on our behalf, we should let them figure out the proper course 
of political action and have the public play only a limited role in this process. While such a position 
is possible to hold, it does not pose a problem for the overall argument suggested in this paper. My 
suggestion is that on some of the traditional and often-held views on representation, there is a need 
for public accountability, and the far-reaching trustee view does not seem to be a traditional view 
of representation.  
 
   Hybrid-View:  
   On the hybrid-theory of representation, citizens choose a broad outline of the ends of 
policy while representatives are in charge of achieving those ends. As such, representatives are 
delegates on behalf of the policy ends, while they are trustees on behalf of achieving those ends.18 
Again, some publicity on behalf of the political actions of representatives is needed on the Hybrid-
View. To evaluate whether representatives are moving towards the broad outline of policy set by 
citizens, some amount of publicity is needed. For example, if citizens delegate the responsibility 
to representatives for implementing some basic measures of a social welfare state, it becomes 
increasingly difficult for citizens to judge which representatives are moving toward establishing 
such measures if they have no information about how representatives vote concerning social 
spending, for example.  
 
                Deliberative Accountability:  
                                               




   Accountability is also often conceptualized as something more than mere sanction and 
reward. For example, Mansbridge suggests that in "… narrative and deliberative accountability, 
the representative explains the reasons for her actions and even (ideally) engages in two-way 
communication with constituents, particularly when deviating from the constituent’s preferences.” 
19 This understanding of accountability does not emphasize the (formal) sanctioning in which the 
polity punishes the electorate by choosing not to re-elect them. Instead, deliberative accountability 
concerns the potential of citizens to require public officials to discursively justify their decisions 
and actions. One need not subscribe to the deliberative understanding of accountability per se to 
see the ‘giving of reasons' as important. Engaging in such deliberative activity is a generic part of 
accountability, as accountability typically involves giving an account of or justifying decisions and 
actions.20 Even on this view, which seeks to implement a system less reliant on sanctioning 
representatives, some basic amount of publicity on behalf of representatives is required. If there is 
an increased need to engage in deliberative accountability when representatives deviate from the 
preferences of the constituency, then this implies that the constituents can know when this deviation 
happens. Publicity on behalf of representatives helps supply this knowledge, and as such, helps to 
ground the possibility that citizens can hold representatives to deliberative forms of accountability.  
 
The Normative Grounding of Accountability:  
    So far, I have sketched different understandings of which obligations representatives 
ought to have towards the public. These different understandings relate to both how and to which 
degree representatives ought to act on behalf of the public. Now I turn to the question of what 
representatives are accountable for. Richard Mulgan has developed a distinction that is useful here. 
He suggests that there are two distinct justifications for accountability. He calls them principle of 
ownership and principle of affected rights.21 The principle of ownership states that relations of 
accountability arise when account-holders delegate power to agents to transact on their behalf. 
Because the agent has been authorized and granted power by account-holders, the agents become 
accountable to their agents. This principle applies to democratic decision-making. Since 
representatives are granted power by the public to act on their behalf, the public is the account-
                                               
19 Mansbridge 2009, 370. 
20 Warren 2014, 41. 




holder to whom representatives are accountable.22 The principle of affected rights, on the other 
hand, states that “… those whose rights or interests are adversely affected by the actions of 
someone else have a right to hold that person to account for the manner in which they have been 
treated.”23 These two principles are complementary. Government has significant power that can 
adversely affect the rights and interests of citizens; therefore, it becomes particularly important 
that citizens are able to hold government to account for how that power is used.24 
 
      Mark Warren suggests a similar normative justification for relations of accountability. 
He conceptualizes the normative importance of democratic accountability in terms of the ‘all 
affected principle’.25 Democratic accountability instantiates the all affected principle “... by 
connecting those entitled to influence collective decisions by virtue of their real or potential 
affectedness to agents who make and organize these decisions on their behalf.”26 On this view, 
those who are affected – currently or potentially – are, by virtue of being affected, entitled to 
influence those collective decisions that affect them. To spell out the significance of this view 
concerning democratic accountability, consider Mark Warren’s description of one of the central 
features of democratic accountability: “Problems of democratic accountability arise from 
individuals’ dependence upon these delegated powers in two senses: negatively, insofar as they are 
vulnerable to the powers agents wield, and positively, insofar as their capacities to exert influence 
over collectivities depend upon agents’ responsiveness and answerability.”27  
 
The all affected principle, therefore, instantiates accountability in two ways. Citizens, 
by virtue of being affected, are entitled to hold influence over those political decisions that 
influence them. Second, by virtue of being affected, citizens are normatively justified in being able 
to "… demand and enforce answerability from those who hold and use delegated powers."28 They 
are justified in doing so because of their vulnerability to the collectively binding decisions of 
representatives. Taking notice of both Mulgan’s and Warren’s descriptions here helps to 
                                               
22 Mulgan 2003, 12. 
23 Mulgan 2003, 13.  
24 Mulgan 2003, 13. 
25 The ‘all affected principle’ usually concerns the proper boundaries of the demos. See Goodin 2007; Young 2000.  
26 Warren 2014, 40. 
27 Warren 2014, 40 




understand part of the fundamental normative grounding of democratic accountability. Such 
accountability is morally significant because of the power that the representatives have over those 
who are affected by their political decisions. This relates to all of the views mentioned in the last 
section. Whether one accepts the principle-agent or the hybrid-view, representatives are – in one 
form or another – accountable to the public over whom they have political power. Different 
conceptions of the relationship between citizens and representatives may yield different 
conclusions about the specific need for and amount of public oversight – but they do maintain some 
basic element of public accountability of representatives to the public for their exercise of 
collectively binding decisions.  
 
Let us take stock. So far, I have suggested that at least two factors are important when 
considering the link between the accountability and the publicity of representatives. First, the 
limited use of secretive voting in parliaments displays an understanding of representation as 
accountability.29 Representatives vote publicly because it serves the value of democratic 
accountability.30 The publicity of their vote enhances the opportunities for the public to observe, 
criticize, and hold accountable those who vote in ways disapproved of by the public at large or the 
constituents of the representatives.31 Second, what is central to the moral significance of the 
accountability of representatives lies in their significant power over citizens. It is, partly, because 
the interests of citizens can be affected that representatives stand in a relationship of accountability 
with citizens. Understood in this way, the exercise of collectively binding decisions marks out the 
normative grounding for which representatives are accountable, while their role as representatives 
indicates some of the obligations the public can hold them accountable to. Combining these two 
elements yields a basic description of representative accountability. 
 
For my purposes, the crucial question now becomes: can citizens play a role that confers 
similar normative reasons for publicity? For the remainder of this paper, I answer in the affirmative.  
 
 
                                               
29 Gianetti 2015, 108. 
30 Elster 2013, 232. 
31 One can also emphasize the possibility that individuals can hold representatives accountable, for example, 




IV. Extending Democratic Accountability  
The suggestion that there are normatively similar reasons for publicity on behalf of 
representatives as well as on behalf of citizens faces an immediate difficulty: Representatives have 
more power than citizens in at least two relevant ways. First, they are individually more causally 
powerful since they are vastly fewer in number than citizens participating in elections. Second, 
representatives are also causally closely connected to the legislative outcome of their vote since 
they are directly engaged in the legislative process, while citizens are relegated to voting for 
representatives.32 This adds complexity to most conceptions of the causal and moral responsibility 
of the electorate. Further complications may arise due to the messy empirical situation of modern 
representational politics. Politicians broker deals with each other and they forge alliances in which 
political outcomes are the result of compromises that are unforeseeable by electors before the 
election. Influence on political outcomes may also come from more obscure sources: lobbyists, 
corporations, interest groups, etc. These circumstances can make it more difficult to trace 
responsibility back to identifiable political actors – including electors. 
 
In the case of referendums, however, citizens are directly engaged in collectively 
binding decisions, and so are closer to the role that representatives undertake. This fact, I shall 
argue, yields pro tanto reasons for citizens’ votes to be public.  
 
First, let us consider some examples. California's Proposition 184 – labeled ‘Three 
Strikes and You're Out' – was a ballot initiative which sought to give life imprisonment to those 
convicted of three crimes. It did not, therefore, discriminate between violent and non-violent 
crimes. Examples of punishment under this law include a fifty-year jail-sentence for stealing 
$150 worth of video games.33 Consider next the following example, given by Christopher Achen 
and Larry Bartels, in which they reference a 2009 study on the effects that a tax referendum had 
on fire protection services in Illinois. Because of reduced staffing and funding, it became 
increasingly difficult to combat firestorms in the areas affected by the referendum. One such 
                                               
32 There are also other differences: they may have more time and resources, they have structured 
deliberative forums, they have (somewhat) clearly defined political obligations, etc. 




firestorm destroyed 3000 homes and killed 25 people.34  
 
Lastly, consider the Californian 2008 Referendum called Proposition Eight, in which 
a slight majority voted to amend state constitution to ban same-sex marriage. This differs from 
the tax referendum on fire protection since this does not, in the same way, materially or 
physically harm citizens. Instead, it did something else that is of significant moral importance: it 
removed a legal opportunity for couples to marry – an option that many consider to be of 
substantial importance to themselves and their life-plans. 
 
One fact about such referendums is undeniable: they affect the lives of individuals, 
communities, and, sometimes, whole societies. Citizens are, most certainly, very vulnerable to 
the effects of these outcomes. By being bound by the collectively binding decisions enacted by 
citizens in referendums, they are in the same position as when representatives make such 
decisions. By being affected, they are in a position to “… demand and enforce answerability from 
those who hold and use delegated powers.”35 If citizens, on the standard account, should be able 
to demand and enforce answerability from those who exercise such a collectively binding 
decision, then it seems that they should be able to enforce answerability from those citizens who 
do this through referendums. 
 
I mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph that there is an important difference 
between the voting of representatives and electors voting in referendums. The difference is that 
individual electors have very little causal influence on the outcome of referendums and that their 
vote is almost always over-determined. That is, individual electors do not decide elections. 
Representatives are not in the same position. Typically, they have much more individual influence 
on the outcome because they are relatively few in number. The fact of over-determination is not, 
in itself, too problematic for the concept of publicity on behalf of citizens. The votes of 
representatives are often also overdetermined – that is, often the individual votes of representatives 
do not determine the outcome. Even if no individual representative determines the outcome, this 
does not mean that representatives should vote secretly. Their accountability does not hinge on 
                                               
34  Achen and Bartels 2017, 84. 




them being the decisive vote. The fact of citizens’ insignificant individual causal power when 
voting in referendums is, however, important for accountability. This is one reason why electors 
should not be subject to the same degree of accountability as representatives. Representatives do 
have more individual causal power and, partly at least, because of this they have to endure greater 
accountability. This, however, does not suggest that the low individual causal power of citizens 
voting in referendums negates the idea of voter accountability. If we hold that low individual causal 
power negates accountability, then problematic implications follow. First, it would mean that 
representatives with little causal power would have no accountability, and would, therefore, prima 
facie, be justified in voting secretly. Few, I believe, would accept this implication.36 Secondly, it 
seems odd to suggest that limited causal influence negates accountability. For example, we would 
hardly accept that any individual participant in a large-scale firing squad is morally exempt from 
being held accountable for her participation.37 This goes for several cases of collectively harmful 
actions. Each individual makes only a small causal contribution to climate change, yet this does 
not seem to cancel out individual accountability.  
 
As suggested in the opening of this paragraph, one can object that representatives do not 
actually hold much political power, and as such, they should only to a limited extent be held 
accountable. This may be true in some circumstances. However, it does not pose an objection to 
my argument, since I argue the conditional: if representatives must vote publicly because they are 
accountable to the public for their exercise of political power, then the same rationale can be given 
for citizens voting in referendums. If the objection is that representatives do not hold political 
power, then it denies one of the conditions of the argument. Such an objection does therefore not 
show that the conditional does not hold, but suggests, rather, that we are wrong in believing one of 
the conditions of the argument. This might be so in some cases but is not of vital importance here.   
 
Before ending this section with a brief summation, it is important to clarify something 
that might seem puzzling. The election of political representatives often has even more far-reaching 
                                               
36 One might reply to this by saying that it does not follow that because representatives are not accountable, that they 
should therefore vote secretly. One might hold that even if representatives are not accountable for the passing of some 
law, they should, due to their public role as representatives, still vote publicly. I discuss this type of reply in the last 
section of the paper.   




and substantial consequences than referendums, so why the focus on the latter? The reason for this 
focus is that electors deciding on a single issue captures the normatively salient circumstances that 
are important for my central argument.  If one extends the primary argument to include elections, 
a move that is certainly possible, further difficulties arise. These difficulties consist in deciding 
which of the policies enacted by representatives electors are accountable for. Including elections 
would require an extension of the argument that is outside the scope of this paper.  
 
Let me just repeat the central point here, namely: if publicity serves as a prerequisite 
of accountability for representatives when they engage in other-affecting, direct exercise of 
collectively binding decisions, then by virtue of citizens engaging in the same sort of behavior, 
the same normative principle of accountability applies. Notice, however, that one important 
element is missing in my account. As we have seen, the publicity of representatives is due both 
to their exercise of power and because they act within their formal capacity as representatives.38 
Citizens lack this latter feature. This absence pushes against the argument of having their vote 
be public on the grounds of accountability. It does so in two ways. First, since citizens do not 
act in the capacity of representatives, it is difficult to see how they are to be held accountable. 
Second, it is difficult to see which obligations citizens are accountable for upholding. For the 
remainder of this paper, I tackle these two problems as two distinct objections. Tackling these 




The Institutional Objection 
The first objection is the following: publicity is tied to specific institutional procedures, 
and since citizens are not subject to those procedures, publicity on their behalf cannot secure 
accountability. Russell Hardin seems to ascribe to something closely related to this view. 
Commenting on publicity on behalf of citizens, he suggests that: “Some citizens might be held 
accountable for their racism, bellicose chauvinism, or other supposed moral failings. But these 
charges would come from some moral theory or principle outside the democratic system, a 
                                               




principle that need not be democratic.”39 I take this to mean that even though electors may be 
accountable, publicity functions within democratic systems of accountability and it is therefore not 
applicable to citizens.40 One reason why it is not applicable is that public voting for citizens lacks 
the component of empowerment. That is, for the public to hold representatives accountable, the 
public must be empowered to do so by being able to punish, demand, or sanction decisions made 
by those who are accountable.41 Empowerment signifies the "... institutional arrangements that 
enable those (potentially) affected by decisions to require an account."42 The ways of doing so are 
many, “... including voting, rights of speaking, pressure, petition, and association, standings to sue, 
and rights to information relevant to the power to question authorities.”43 The worry is, then, that 
“… without the possibility of sanctions, accountability processes are empty.”44 Voter-to-voter 
accountability does not include this form of empowerment. That is, electors do not have any 
institutional arrangements through which they can hold each other accountable. Voter group A 
cannot, and should not, be able to determine that voter group B should lose their voting rights, nor 
should group A be able to demand that group B stand trial the way representatives might have to.45 
There are also some important practical worries related to disclosure. Public voting means that 
actors can retaliate against those who they deem to vote wrongfully. For example, voting in 
unpopular ways might mean that electors will engage in harmful forms of social sanctions – such 
as social alienation, bullying or personal attacks. Perhaps even worse, powerful governments might 
intimidate or punish electors for voting for opposing political parties or candidates.  
 
  Let me start by discussing these practical worries. While the behavior of citizens 
and governments is certainly something to worry about when one considers the practical 
implementation of publicity on their behalf, it does not pose a direct objection to the central claim 
advanced in this paper. To see this, consider the distinction between normative and non-normative 
understandings of accountability. A non-normative usage would simply be a description of 
                                               
39 Hardin 1999, 221. 
40 This leaves us with only a general form of accountability: “... all moral agents to the moral community at large for 
acting in accordance with the moral law.” Goodin 2003, 363.  
41 Bovens 2007; 447–68. Goodin 2003; Warren 2014. 
42 Warren 2014, 41. 
43 Warren 2014, 41. 
44 Borowiak 2011, 7. 




someone being in the condition of accountability by being interrogated, made to stand trial, forced 
to offer explanations etc.25 Normative usage concerns whether accountability is justified. 
Accountability can be unjustifiably exercised if, for example, one is held accountable on spurious 
evidence or if one is held accountable in some highly improper or exaggerated way. A normative 
usage, then, conveys that it is legitimate to hold someone accountable, or that someone has an 
obligation to hold someone accountable.46 My argument pertains to the normative use. I have said 
very little about how such conditions of accountability may play out. Even if conditions of citizen-
to-citizen accountability play out only as social bullying and personal attacks, this does not mean 
that there is not a normative justification for why it is legitimate to be held accountable. 
Importantly, this point also applies to representatives. Even if it is normatively justified that 
representatives are accountable to electors, it might be that the conditions of accountability 
between citizens and representatives may turn out to be non-functional or improperly exercised. 
For example, some might hold representatives politically accountable for mistakes they have made 
in their personal lives.47 Even though this is an improper condition of accountability, it does not 
tell us much about whether there is a normative justification for holding representatives 
accountable. Likewise, even if the conditions of citizen-to-citizen accountability take on an 
improper form, this does not imply that their normative conditions of accountability do not apply.  
Nonetheless, these kinds of practical worries are still highly relevant. Even if they do not directly 
pose an objection to the normative grounding of accountability, these worries might be overriding 
reasons for keeping the vote secret. So, let me say a couple of things in response. 
 
 The first thing to notice is that these are empirical issues. The degree to which they will 
manifest in society will depend upon a range of different empirical circumstances. While 
government retaliation is certainly possible (even probable) in some countries, it need not be 
everywhere. There is a wealth of information that some democratic governments already possess 
about their citizens. They have detailed financial and health-related information about citizens, for 
example. Sufficiently strong institutions and rule of law mean that (some) governments possess 
such information without widespread misuse against citizens. It is not clear why information about 
                                               
46 Katell & Moore 2016, 7. 
47 Some might not believe this to be an improper form of accountability. It can be replaced by any other example in 




voting cannot also (to a sufficient degree) be kept from misuse. Consider also that elections 
potentially involve millions of electors. Retaliating against electors who vote against incumbents 
might be a low-reward, high-risk strategy.48 Government officials risk not only their political 
careers but might also face legal action if such misdeeds come to the public’s attention. 
 
 These brief comments do not, of course, offer any guarantees. If governments engage in 
misuse, then this will most likely provide an overriding reason against the practical implementation 
of public voting. These empirical matters cannot be settled here.  
 
What if, as the first part of the objection suggests, conditions of voter-to-voter 
accountability must play out within institutional frameworks that simply do not exist for citizens? 
If such a framework for citizens does not exist, then it is difficult to see how conditions of 
accountability could ever fruitfully play out.  
 
The reply to this is that we should not assume that voter-to-voter accountability must exist 
within an institutional framework. At least, the kind of accountability I appeal to is not very much 
different from the kind of accountability that is routinely endorsed on similar normative views 
concerning the behavior of electors. It is also no different from the kind of behavior that routinely 
plays out in political settings. If these fruitful conditions of accountability can exist without 
institutional arrangements, then so can the kind of accountability I appeal to. If someone has 
misbehaved or publicly stated some morally illicit proposition, others will question or criticize that 
person. This can take the form of deliberative accountability, in which individuals are called upon 
to give an account of their actions. This happens often in political discourse: we hold each other 
accountable for our public political statements or even our political affiliations. This does not, in 
itself, seem the least bit problematic. Is it improper to exercise the same form of accountability 
based on how someone votes? It seems to me that it is not. If someone publicly argues against gay 
marriage, then that person can be held accountable for expressing that view. If that person also 
uses political power in order to legally enforce that view, then this person’s accountability is 
greater, certainly not less. It would be odd indeed to suggest that we can hold someone accountable 
                                               




for espousing some political opinion publicly but that we cannot hold that same someone 
accountable for voting on such a belief. If someone votes a way that I disapprove of, I may question 
that person, or otherwise regulate my behavior towards that person. This might be important in 
some cases – for example, if I am deeply affected by the outcome of proposition 8, I might want 
to engage less with those who have voted to deprive me of something important. I would want to 
be able to moderate my behavior, feelings or friendships with those who have used political power 
to affect me.49   
 
Eric Beerbohm has argued that this form of interpersonal moral address is in itself a pro-
tanto reason to favor publicity. He holds that since citizens can be involved in the coercive powers 
of legislation, citizens who are impacted by democratic decision-making have a moral complaint 
towards those citizens who have been involved in creating those outcomes.50 As such, those 
affected by the results of proposition 8, for example, have a legitimate moral complaint against 
those who voted for it, and secrecy in such an instance makes interpersonal moral complaint 
impossible. All of this is also compatible with electors behaving in illicit ways. As mentioned, it 
is possible that none, or very few, of these kinds of conditions of accountability will materialize. 
It might be that electors instead will engage in shaming, bullying or similarly toxic forms of 
behavior. These empirical issues need further investigation. The important point is that 
accountability for one’s voting-choice is, essentially, not much different from the kind of 
accountability that citizens regularly engage in. If electors engage in improper forms of 
accountability, it does little to show that there is something misguided about this normative 
conception.51  
 
As such, I offer no theory of what a desirable form of accountability looks like for 
electors. I have merely suggested that it shares characteristics with ordinary and often appealed to 
relations of accountability. Deliberative accountability is constantly at play in deliberative settings, 
                                               
49 Rehfeld suggests the following when speaking of non-representative accountability: “And each [kings and citizens] 
will be more or less responsive to sanction. A king might act to avoid revolution, a citizen in a direct democracy might 
act to avoid ostracism or simply ill reputation, or both might simply act gyroscopically on the basis of principle or 
policy without regard to sanction.” (Rehfeld 2009, 229).  
50 Beerbohm 2012, 258. 
51 Consider an analogy: individuals falling short of ideals of deliberation does not show deliberative ideals to be 




and it seems that accountability for voting-choices easily fits within this picture.  This suggests 
that the lack of an empowerment component does not constitute a strong objection to the notion of 
voter accountability. 
 
The Representative Objection 
      Another central objection to my argument, which I will call the representative objection, 
concerns the obligations of representation. As mentioned earlier, representatives have certain 
ethical duties and obligations. These obligations might be to act as trustees or delegates of their 
constituency or to advance the common good. Whichever obligations representatives have, they 
can be held accountable for failing to advance them or for putting other interests ahead of them. 
Citizens do not have the same kind of obligations. Since they do not have the same demands or 
obligations placed on them as representatives, they cannot fail in upholding such demands or 
obligations. Since they cannot fail in doing so, publicity on their behalf is misplaced.52 Annabelle 
Lever comes close to endorsing this view. She argues: “While democratic legislators may be more 
vulnerable to intimidation than citizens – as they are relatively few in number, and hold special 
power and authority qua legislators – it is the former, not the latter, who must vote openly, not 
secretly. Legislators have duties of accountability that citizens lack.”53 Put differently, to propose 
publicity for citizens is to misunderstand the nature of the political role that citizens play, because 
the “... constraints of publicity and accountability on public officials are, on the contrary, inherent 
in their democratic positions.”54 Since citizens do not take on a representational role in their voting 
but vote qua citizens, then they are not accountable in a way that justifies publicity. Since citizens 
lack the type of obligations that representatives have, their voting cannot be judged as failing in 
these obligations and therefore publicity can play no part in making sure they uphold such 
obligations. 
I believe that at least two replies can be offered to the representative objection. First, it is 
certainly true, as Lever suggests, that representatives, qua being representatives, have duties of 
accountability, but that need not suggest that citizens do not have similar duties of accountability. 
                                               
52 It is on the basis of this that Nadia Urbinati raises the questions: “How are the positions of representatives and 
electors similar? What is the purpose of a citizen’s vote? What does that vote represent if not individual interests?” 
Urbinati 2002, 110.  
53 Lever 2015, 175; Lever 2007 




For example, some argue that citizens are morally obligated to vote on behalf of the common good,55 
or to vote on epistemically and morally justified grounds.56 On these views, then, citizens voting 
qua citizens do have obligations. As such, even on the assumption that there is a difference between 
the voting of representatives and citizens, it need not be the case that this difference should lead to 
different conclusions about the public accountability of either citizens or representatives. 
 
There is an additional rebuttal available against the representative objection. The 
representative objection suggests that since electors have no, or very few, public duties as electors, 
they cannot fail in upholding such duties – as such, publicity on their behalf is misplaced. However, 
I believe that this is suggestive of a mistaken implication. Even if electors have none of the same 
duties as representatives, it does not follow that publicity on their behalf is misplaced. The 
representative objection overlooks the possibility that it might be proper to hold electors accountable 
simply by virtue of electors exercising political power. Recall Richard Mulgan’s two categories of 
accountability. The principle of ownership applies when an account-holder delegates power to an 
agent. The principle of affected rights applies when someone is accountable for adversely affecting 
the rights or welfare of others. While the first principle might not grant public accountability on 
behalf of electors, the latter principle straightforwardly applies. Assume, arguendo, that electors 
have no obligations and are required merely to register their individual political preferences when 
they vote. The political preference of voter A is that there ought to be no possibility of same-sex 
marriage in the state of California. Thousands of electors with the same political preference 
successfully ban same-sex marriage. In this scenario, the principle of affected rights apply, and as 
such, the accountability of electors is realized by having their vote be public. They take on the 
obligations of publicity and accountability by exercising such power, regardless of whether they do 
so in their capacity as citizens or representatives. For this reason, I remain unconvinced that the 
exercise of collectively binding decisions cannot be sufficient for establishing publicity – in some 
circumstances – for citizens, and thus, I remain unconvinced that citizens voting qua citizens cannot 
attain such obligations merely because they are not representatives. To further stress this point, 
consider the following example: 
 
                                               
55 Freeman 2000. 




 The War Referendum: 
 
A powerful country has decided by referendum to engage in warfare against an 
equally powerful neighboring country. There are massive humanitarian, political 
and social consequences of this war. Thousands are left dead, while millions are 
forced to flee the countries. 
 
In the war referendum, electors are directly engaged in the exercise of a political action 
that has enormous social, economic and humanitarian consequences. This, I believe, gives us 
strong prima facie reasons that electors should endure publicity if they decide to partake in the 
war referendum. If, on the other hand, we hold that the role of representation is necessary for 
publicity, then we would have to say that publicity for citizens is improper because they are 
citizens, who, qua citizens, have participated in this referendum. I believe this to be wrong. While 
formal representation may be important when considering publicity, this need not suggest that 
citizens voting qua citizens can never be put in situations in which they have accountability 
similar to that of representatives. If representatives had voted in the war referendum, we would 
expect them to do so publicly, as we would expect to be able to hold them accountable. If citizens 
do so, they also exercise power that gravely affects others, and therefore, there are prima facie 
reasons that they should also do so publicly. To suggest that these reasons are negated because 
citizens do not act in the formal capacity of representation is to, peculiarly, locate the normative 
value within the role of representation, rather than in the exercise of power that is typically 
entailed in that role.57 This seems to me misguided. In the case of the War Referendum, for 
example, the normative grounding of publicity is present, even if the formal role of representation 
is absent. If representatives had voted for the war, it might have been, in a different sense, even 
worse than if decided by referendum. This is because representatives may have failed in every 
moral obligation they have as representatives. Because of this their misdeed might exceed the 
misdeed of electors, since electors may fail in fewer obligations. This speaks to the point that 
formal roles of representation are important to the notion of publicity as accountability. However, 
                                               
57 Rehfeld has espoused a position similar to this: “... I believe it is proper to say that representatives take on different 
kinds of obligations and duties based not on account of their being a representative, but rather, based on the function to 









The asymmetry does not receive much discussion in contemporary political philosophy, 
even though, as I have argued in this paper, there are some good reasons for challenging it. If we 
take seriously the normative grounding for why it is incumbent upon representatives that their 
vote be public, then this is suggestive of similar reasons why citizens, under some circumstances, 
should also vote publicly. Citizens also engage in the process of deciding on collectively binding 
decisions, an action for which we hold representatives accountable. This consideration, by itself, 
does not justify public voting. It is, however, a strong normative starting-point for thinking 
seriously about how the asymmetry is understood theoretically and how it is expressed practically 
in our institutions. It is difficult to spell out the exact empirical circumstances in which the 
asymmetry ought to hold – what is clear, however, is that these questions are not set in stone and 
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Who Let The Votes Out? 
-  An Argument for Publicity in Voting  
 
 
This paper presents an epistemic argument for public voting. This 
argument consists of two components – one normative and one 
epistemic. The normative component is an argument for why 
public voting is a normatively viable way of improving voter 
knowledge. The epistemic component involves showing how 
public voting can have epistemic benefits on the voting citizenry. 
This is an interesting approach to epistemic benefits that warrants 
further empirical and normative exploration. 
 
I. Introduction  
 
Solving political problems seems to require quite complex knowledge. For example, to 
combat the effects of climate change, we need to be knowledgeable about which policies will help 
us do so. We need knowledge about the (likely) empirical effects that such policy has on climate 
change, the economy, and society. We might also need moral knowledge if we are to implement 
such policies in a just way. If citizens are asked how to most effectively combat climate change, 
they would (most likely) happily defer to experts on the subject. This is not the case in democratic 
decision-making. Here, an egalitarian system of equal influence is deployed, and no (at least in the 
formal voting-process) special reverence is given to experts. From Plato onwards, this constitutes 
a long-standing problem for democratic theory: How, and why, are we to rely on citizens to solve 
such problems, given that the voting-process does not attend to any epistemic qualifiers such as 
competence, expertise or knowledge?  
 
One way to alleviate such problems is to design the voting-system such that it reflects the 
epistemic properties of the electorate. Some have argued for suffrage based on competence or 





for an enfranchisement lottery (Lopez-Guerra 2014). John Stuart Mill famously proposed giving 
the educated part of the populous extra votes, a suggestion that has received some attention in 
modern political philosophy (Latimer 2018; Mulligan 2018; Estlund 2008, 206-222; Waldron 
1999, 114-116). In this paper, I call attention to another one of Mill’s proposals, that of public 
voting.1 I argue that the prospects of public voting make for a very appealing epistemic argument.  
 
Unlike Mill’s proposal of plural voting, public voting has received relatively little 
discussion in contemporary political philosophy,2 and has, until now, not been articulated and 
expressed as a distinctively epistemic argument. The epistemic potential is discussed by Brennan 
and Pettit and Engelen and Nys; neither treatment, however, substantially spells out or argues from 
the perspective of epistemically improving the voting process.3 This is unfortunate, since public 
voting represents a promising way of improving voter knowledge – and, importantly, is less 
controversial from the viewpoint of procedural justice than comparable voting-schemes. Because 
of the limited discussion of these issues, one potentially fatal objection against the epistemic 
potential of publicity in voting has not been sufficiently discussed and refuted – namely, the 
concern about conformity.4 In short, this objection argues that if votes are public, electors will not 
inform themselves, but merely vote (and think) in ways that make them acceptable to their social 
surroundings. I call this the conformity objection. If an epistemic case for publicity is to be 
successful, it must deal with the conformity objection. Dealing with this worry is the second 
objective of this paper. 
 
                                               
1 Mill 1876, Ch. 10.  
2 Brennan and Pettit 1990; Sturgis 2003; Lever 2007; Urbinati 2012; Engelen and Nys 2013; and Vandamme 2017 
are notable exceptions.  
3 They both, however, include epistemic components in their arguments. Engelen and Nys hold that the increase in 
deliberation that follows from open voting will be conducive to electors informing themselves and being attentive to 
the reasons of others (Engelen and Nys 2013, 493). Their approach, however, is to argue that public voting is implied 
by a normatively desirable model of democracy in which electors are interpersonally accountable and can be held to 
give reasons for their voting-choices. Brennan and Pettit also suggest that public voting will motivate electors to 
inform themselves. Their fundamental argument, however, is that public voting is more likely to realize what they call 
the judgement ideal of voting (Brennan and Pettit 1990, 314-16).  
4 The lack of discussion of conformity is puzzling. Engelen and Nys write that some will succumb to peer pressure 
and thus fail to form autonomous judgements. This, in their view, is a “democratic loss” (Engelen and Nys, 501). 
However, they do not offer any responses to this worry. Taking into account that their self-admitted objective is to 
argue that public voting better fits a deliberative conception of democracy, the fact that public voting will result in a 





This paper, then, aims to contribute in two ways. First, it compiles various paragraphs on 
the epistemic potential of public voting and constructs one sustained, detailed, theoretical, and 
empirical argument for the epistemic potential of public voting. Second, it brings the conformity 
problem to the forefront of the discussion and argues why it, while being a substantial problem, 
does not negate the promises of public voting.  
 
I will start by giving some normative justification for the proposal being advocated. This 
normative task involves showing why (some form) of public voting should be considered 
normatively justified under the proper circumstances. The epistemic task involves showing how 
public voting can generate epistemic benefits. From here on, I will refer to the epistemic argument 
for public voting as EAP. In short, the EAP suggests introducing (some) publicity into the voting-
process such that electors can potentially be confronted with their voting-choices. This will have 
the epistemic pay-off of creating basic incentives for electors to inform themselves on electoral 
issues.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: in (I) I give a brief normative defense of public voting. 
In (II) and (III) I lay out the epistemic dimensions of public voting. I then discuss and reply to the 
conformity objection. In (IV) I discuss objections.  
 
II. Utopia  
 
Before going to the epistemic dimension of the EAP, it instructive to say something 
preliminary about what kind of argument it is and why it is interesting. To see this, consider Utopia.  
 
Utopia is a democracy that has succeeded in eliminating social and economic inequality. 
Utopia has very strong, well-functioning, and well-funded public and civic institutions. 
Utopia also uses a public form of voting. In Utopia, public voting does not result in any 






Utopia is important because the justification for the secret ballot is typically instrumental: 
it prevents vote-buying, coercion of electors, and unequal distribution of political power (Reeve & 
Ware 1992; Manin 2015). This means that if these empirical outcomes do not materialize, then 
there are fewer strong prima facie reasons for having the secret ballot.5 Whether or not these 
outcomes occur and to which degree they occur relies on a host of different empirical 
circumstances such as social and economic stability and properly functioning public institutions.6 
The specific form of public voting might also make a difference. More modest and restricted forms 
of publicity will likely have different outcomes than having an easily accessible, online register of 
everyone’s vote. 
 
 In this paper, I bracket the issue of whether and to which degree these harmful effects 
occur. I do this because I am interested in the epistemic benefits of public voting. My objective is 
to show that there is a strong epistemic case for public voting that merits further empirical and 
normative investigation. This case consists of putting forth the conceptual clarifications and 
theoretical (and empirical) reasons to expect epistemic benefits of public voting. The normative 
grounding of this proposal concerns reasons why it is reasonable for the electorate to vote under 
some measure of publicity. I do not bracket all instrumental effects. Some instrumental effects 
concern the epistemic influence of public voting and since these interests are central to the paper, 
they obviously cannot be bracketed. The potential benefits of public voting will have to be weighed 
against the harmful outcomes in the specific empirical circumstances in which it takes place. The 
weighing of these concerns is a further normative issue I do not take a stand on here.  
 
 Why should we think that it is – at least a priori7 – reasonable to expect that citizens can 
know how others have voted? Consider the three following reasons. First, decisions of enormous 
                                               
5 I am only aware of Annabelle Lever who does not justify the secret ballot on behalf of instrumental reasons. I am 
not suggesting that she is wrong to do so but merely that her view is not the consensus view. See Lever 2005; Lever 
2007. 
6 These circumstances do not only change from country to country but might also be significantly different within 
countries themselves. A public form of voting in one municipality in one area of a country will be different from other 
areas with different social and economic circumstances. It will also likely be different from public voting in general 
elections.  
7 Since I have bracketed the issue of harmful empirical effects, ‘a priori’ here refers to a situation in which these 





importance are decided by how people vote (Brennan 2011, 1-3). The outcomes of how citizens 
decide to vote not only affect others but can also directly harm or set back the interests of others. 
If the act of voting was primarily a self-regarding action, it might be an improper suggestion that 
it should be exercised publicly. It might be right for citizens to react in the following way: “How 
we vote is something which does not affect anyone else, so it is no one’s business.” However, any 
such claim can hardly be made about voting. Second, consider that representatives must vote 
publicly. This serves as one way in which the public can hold them accountable. If representatives 
vote in secret, then the public has fewer means to hold their representatives accountable for their 
voting-choices. Transparency is an important aspect of accountable democratic governance.8 
However, citizens are also sometimes put in a position to decide on political matters. They not 
only vote for candidates but also take part in referenda. Limited forms of publicity would make 
such electors accountable to their fellow citizens. The EAP suggests introducing something that 
we already value – public accountability for the exercise of political power – into the current 
process of the voting of electors.  
  
We should also attend to some of the possible advantages over comparable voting-schemes. 
Consider proposals such as plural voting or epistocracy. Some of the central objections to these 
forms of enfranchisement are procedural in nature, as critics claim that these proposals are 
problematic by virtue of their formal inegalitarian procedures.9 Objecting to plural voting or 
epistocracy on these grounds means that one’s objection is not (substantially) reliant on which 
empirical outcomes occur. Plural voting is not (only) wrong because it might produce bad 
outcomes, but because it violates an important procedural principle of equality. Consider, for 
example, Utopia-Two in which plural voting rather than public voting is used. In Utopia-Two, 
there are no harmful empirical outcomes of the voting-system. Still, critics can maintain that 
Utopia-Two is unjust because it affords less respect or formal recognition to some by virtue of 
them having less (formal) political influence. Objections to public voting are not like this, as public 
voting does not violate any obvious procedural principles. The fact that it does not violate such an 
                                               
8 Publicity here means something along the lines of transparency. Public voting is a subset of government or public 
transparency. The connection between accountability and transparency is expressed in: Waldron 2010, 72-3.  
9 Charles Beitz objects to Mill’s proposal of plural voting because it disrespects those only afforded one vote (Beitz 





ingrained principle as one-person-one-vote is, I take it, a prima facie comparative advantage of a 
scheme such as public voting.10 In addition, public voting does not entail any temporary or 
permanent disenfranchisement of citizens. Public voting makes it up to the citizens themselves 
whether or not to endure some limited form of publicity.11 It applies only to those who choose to 
vote in any given election. These circumstances of public voting are, prima facie at least, 
normatively attractive.12  
 
In summation, public voting has the three following attractive characteristics: (i) it relies 
on public accountability, a value some are already committed to; (ii) it is not formally inegalitarian; 
(iii) it is imposed only on those who voluntarily choose to vote.  
 
The Epistemic Argument for Publicity (EAP) 
 
The Main Motivation: 
 
The central notion underlying the EAP is the notion of actual or potential public scrutiny. 
Most of us have experienced that we modify our actions if we know that others will come to know 
of those actions or even if we just know there is a possibility that others will know of them. Such 
an effect can be harnessed for public benefits. For example, tax revenues are public in Norway, 
and so Norwegians are better at reporting their taxes due to the fear of others noticing discrepancies 
(Slemrod, Thoreresen 2013). The EAP works in a similar way. By lessening some measures of 
secrecy in the voting process, electors are incentivized to examine their own political beliefs and 
vote in ways that can be justified publicly.13 Empirical data suggests that publicizing whether or 
                                               
10 Some might find plural voting so objectionable that they are unimpressed by the fact that other voting schemes have 
relative advantages over it. I agree that this starting-point makes my argument unpersuasive. However, the relative 
advantages should at least, then, speak in favor of having public voting occupy a position in the literature, as there is 
plentiful discussion of plural voting.  
11 In this normative defense, I assume that public voting is not used in combination with compulsory voting.  
12 Again, these are normative circumstances attributable to this form of voting. These can certainly be overridden by 
harmful empirical outcomes.  
13 Political ignorance on behalf of the citizenry is a very well-studied phenomenon. See Bartels & Achen 2017 ch 5, 
Somin 2016 ch. 2 and Caplan 2007. I do not take a strong stand on these issues in this paper. My objective is to argue 





not people have voted results in substantially larger voter turnout (Gerber, Green, and Larimer 
2008, 3-4). The EAP theorizes that publicizing how people vote will result in them taking more 
epistemic care in their voting.14 The central notion underlying this proposal is that public voting 
changes the value that electors attach to the voting-process. This is important because one much-
discussed and enduring feature of mass democracies is that the ignorance of electors is due (in 
part) to the individual causal unimportance of individual votes. Because of this individual 
unimportance, individual electors have few incentives to engage in time-consuming activities to 
inform themselves politically (Brennan 2019). By having the vote be public, the act of voting 
attains interpersonal and social significance. In this way, public voting is a way of altering the kind 
of value citizens place on their individual votes (Brennan & Pettit 1990, 327). 
It is important to mention that knowledge, by itself, does not necessarily promote social 
justice nor is it, in itself, necessarily desirable. For example, some individuals might favor unjust 
policies and equipping such individuals with knowledge will only increase their ability to 
effectively implement unjust policies (López-Guerra 2014, 35). Public voting is relevant here in 
one respect. Namely, if there is social consensus against some unjust political outcome (regardless 
of what one’s metric of justice is), then public voting will, prima facie, incentivize voting that is 
consistent with the perceived view of social justice. It dis-incentivizes voting for candidates or 
policies which are deemed, by the public at large, to be inconsistent with social justice. For this to 
be a positive argument for public voting, however, it must be the case that the public is 
(consistently) able to identify which policies or candidates are most in line with social justice. This 
is a further issue that I do not deal with in this paper.15  
 
 
                                               
convinced that public ignorance does not pose a problem for democratic procedures, then one will not care much for 
ways to counteract it.  
14 Furthermore, publicizing attendance merely increases political participation. This is only valuable insofar as voting 
is valuable regardless of how people vote. The EAP, on the other hand, tries to increase informed voting.  
15 The concern that knowledge is not sufficient for social justice is not only a concern for public voting. It therefore 
does not fare any worse (concerning this issue) than other arguments relating to the epistemic improvement of the 





III. Epistemic Improvement  
 
 Some of the proposals for public voting in the literature already mention possible 
epistemic benefits. I will discuss two separate contributions, one by Bart Engelen and Thomas Nys 
and one by Geoffrey Brennan and Phillip Pettit. I aim to extract and discuss the epistemic content 
from both of these contributions. To start with, let us consider some of the arguments made by 
Brennan and Pettit. They point to some of the epistemic benefits of the kind that the EAP proposes. 
The operative paragraph, which is worth quoting at length, is the following:  
 
To vote in a discursively defensible manner is to vote in such a way that you are able to 
argue with others, at least to the extent that they’re in a similar position, that they should 
follow the same path. It is to be able to represent your vote as a universalizable act: an act 
which is right, not just for you, but for anyone in the same sort of circumstances. If you are 
able to represent your act in this light then normally you must be able to show that it is 
supported by considerations that are as relevant for your audience as they are for you. Such 
considerations must subsume interests that are common to all, and not just your particular 
concerns. They must be considerations of the common good. They must bear, if not on 
matters of people’s welfare, at least on matters that all can recognize as relevant and 
important. (Brennan and Pettit 1990, 324) 
 
By lessening the secrecy of the ballot, citizens will be strongly motivated to vote in ways 
that can be discursively defended (Brennan and Pettit 1990, 326). Importantly, this discursive 
pressure will also disincentivize purely symbolic or ill-considered voting as such defenses will 
have little resonance in public conversation (Brennan and Pettit 1990, 327). Engelen and Nys make 
similar observations. Consider the following paragraph: 
 
The deliberative case for open voting can thus be based on the simple observation that it 
makes citizens more accountable to each other, which is thought to motivate them to inform 
themselves and to take the general interest into account. Selfish or even malicious 





publicly. Like public deliberation, open voting can be said to ‘launder’ or filter preferences, 
inducing people to become more public-spirited… (Engelen and Nys 2013, 495).  
The external discursive pressure makes electors think about what they will say when they 
are met with demands for explanation from their social surroundings and their answer to this 
question will likely consist of giving some explanation or rationale that others can understand or 
acknowledge. The central theoretical underpinning of the epistemic proposal is, then, that by 
having to defend one’s position, individuals are made to think about their own voting-choice and 
which reasons they have to offer others.16 Anticipating adversarial attitudes or opinions prompts 
one to marshal counter-arguments and explanations of one’s opinion (Mutz 2006, 63).  
This central theoretical claim gives rise to two distinct epistemic claims. The first claim is 
that publicity gives electors reasons to inform themselves while the second is that it gives electors 
reasons to vote in ways that can be publicly defended. Let us call the combination of these two the 
knowledge procurement incentive. Consider the first part of the knowledge procurement incentive: 
the claim here is that if electors know that their voting-choice will have to be defended at some 
point, they will take some basic measures to inform themselves about that choice. They will want 
to avoid having nothing to say when asked about it. This, presumably, also occurs when electors 
make an effort to identify the correct candidate. That is, if A cares about free trade policy, then the 
fact that others will know of her voting choice will give her an extra incentive to correctly identify 
the candidate which matches her attitude towards free trade. It is potentially embarrassing for A to 
publicly support free trade, but to have misidentified the free trade candidate, ending up voting for 
someone who is not in line with her political beliefs.  
The basic incentive to avoid appearing uninformed in front of others will, I suspect, appear 
quite familiar to most. If A knows that a specific topic will come up in conversation, A has some 
prima facie reason to inform herself about that topic if she is to partake in that conversation.17 
                                               
16 This has been referred to as having an ‘argument repertoire’ (Capella, Price, Nir 2002).   
17 This effect shows itself in empirical observation of political discussions. Conover, Searing and Crewe write in their 
study of focus groups: “Why do people avoid political discussion? Certainly, as political theorists worry, inequalities 
in resources or capacities discourage some citizens from even attempting discussion. In every focus group, some 
participants mentioned that lack of information, of the ‘facts’, kept them quiet. As an American woman explained, 
‘I’m not going to bring it up because I have not studied it; I’ve not read about it. And I don’t want to be made to look 





Imagine that A knows that she will have to defend a position during this conversation; this gives 
her an even stronger incentive to be informed about the topic. Something analogous happens in 
comparable situations. For example, students are motivated to inform themselves and to think 
about topics if they have to defend themselves in oral conversation.18 This basic form of incentive 
is similar to the one that EAP proposes to utilize. While the EAP does not perform any sort of test, 
it uses the same form of motivational factor that leads people to inform themselves. The EAP ‘test’ 
is merely the motivational factor of having one’s vote be scrutinized. One issue with traditional 
forms of voter competence tests is that they are prone to misuse and it is difficult to design them 
such that they approximate political and moral neutrality.19 The EAP stimulates the effects of 
undergoing a test on electoral politics while avoiding the contentious and problem-ridden 
prospects of having to design the tests themselves.  
 There is some encouraging empirical data to draw on here. Consider, for example, voting 
by mail, where electors mark their ballot in the presence of others. The special opportunity 
provided by voting by mail is “… for all voters, including those less politically engaged, to discuss 
ideas, candidates, and ballot measure with interpersonal contacts while making their voting 
choices.” (Reedy et al., 2016, 41). This form of voting increases the amount of political discussion 
electors engage in during the week of the election and there are “... positive benefits from the 
increased deliberative environment of vote by mail.” (Richey 2005, 441). In one survey, data 
suggests that more than one-third of vote-by-mail respondents discussed their choices with others 
as they filled out their ballots (Ready et al., 2016). Researchers also conclude that those willing to 
engage in discussion bear a strong resemblance to the electorate as a whole, while those with a “… 
stronger sense of partisanship are somewhat more likely to discuss their ballots with others, those 
who are less politically knowledgeable are also more likely to engage in those discussions.” (Reedy 
et al., 2016, 52). 
                                               
uncomfortable, unsure about it … they don’t feel confident to talk about politics.’ And when pushed by her friends to 
explain why she did not discuss politics publicly, one British woman insisted, ‘I’m not that brave’.” (Conover, Searing 
and Crewe 2004, 53).  
18 They are also sometimes given a grade to incentivize them. This, however, is not unlike the kind of social status or 
feeling of confidence that electors can experience when they are acknowledged by others as informed or capable of 
giving (good) reasons.      





The second leg of the knowledge procurement incentive concerns the motivation to vote in 
ways that can be publicly defended. The value of this, for Brennan and Pettit, is that motivating 
electors to vote in ways that can be publicly justified is one way of making it less likely that the 
electoral outcome will turn out to be contrary to the public interests of citizens (Brennan and Pettit 
1990, 326). The notion of ‘public’ here is not merely a justification that is given in public, it is also 
a justification that involves the use of public reasons. Offering public reasons concerns offering 
reasons that are understandable by others in different contexts. Brennan and Pettit suggest that 
purely selfish reasons will be less prevalent in public systems (Brennan and Pettit 1990, 324). The 
potential epistemic upshot of this process is that electors are motivated to inform themselves from 
the perspective of citizens in other circumstances. Public audiences are likely to represent a 
plurality of different characteristics – social, cultural, and political. If electors are driven to think 
about what they are to say for themselves, then they are actively seeking to inform themselves 
about how their vote relates to issues of the common good.20  
Some will most likely not think differently about their voting-choices due to publicity. 
Perhaps some will care more about tailoring their justification so that they merely give that 
impression. For this reason, the offering of public justification does not necessarily suggest an 
epistemically satisfactory process of deliberation. As Simone Chambers has pointed out, people 
can have well-thought-out, informed private reasons and have superficial, uniformed public 
reasons (Chambers 2004, 2005). While this is certainly true, publicity at least increases the 
incentive to think about electoral choices in terms of considerations of the common good.  
This line of reasoning faces an important objection. This is, as mentioned, the conformity 
objection. The objection is that electors will be incentivized to adopt the political preferences of 
the group they want to please the most. Inclusion, the objection goes, into groups does not 
necessarily motivate citizens to inform themselves, but may rather just incentivize them to vote 
the way they are expected to. This is a well-known political phenomenon. Politics can foster 
tribalism and partisanship, giving the impression that political views are about social and cultural 
belonging rather than argumentative engagements with others. A public rather than a secret ballot 
                                               
20 Notice that I am using the common good here in a deflationary sense. It is merely a shorthand for issues that 





will exacerbate such problems. Citizens voting in a neighborhood with strong liberal values, for 
example, will be expected to vote Democrat or independent. They are expected to do so because 
in that neighborhood the Democrats are considered the home team. Shame and ridicule might 
follow if citizens change (political) teams. For my purposes, the conformity problem is especially 
important because it has direct epistemic implications. If public voting does not incentivize 
discursive self-justification but rather mere social conformity, then this is potentially a decisive 
objection to the EAP. I now turn to this issue.  
 
The Conformity Objection  
 
Any serious epistemic argument for public voting must face the dangers of conformist 
social influence on electors. John Stuart Mill, a proponent of public voting in his day, was very 
aware that public opinion could overwhelm individuals, making their behavior and thoughts the 
results of imposed social norms rather than something resulting from their unique individuality. 
He eloquently expressed this worry in the following passage from On Liberty:  
 
Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of 
right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practices a social 
tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually 
upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more 
deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. (Mill 1859, 13)  
 
Public voting reinforces this Millian worry because it opens up the voting process to 
additional influence by external social factors.21 In one sense, the EAP suggests that it is desirable 
that the vote is exposed to the right amount and the right kind of social influence. However, the 
wrong kind or an excessive amount can hurt the epistemic possibilities of public voting. Bernard 
Manin has forcefully pushed the conformity objection. Before attending to his criticism, it is 
                                               
21 Interestingly, Mill on the one hand explicitly referenced the dangerous encroachment on individuality by public 





important to introduce the notion of observer group, as its introduction necessary for discussing 
Manin’s criticism. Observer group refers to the collection of individuals who know of someone’s 
vote. Thus, A’s observer group includes all those individuals who know how A has voted. Manin 
argues that the interaction between electors and their observer group is not likely to be a fair and 
epistemically satisfying process. He argues that if the voting records of millions of citizens are 
made available people cannot and will have no interest in surveying how everyone has voted. They 
also have no interest in looking up how strangers have voted. Instead, they will be inclined to look 
up how people in their social environment have voted – that is, friends, family, colleagues, etc. 
(Manin 2015, 211). Having one’s vote evaluated by such groups rather than by the general public 
is problematic, since there is “… no reason to expect this limited group to be vastly less 
particularistic, selfish, or narrow-minded than the person whose vote they control.” (Manin 2015, 
211). Furthermore, importantly, if citizens primarily check up on those in whom they are 
interested, “... such checking is likely to be driven by private and personal concerns, whether of a 
benevolent or a malevolent character.” (Manin 2015, 212). It is worth making explicit here that 
the issue that Manin is (also) pointing to, is, I take it, that if electors are incentivized to vote in 
ways that will satisfy their observer groups, then their vote will not be cast in terms of the common 
good. They will be cast in ways that reflect the equally selfish and particular political views of the 
observer groups.  
 
 Observer groups, then, can be epistemically bad. They are epistemically bad if they are 
highly partisan or one-sided, caring mostly about strict adherence to some policy or political party, 
without caring why that policy or party should be adhered to. The picture that Manin paints is akin 
to that of a criminal trial. Having a jury consisting of acquaintances of the defendant will not yield 
the right kind of (non-personal) evaluation of evidence. Similarly, having an observer group of 
acquaintances when voting raises similar concerns. What needs to be encouraged is deliberation 
with divergent views in order not to facilitate echo chambers in which electors are only confronted 
with views they already hold. If electors are placed in such political echo chambers, they are not 







I want to confront this objection in several ways. I will start by offering some theoretical 
points that are worth considering. Afterwards, I will argue on behalf of empirical data that Manin’s 
worry here is not decisive.  
 
First, it does not follow that, simply because observer groups are not appropriate judges of 
the common good, that those they judge will not be motivated to vote (more) on behalf of the 
common good. It might be that even epistemically bad observer groups will induce more voting 
on behalf of the common good than no observer groups. Imagine, for example, that there is general 
social pressure against voting for a candidate or policy because it is perceived to be against the 
common good. This might make A choose to not vote for that candidate, even though highly 
partisan outsiders incentivize A to do so. 
 
 Furthermore, even if electors do not (due to these observer groups) vote in a more public-
spirited way, this does not imply that electors are not incentivized to inform themselves. Imagine 
that A utilizes public voting in circumstances in which an epistemically partisan control-group (her 
family) are interested in evaluating A’s vote. Because they are highly partisan, they are not 
engaged in evaluating A’s vote by parameters of the public good, but are merely interested in 
making clear that A should believe what they believe. However, even though A is not incentivized 
to consider her vote in terms of the common good, it does not follow that A is not incentivized to 
inform herself. She might well be. These can be separate undertakings.  
 
Second, there is an important issue concerning the degree to which these phenomena take 
hold. For example, imagine that public voting incentivizes half the electorate to inform themselves 
and vote in a way that reflects their best judgment of the common good. In that case, even if 
publicity has no (epistemic) effect on half the population, there is still epistemic improvement 
concerning the other half. Even if publicity incentivizes a minority of electors to inform 
themselves, there is, all things being equal, an uptake in epistemic improvement. This obviously 
need not be the case. Imagine, for example, that 80% of observer groups are epistemically bad. 
Electors in such groups are not incentivized to inform themselves or to consider the common good 





even have a negative effect. For this to be the case, however, there would not only have to be a 
substantial number of bad observer groups, but these negative effects would also have to override 
other beneficial epistemic effects of public voting. These theoretical possibilities illustrate that it 
is not obvious that simply because some will be motivated by particularistic motives, that this 
necessarily spells epistemic trouble for public voting. It depends on the different degrees to which 
these effects take hold, and whether the problematic tendencies override the potential positive 
ones.  
 
The second rejoinder to Manin is that the EAP does not only rely on the epistemic 
circumstances of observer groups. To see this, consider the following distinction. 
 
1) The internal dimension: 
Electors are (internally) motivated because of the possibility that they may be confronted 
by others. It may turn out that they are never confronted, although this is not known by the 
voter at the time of the vote. It does not need to be the case that I need to actually be 
confronted in order for me to be incentivized to become more knowledgeable; the 
possibility that I may be confronted does the work.  
 
2) The external dimension:  
The external dimension concerns those external circumstances that must function in some 
specific way for the desired effect to take place. For example, imagine that A is held 
accountable by friends who are irrational about politics. They refuse to draw rational 
conclusions from the available political information. A’s political ignorance is not 
remedied, or even embarrassing for A, if these friends hold him accountable. For A to 
actually be held accountable in an epistemically satisfying way, someone else has to do so 
besides A’s irrational friends.  
 
The internal dimension signifies the incentive that holds independently of some specific 
configuration of one’s social circumstances while the external dimensions track the desired 





overlap with what Robert Goodin calls deliberation within. Deliberation within is the internal 
process of evaluating reasons and considering other points of view. This dialectical process is one 
in which individuals imagine that other people are present, and therefore imagine the kind of back-
and-forth exchange which would transpire between them (Goodin 2000). Similarly, one important 
epistemic aspect of public voting is that it heavily increases the motivation for voters to engage in 
such an internal process. It need not be the case that the voter is engaged in actual, external 
deliberation for this process to take hold. It just needs to be the case that they have some good 
reasons to engage in this process. Manin’s criticism does not take this part of the EAP seriously 
enough. He is right to point to the problem of epistemically skewed observer groups, but the 
internal dimension still does valuable epistemic work regardless of the existence of such groups. 
It might be objected here that the separation between internal and external circumstances is too 
staunch. If a voter knows that she will be questioned only by her (epistemically skewed, partisan) 
family, she will lack reasons to take an impartial, internal deliberative stance. The two dimensions 
cannot be entirely separated. While this is true, this again raises the question of to which degree 
such observer groups counteract internal deliberation. The fact that A has this observer group does 
not mean that she does not have sufficient reason to undertake (some) internal deliberation.  
 
The third rejoinder to Manin is that his argument fails to take into account the different 
ways in which public voting can be instituted. Recall that Manin’s criticism relies on thinking of 
public voting as entailing a massive database of voting-choices. This system is what generates the 
incentive for people to check up on the votes of those they know, which is what creates 
epistemically skewed observer groups in the first place. However, public voting need not function 
like this. It is premature to indict public voting in general because this specific form of public 
voting will have harmful consequences. One way, then, to combat the conformity problem is by 
way of institutional design. Before going into this issue, however, I will, as mentioned, also 
consider some of the empirical issues that relate to the conformity problem.  
 
 Manin raises the conformity problem without reference to empirical data, so it is tempting 
to engage solely in theoretical refutation against that which is solely theoretically asserted. Manin’s 





result, taking empirical data into account is important here. So, consider a recent review paper on 
some of the empirical findings on how agents behave under conditions of accountability. This 
review paper summarizes the results of 211 articles, all published from 1970 to 2016 (Aleksovska, 
Schillemans, Grimmelikhuijsen 2019). The studies when summarized understand accountability 
as a relationship between an actor and a forum in which the actor has an obligation to justify her 
conduct. This is an understanding of accountability characterized by “… an expectation of 
evaluating and need for justification …” (Aleksovska, Schillemans, Grimmelikhuijsen 2019, 5). 
The studies rely on experimental data, and the majority of the studies are laboratory studies (83%) 
with students as experimental subjects (73%) (Aleksovska, Schillemans, Grimmelikhuijsen 2019, 
5). The most “… frequently observed settings are audit evaluations (9%) and negations (9%), 
followed by performance evaluations (5%), and attitude expression (3%)” (Aleksovska, 
Schillemans, Grimmelikhuijsen 2019, 6). 
 
The authors summarize the results as follows: decision-makers facing accountability 
searched for more information, engaged in deeper information processing, used more analytical 
decision-making strategies, and showed higher integrative complexity in their thinking. They also 
invested more time and effort into their decision (Aleksovska, Schillemans, Grimmelikhuijsen 
2019, 8). The general conclusion is “… that accountability has an overwhelmingly positive effect 
on decision-making. Specifically, accountability improves the collection and treatment of 
information and stimulates more effortful decision-making.” (Aleksovska, Schillemans, 
Grimmelikhuijsen 2019, 8).  
 
Consider also a slightly older review paper by Jennifer Lerner and Philip Tetlock (1999). 
In this paper, the authors limit accountability to studies that look into the effects of the “… implicit 
or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to 
others.” (Lerner & Tetlock 1999, 255). They offer some empirical support for Manin’s argument, 
writing: “… experimental work has repeatedly shown that expecting to discuss one’s view with an 
audience whose views are known led participants to strategically shift their attitudes toward that 
of the audience.” (Lerner & Tetlock 1999, 256). However, they add an important caveat: these 





advance. When the views of the audience are unknown, people “… think in more self-critical, 
integratively complex ways in which they consider multiple perspectives on the issue and try to 
anticipate the objections that reasonable others might raise to positions that they might take.” 
(Lerner & Tetlock 1999, 257).  
 
These empirical results do not settle the specific empirical matter at hand. These are 
findings from controlled experiments and cannot, therefore, easily be applied to the complex world 
of interpersonal political deliberation of electors. However, that is not the ambition here. The 
ambition is to show that the conformity objection (advanced by Manin) is not decisive, and that 
there are empirical data suggesting that accountability has a range of beneficial effects on decision-
makers. The rational conclusion here seems to be that this warrants further empirical and normative 
consideration. This is particularly so when we consider the different ways in which public voting 
can function. As mentioned earlier, Manin objects to one specific form (an online database of 
everyone’s vote). There are, however, several distinct ways of implementing public voting. One is 
the model advocated by Brennan and Pettit,22 which I call Local Exposure. Brennan and Pettit 
describe their proposal in the following way: 
 
We believe that voting should be organized in a manner which means simply that no one 
can be sure that how he votes will be hidden from his friends and associates. This could be 
ensured by an arrangement under which a number of electors are allowed at the time into 
the polling station and each votes by an act which indicates his intention: if he votes A he 
may have to go to one booth, for example, if for B he may have to go to another. (Brennen 
and Pettit 1990, 327) 
 
Engelen and Nys raise some issues with Local Exposure. They suggest that this form of 
public voting does not solve the conformity problem. Specifically, they argue that if voting is 
observed by ‘friends and associates’ rather than unknown fellow citizens, this prompts voting in 
                                               
22 Lack of theoretical discussion of different models of public voting might give the impression that voting is either 
fully public (similar to the public voting of representatives) or fully secretive. Discussing specific models of publicity 






favor of social allegiances rather than what is best for all (Engelen and Nys 2013, 504). In other 
words, Brennan and Pettit’s proposal incorporates the wrong observer group. It seems, however, 
that part of the criticism by Engelen and Nys is overstated. Brennan and Pettit are not suggesting 
that ‘friends and associates’ ought to be present when someone votes but rather that electors cannot 
be sure that they will not be present. Still, Engelen and Nys are likely right in suggesting that those 
interested in observation are the acquaintances of the electors.   
 
This is not, however, an insurmountable problem for the Local Exposure model. One could 
modify the model such that it better accommodates the conformity problem. For example, one 
could randomly distribute timeslots to people in which they have to cast their votes. In order not 
to burden citizens too much, a timeslot could be three hours – from 1 pm to 4 pm, for example. 
Electors allotted this timeslot will have to vote during that time. Imagine now that only electors 
allotted that timeslot are allowed in the specific location at which the voting takes place. This 
would reduce the conformity worry since observer groups would be selected at random. It also 
does not seem too burdensome to allot a timeslot for electors. Electors are already made to vote on 
a specific day and in a specific place. Deciding that they must also cast their vote in a three-hour 
timeslot does not seem far outside the bounds of what is being done already. Alternatively, the 
time of voting could be voluntary, but there could be a small monetary compensation for voting 
within the allotted timeslot. This will motivate electors to act as randomly sampled observer groups 
for each other.  
 
Engelen and Nys propose a different model that they label Justification Day. On their 
scheme, a small percentage of voters (they suggest 1%) will have their votes revealed some time 
after the election. Those citizens who have had their votes revealed will have to attend small 
assemblies and discuss their voting-choices. Engelen and Nys speculate that by revealing a random 
one-percent of citizens’ votes, everyone will be incentivized to think through their voting-choice. 
The mere probability of being exposed will trigger ‘… more deliberative and public-spirited 






Notice that in both the Local Exposure (modified version) and Justification Day electors 
do not know in advance who their audience is. Both therefore fulfill the empirical criterion 
described by Lerner and Tetlock, that not knowing the views of the audience was instrumental for 
decision-makers thinking in more self-critical, complex, and perspectival ways (Lerner & Tetlock 
1999, 257). Likewise, as mentioned, these models are not public in the way that Manin imagines. 
There is no online register from which people will check to see how others (presumably their 
acquaintances) have voted. Manin’s worry about the crippling epistemic effects of conformity can, 
therefore, also be mitigated by adopting the proper kind of system. That is not to say that the 
conformity objection has been soundly refuted. It simply means there are good reasons that count 
against it and, because of this, these issues remain open.  
 
Before ending with a few concluding remarks, it is important to discuss one instrumental 
objection that can also have epistemic consequences. This is a worry concerning citizens 
abstaining from electoral participation due to publicity.   
 
An Epistemic Worry about Abstention  
 
Any form of public voting is more demanding than fully secretive voting. This might cause 
some to abstain rather than to vote.23 As well as being more demanding, public voting might 
potentially also increase the likelihood of social conflict. When engaging in political participation, 
people feel socially accountable to a range of different groups – workplace, family, and friends. 
Because these groups can be diverse, it becomes impossible to please them all (Mutz 2006, 106-
8). Some would likely choose to abstain from voting rather than risk compromising any of these 
social relationships.24 The evaluation of this problem depends on which value one places on 
political participation.25 I will focus on the epistemic dimension of this worry. Héléne Landemore 
has argued that a diversity of viewpoints is of high epistemic value (Landemore 2012). I assume, 
                                               
23 The worry about abstention is discussed in Engelen and Nys 2013, 501-2. 
24 There is an important difference here concerning different kinds of political participation. For example, if someone 
places low value on her ability to participate in a political demonstration, then it is easier for her to abstain from such 
activity. If she, on the other hand, cares deeply about casting a vote, then abstaining requires more substantial 
countervailing reasons.  





arguendo, that she is right in this. If public voting causes abstention, then it might also cause a 
drop-off in the diversity of viewpoints that decide the outcome, potentially hurting the epistemic 
circumstances of voting.  
 
There are some possible replies to this worry. First, there are good reasons why it is far 
from obvious that public voting has a purely negative effect on voter participation.26 As mentioned 
earlier, publicizing whether or not citizens have voted has been shown to increase voter turnout. 
Public voting, is, in effect, also a way of making public if electors vote. So even if publicity will 
make some abstain, others will actually be incentivized to vote because of the social pressure of 
going to the polls. Secondly, some might be emboldened to vote because it is public. Voting in 
front of others might re-invest the process of voting with renewed significance and importance for 
electors. Such significance might consist of being better able to visually display one’s political 
affiliation to others at the voting place. These are empirical issues, but there are at least some 
reasons to think that the consequences of publicity concerning participation will not be wholly 
negative.27   
 
Second, if the abstention worry is to be an epistemic defeater to the EAP, it must be the 
case that the epistemic deficit of abstention cancels out the epistemic benefit caused by those who, 
due to the pressure of publicity, inform themselves. Imagine, for example, that Local Exposure 
causes a ten percent drop in voter turnout. Even if that ten-percent includes those diverse 
viewpoints that would epistemically increase the quality of the electoral outcome, it is not evident 
that there has been an epistemic deficit. It might be that Local Exposure has caused twenty-five 
                                               
26 There is some empirical data suggesting that secrecy leads to abstention rather than participation. Jac C. Heckelman 
after surveying the literature, writes: “Empirical evidence has consistently shown that secret (or Australian) ballots, 
introduced in many states prior to the turn of the century, were responsible for a marked reduction in voter turnout 
rates.” (Heckelman 2000, 195). James Gardner has suggested: “It is possible that turnout declined because anonymity 
freed many voters to express their true preferences, which for many voters was that they preferred not to participate 
in electoral politics.” (Gardner 2011, 943). None of this is in any way conclusive. There are difficult empirical 
questions here about to which degree abstention in contemporary societies will increase or decrease. I reference this 
merely to illustrate why we should be skeptical of the a priori assumption that public voting will be purely harmful to 
political participation.  
27 There is some data to this effect concerning non-voting conditions. Lerner and Tetlock write: “Research on attitude 
change reveals that people who sense that an audience wants to control their beliefs will often respond to the threat to 





percent to inform themselves.28 This is not to say that abstention cannot cause an epistemic deficit, 
but that much more is needed to show that abstention is an epistemic defeater to the EAP. Notice 
also that the amount of abstention will likely depend on which model of public voting is used. The 
worry of low turnout, then, can also be mitigated by paying attention to the specific model of 
publicity.  
 
 Let me offer some brief concluding remarks. The opportunities provided by (different 
forms) of public voting are under-theorized both normatively and epistemically. This topic has 
interesting epistemic potential for democratic theory and for issues of institutional design. I hope 
to have remedied some of this absence in this paper. My primary objective has been to provide 
some of the theoretical and empirical reasons concerning the epistemic properties of publicity in 
voting – while little of this merits any definitive conclusions, it is, I hope, useful and instructive 















                                               
28 Additionally, viewpoints have to reach some minimum of epistemic competence in order for diversity to be 
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Voting, Privacy, and Electoral Autonomy –  
A Critique of the Democratic Value of Privacy 
 
Two traditional views hold that there is an important relation between privacy 
and democratic decision-making. The first view suggests that privacy furthers the 
kind of autonomy that is required on some conceptions of democracy. The second 
view links this value with the institution of private voting. I argue that both of 
these views face serious problems. The first view suggests a notion of autonomy 
that is ill fitting for democratic decision-making and the second view fails to 
justify the use of the private ballot.  
Keywords: Privacy, Voting, Secret Ballot, Autonomy, Democratic Theory.  
 Issues such as electoral malpractice and pernicious influence on voter behavior are, it 
seems, more pertinent than ever. The ability to micro-target specific electors (or would-be electors) 
based on massive data-sets and alternate ways of casting one’s ballot, such as mail-in voting or 
electronic voting, will challenge the ways in which democratic politics function. Problems are sure 
to emerge from this and dealing with such problems will likely involve developing better and more 
secure technologies while also potentially changing the legal system. These issues, however, also 
reacquaint us with the philosophical task of understanding what is potentially problematic about 
these practices, and what kind of threat they pose to the normative standards that we often apply 
to democratic participation. I offer no technological or legal solution to these issues. Instead, I 
analyze the philosophical underpinnings of these issues by examining the value of the autonomy 
of voters and the role that privacy plays in securing such autonomy. The traditional views on these 
issues are, surprisingly, problematic in several ways – and, because of this, call for renewed 
attention and consideration.  
Several theorists have claimed that privacy is important for democratic decision-making.1 
Privacy is important because it fosters and sustains the kind of autonomy needed for citizens to 
                                               
1 Brettschneider 2007; Lever 2015; Boone 1983, 8; Reiman 1995; Cohen 2000; Cohen 2013, 1912-1918; 
Nissenbaum 2010, 177-8; Susser, Roessler, Nissenbaum 2018, 3. 
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vote on behalf of their own political preferences. Let us call this the democratic value of privacy.2 
Some claim further that the institution of private voting is justified because of, or valuable for, this 
kind of autonomy.3 Call this the institutional value of privacy. This gives us the following outlines 
of the two views:  
(I) Democratic Value of Privacy:  
Privacy is important for democracy because it is beneficial for the kind of autonomy that 
democracy presupposes or requires.  
(II) Institutional Value of Privacy: 
The private ballot is valuable for, or justified due to, how it enables citizens to express their 
autonomous political preferences in the voting-booth.4 
Let me briefly clarify how these two views are related. The first view describes the 
(general) value that privacy has for democracy while the second view suggests that this value 
justifies the specific institution of private voting. An appropriate analogy here is the one-person-
one-vote voting scheme. The basis for this scheme, according to some, is that persons are moral 
equals and deserving of equal respect. This equality justifies an egalitarian voting-scheme because 
such a scheme affords each person equal influence and is, therefore, a way of treating them as 
moral equals.5 (I) and above (II) work in the same way. There is a general principle that explains 
why privacy is important and this importance justifies or is reflected in the way in which voting is 
private.6  
                                               
2 Dorota Mokrosinska summarizes the democratic value view as follows: “A number of scholars have argued that the 
exercise of privacy creates conditions for the enhancement of independent political judgement and in this way 
contributes to the formation of citizens’ political preferences and reasoned political discourse.” (Mokrosinska 2018, 
125). 
3 Reiman 1995, 42; Brettschneider 2007, 75-6; Nissenbaum 2010, 176-7; Birch and Watt 2004, 65; Paulo and Bublitz 
2019, 61. Note that private voting refers to the way in which electors are able to vote in the privacy of the voting 
booth. I use this description throughout the paper. It is important to note that this feature of voting is not identical with 
the institution of secretive voting. I explore this difference in the latter part of the paper.  
4 There is a difference depending on whether private voting is valuable for or justified because of autonomy. I attend 
to this difference on page 9.  
5 Dahl 2006, 4.  
6 This analogy is imperfect since the moral equality of persons is different from (I) the democratic value of privacy. 
Moral equality is an axiom while (I) is an instrumental claim about why privacy is valuable.  
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I argue that both (I) and (II) are faulty in various ways. The first view makes an illicit move 
from privacy being valuable for the private lives of citizens to it being valuable for ideals for 
democratic participation. The second view is insufficient because it does not justify why voting in 
private should express the value of autonomy rather than a host of other possible arrangements.  
The Democratic Value of Privacy 
Let me start by describing both views in detail. I will start with the democratic value of 
privacy. Ruth Gavison has given the standard formulation of this view:   
Privacy is also essential to democratic government because it fosters and 
encourages the moral autonomy of the citizen, a central requirement of a 
democracy. Part of the justification for majority rule and the right to vote is the 
assumption that individuals should participate in political decisions by forming 
judgments and expressing preferences. (Gavison 1980, 455) 
As Gavison suggests, democratic rule presumes that citizens can express and act on behalf 
of their own political preferences. Privacy is, according to this view, a way of fostering and 
maintaining the political preferences of citizens. Different scholars have expressed this view in 
different ways.7 I will therefore focus on a few select descriptions in what follows.  
There seems to be some common ground concerning what is (democratically) worrisome 
about a lack of privacy. For example, Julie Cohen suggests that if behavior is being tracked or 
observed, people will be prone to think and behave in more conformist ways. This is because the 
experience of “… being watched will constrain, ex-ante, the acceptable spectrum of belief and 
behavior.” (Cohen 2000, 1426). The condition of non-privacy will not only “… chill the expression 
of eccentric individuality, but also, gradually, […] dampen the force of our aspirations to it.” 
(Cohen 2000, 1426). 
I understand Cohen’s view here to be that if A knows that both her behavior and her beliefs 
will be publicly known, then A will be (strongly) incentivized to behave and think in ways that 
                                               
7 Brettschneider 2007; Reiman 1995; Cohen 2013, 1912-1918; Cohen 2000; Susser, Roessler, & Nissenbaum 2018, 
3; Nissenbaum 2010, 177. 
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align with what is deemed publicly acceptable and appropriate. Not only will this lead A to behave 
and think differently in certain situations; it also means that A will (potentially) not even develop 
the habits and state of mind needed to pursue her autonomous beliefs and desires.  
Cohen’s point does not only apply to individual behavior and thought. It applies, 
importantly for my purposes, to political participation as well. Much like conditions of non-privacy 
will incentivize behavior that falls within the spectrum of acceptability, so will conditions of non-
privacy negatively affect political deliberation and participation. Informed and reasoned political 
deliberation and participation require a wide variety of views, but such views are unlikely to 
develop or be brought up, since “… examination chills experimentation with the unorthodox, the 
unpopular, and the merely unfinished.” (Cohen 2000, 1426).  
Cohen’s worry about political participation here concerns (mainly) epistemic worries. 
What is troublesome are the effects on reasoned and informed debate. Let us call this the epistemic 
value of privacy for political participation.  
 Jeffrey Reiman expresses the same kind of concern as Cohen does. He appeals to the same 
kind of conditions of non-privacy and suggests that being subject to public review will lead people 
“… to act in safe ways, to hold and express and manifest the most widely-accepted views, indeed, 
the lowest-common denominator of conventionality.” (Reiman 1995, 41). On this view, being 
subject to public observation will lead people to act and think in ways that are demanded by social 
conventions rather than their own autonomous agency.8 I take Reiman’s position to be, then, that 
if more of A’s behavior is open to public observation, then A will begin to behave and think in 
ways that the public finds acceptable. This will induce A to be less able to distance herself from 
her surroundings, as she is pressured to think about herself from the vantage point of ‘the public’.9 
These worries are very similar to the concerns that Cohen raises. And, like Cohen, Reiman 
also suggests that this has implications for democratic participation. The value of democracy, 
Reiman notes, is premised on the idea that citizens can form their own autonomous political views 
                                               
8 Reiman 1995, 41-42. 
9 Thomas Nagel makes a similar point: “We also have to learn, especially in adolescence, not to be overwhelmed by 
a consciousness of other people’s awareness of and reaction to ourselves – so that our inner lives can be carried on 
under the protection of an exposed public self over which we have enough control to be able to identify with it, at least 
in part.” (Nagel 1998, 4). 
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and express these in the democratic process. If conditions are not such that citizens can develop 
these autonomous views, then democratic voting “... becomes mere voluntary conformity.” 
(Reiman 1995, 42). Reiman’s worry here is not that voting becomes formally unfree or unequal, 
rather, it is a worry about the value of voting. Voting, in Reiman’s view, becomes worthless if it 
merely expresses conformist preferences that electors uncritically accept. Privacy is important in 
this context because it shields citizens from extensive outside social pressure and helps citizens 
think independently about their political beliefs.10  
Unlike Cohen, Reiman does not refer to epistemic benefits. Rather, he seems to suggest 
that expressing autonomous political views is intrinsically valuable, regardless of their epistemic 
outcomes. Call this the intrinsic value of political participation. 
Reiman’s account leaves some important issues untouched. Most importantly, it is difficult 
to ascertain when preferences are autonomous according to this view and when they are not. 
Reiman does suggest that autonomy is related to accepting principles based on ‘critical review’ 
rather than absorbing principles without questioning them. While plausible, this answer only tells 
us something about how the agent should process information coming from outside influences.11 
This is, prima facie, unrelated to issues of privacy and non-privacy. One can accept principles 
carefully and critically or in an unquestioned manner in conditions of both privacy and non-
privacy. Reiman’s position must be, then, that conditions of privacy are more conducive to the 
kind of critical reflection needed if individuals are to avoid uncritically conforming to public 
opinion. This answer, however, raises an additional issue. It seems Reiman is particularly worried 
about how social conventions will make emotions “… simpler, safer and more predictable, less 
nuanced and more interchangeable.” (Reiman 2000, 41) He is also worried about the effects this 
will have on the “… personal core that is the source of criticism of convention, of creativity, 
rebellion, and renewal.” (Reiman 2000, 42). However, these outcomes might also follow from 
careful and critical acceptance of social conventions. It is perfectly imaginable that someone after 
careful reflection comes to accept social conventions, and, because of this, lives and thinks as 
                                               
10 Reiman 1995, 41-42. 
11 Put differently: it tells us something about the internal perspective that agents must have. It says little about the 
external ways by which electors can be influenced.  
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mandated by these conventions. It is unclear on this account whether such an outcome is 
problematic or not. I will set these difficulties to one side for the remainder of this paper.12  
 Lastly, consider Corey Brettschneider’s view. Brettschneider’s view concerns decisional 
privacy rather than informational privacy, but his view is similar to that of Cohen and Reiman.13 
Autonomous decisions and judgments are, on Brettschneider’s view, part of the democratic ideal.14 
This means that a “… presumption of a right to privacy is defensible in part because privacy is 
necessary for individuals to develop the capacity to reason autonomously as citizens.” 
(Brettschneider 2010, 75). Privacy is important for forming independent judgments since “… in 
order to judge, one must have some critical distance from public discussion and a conceptual space 
within which to make up one’s mind.” (Brettschneider 2010, 76). 
Much like Reiman and Cohen, then, Brettschneider suggests that privacy is valuable, in 
part, because it facilitates autonomy by creating some distance between those who render their 
judgments and their social surroundings. The value of privacy is, then, according to all three views, 
tied to the value of expressing autonomous political judgments. A further issue arises here of 
spelling out why autonomous judgments are especially important in the context of political 
participation. While Cohen hints at the epistemic benefits of having properly formed autonomous 
views, there are some additional reasons to take into consideration. Think of the following 
example, provided by Loren King. He asks us to imagine Marty – a 30-year old who lives with his 
parents and follows their advice in every significant decision in his life, including what he should 
believe politically and how he should vote.15 King argues that when Marty proclaims his support 
for a candidate or policy, he is not “… the author of the laws we together legislate and obey; at 
best, he is a faithful delegate on behalf of his parents, thus over-representing their positions on 
political matters.” (King 2011, 35). 
                                               
12 I regard Reiman’s account as a large-scale picture of what he believes to be problematic about the lack of privacy 
and the relevance thereof for democratic participation. He is not trying to spell out exactly when lack of privacy results 
in non-autonomous decisions nor what kind of external influence renders decisions non-autonomous. 
13 Brettschneider understands decisional privacy as “… the individual’s right to a sphere of intimate decision making 
free from state coercion and public scrutiny.” (Brettschneider 2007, 71).  
14 Brettschneider 2007, 74-5. 
15 King 2011, 35. 
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 King is here pointing to two different issues with the non-autonomous voter. First, because 
Marty is merely parroting the views of his parents, his preferences are not influencing political 
outcomes.16 Second, the views of his parents are being over-represented because he votes on their 
behalf.  
The Institutional Value View  
The institutional value view simply adds institutional design to the democratic value 
view.17 It holds that the value of autonomy expressed in the democratic value view justifies, or is 
reflected in the way in which voting is private. Several scholars express this view.18  
Brettschneider holds the institutional value view. He writes:  
A presumption of a right to privacy is defensible in part because privacy is 
necessary for individuals to develop the capacity to reason autonomously as 
citizens. In deciding how to vote, citizens are entitled to freedom from coercion and 
to a “private space” in which to make up their own minds through the exercise of 
political judgment. The privacy of the voting booth serves to enhance the sense that 
we are free to make our own decisions without external coercion. (Brettschneider 
2007, 75)19 
 Brettschneider advocates the institutional value view by suggesting that citizens are entitled 
to a ‘private space’ because this is a way of treating citizens as autonomous rulers and decision-
makers. The value of independent (political) judgment, at least in part, justifies the institution of 
private voting.  
 Before moving on, it is important to clarify a possible ambiguity in Brettschneider’s view. 
In the quoted passage, he refers to freedom from external coercion and he also, in other places, 
                                               
16 Although if Marty’s preference is to parrot his parents, then his preferences are registered. This view, then, must 
assume that Marty has a set of ‘true’ or ‘real’ preferences that is distinct from those he affirms from his parents.  
17 Issues of privacy seem closely tied to issues of institutional design. If citizens are to develop and maintain autonomy, 
they need physical spaces in which they can think and reflect without the interference of others (Koops 2018, 29; 
Richards 2008, 412-3). 
18 Reiman 1995, 42; Brettschneider 2007, 75; Nissenbaum 2010, 176-7; Birch and Watt 2004, 65; Richards 2015, 100. 
19 Cursive added.   
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refers to the practice of vote buying.20 If all he means by autonomy, in this context, is the absence 
of coercion of voters and the avoidance of vote buying, then he is plainly not concerned with the 
kind of autonomy that privacy is important for – and, therefore, he is not advocating the 
institutional value view after all.  
 While it is true that Brettschneider is concerned with coercion and vote buying because 
they would violate electors’ autonomy, autonomy is not the mere lack of these forms of external 
coercion.21 He says as much when he suggests the “… privacy of the voting booth serves to 
enhance the sense that we are free…” (Brettschneider 2007, 75) and that privacy is “… necessary 
for individuals to develop the capacity to reason autonomously as citizens.” (Brettschneider 2010, 
75). He also suggests that “… in order to judge, one must have some critical distance from public 
discussion and a conceptual space within which to make up one’s mind.” (Brettschneider 2010, 
76). It is, I think, quite clear here that he does not equate autonomous judgment with lack of 
external coercion. He is explicitly concerned with the kind of independence of mind that requires 
‘critical distance’ from public discussion and the institutions that treat electors as autonomous self-
rulers in this way.  
 There are additional reasons not to equate autonomy with the lack of coercion. If 
autonomous judgment merely meant the absence of coercion, then Brettschneider’s overall 
normative framework becomes less clear. Surely, the avoidance of electoral coercion is important 
for reasons unrelated to the values of privacy. Practices such as coercion that subvert the autonomy 
of electors should be avoided on purely procedural grounds without having to appeal to the 
democratic ideals of the autonomous political judgments of citizens.22 In addition, Brettschneider 
is explicitly concerned with privacy having an intrinsic value.23 If its value consists in the reduction 
of coercion and vote buying then it would be instrumentally valuable and not intrinsically valuable.   
Reiman also holds a view close to the institutional value view, although without explicitly 
referring to the voting-booth. Autonomy, in his view, “... requires a kind of space in which to 
                                               
20 Brettschneider 2007, 24. 
21 There is a potential issue of categorizing ‘vote buying’ as coercion, as this is (under certain circumstances) an act 
of coercion. It is done merely for the sake of convenience.  
22 There are also, prima facie, wrongs related to vote-buying which do not concern the inability to express autonomous 
political preferences. For example, it can skew the political power of electors.  
23 Brettschneider 2007, 73. 
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reflect on and entertain beliefs, and to experiment with them – a private space.” Without such 
autonomy, “... democratic voting becomes mere ratification of conventionality, and individual 
freedom mere voluntary conformity.” (Reiman 1995, 42). Helen Nissenbaum also expresses the 
institutional value view. She writes:  
Specifically, the drama of enforced privacy – the curtained voting booth – signals 
to voters that they are alone and free to make their selections.” (Nissenbaum 2010, 
176) 
 Notice that Nissenbaum does not say that voting in private is justified because of the value 
of autonomy, but that voting in private reflects the value of autonomy.24 These are different views. 
I can hold that B reflects the value of A and also hold that A does not justify B. I can also hold that 
A justifies B while also holding that the value of A is not reflected in B. While there is a discernable 
difference between these views, this difference does not matter for the arguments of this paper. 
The objections I raise concern both views.  
 Objections to the Democratic Value View   
I will argue that both the democratic value view and the institutional value view suffer 
some substantial problems. I will start with the democratic value view. There are two issues with 
this view. The first issue I want to raise is that some advocates of this view assume that the value 
of autonomy in private life is translatable into a similar (or equal) value when considering 
democratic decision-making. This kind of move is problematic. If autonomy has an important 
function or is an important value in the lives of citizens, it does not follow that it has the same 
function or the same value when assessing the democratic decision-making of citizens.  
This problematic inference occurs in Cohen’s epistemic defense of the value of privacy for 
political participation. As described earlier, she argues that public exposure will incentivize 
behavior and thought that gravitates towards the mainstream and the popular. The chilling effects 
                                               
24 This is clear from her suggestion that the voting-booth signals that they are alone and free to make their choices. 
Autonomy is, on this view, of particular significance in the context of democratic elections (Nissenbaum 2010, 176-
177).   
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of exposure will mean that citizens act and think in narrower spectrums of public acceptability. 
This, according to Cohen, is also harmful to political participation and discourse. She writes:  
The formation and reformation of political preferences – essential both for reasoned public 
debate and informed exercise of the franchise – follows the pattern already discussed: 
Examination chills experimentation with the unorthodox, the unpopular and the unfinished. 
A robust and varied debate on matters of public concern requires the opportunity to 
experiment with self-definition in private ... (Cohen 2000, 1426)  
While we might agree with Cohen that too much public exposure will set limits on what is 
seen as acceptable behavior and thinking, it is much more ambiguous whether such public 
exposure is hostile to ‘political preferences’ and ‘reasoned public debate’. Think of, for example, 
how the political discussions and decision-making of politicians are public.25 Their political 
dealings (voting and deliberation) are often made available to the public such that the public can 
hold them accountable. If discussion and decision-making are done in private, politicians are freer 
to disregard and remain uninfluenced by the interests and views of the public. Deliberating in 
public means that one is less able to offer self-interested views.26 It can also be that political 
debates, by being public, incorporate more points of view and more experimental and unorthodox 
points of view than if held in private. A public audience means that a broader pool of ideas has the 
potential of influencing the debate, which might yield an increase in the kinds of experimental and 
unorthodox viewpoints that Cohen attributes to the practices of privacy. Furthermore, consider 
also that unorthodox and experimental viewpoints are not, by themselves, valuable as political 
statements or for public debate. While unorthodox and experimental political viewpoints can be 
important for enlarging the pool of ideas or for critically assessing mainstream opinions, they 
might also be unorthodox or experimental in ways that are not obviously valuable, or even harmful. 
For example, an opinion might be unorthodox in the sense of holding to highly contentious views 
about sexual or racial equality.  
One might object that this misunderstands Cohen’s view. What I mention are specific 
instances of publicity while Cohen is concerned with the capacity for autonomous choice. What 
                                               
25 For a discussion of the epistemic merits of publicity, see Chambers 2004. 
26 Conover, Searing, & Crewe 2002, 26-27. 
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Cohen is arguing, according to this objection, is that those who participate in political debate and 
participation must be able to develop their (political) views in conditions of privacy and then bring 
these views to bear in the political arena. She is not claiming that specific instances of publicity 
will hurt deliberation or participation.  
I do not find this objection convincing. Although Cohen is most certainly concerned with 
how privacy is important for developing autonomy, she is also, explicitly, concerned with how the 
“… experience of being watched will constrain, ex-ante, the acceptable spectrum of belief and 
behavior.” The examples I have brought up are specific examples of when it is (epistemically) 
valuable that officials and politicians experience ‘being watched’, and so these examples seem to 
be legitimate counter-examples.  
There seems, then, to be a mixture of potential benefits and drawbacks to conditions of 
publicity and non-publicity as they relate to public debate and political participation. What about 
the non-epistemic, intrinsic value of autonomous political participation? Here, again, there seems 
to be a problematic inference from the value of autonomy in private life to it being valuable for 
democratic participation.   
To see this, think of voters that are, in Reiman’s sense, autonomous. They have developed 
their own views through stringent examination and they are highly independent in their (political) 
thinking. It is possible that these autonomous voters can vote on behalf of morally arbitrary 
preferences. Imagine, for example, that the autonomous preference of these electors is to vote on 
behalf of the physical appearance of candidates.27 Alternatively, imagine electors who have the 
autonomous preference to vote only for candidates of certain races. Similarly, there might be 
autonomous, ignorant political participation. Think of an autonomous elector who also happens to 
be ignorant of the issues on which she is voting. Instead of informing herself, the voter reflects 
upon her ignorance and concludes that she will toss a coin to decide how to vote. She comes to 
this conclusion without much (if any) outside interference. The decision to toss a coin is an 
autonomous decision that she herself comes to. 
                                               
27 Voting with an emphasis on physical appearance is a well-known electoral phenomenon (White, Kenrick, & 
Neuberg, 2013; Lenz 2011). 
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 If autonomous political decisions are intrinsically valuable, then there is something 
valuable about voting in the ways just outlined. Reiman and others can maintain that while ignorant 
or arbitrary voting is not desirable, it is at least desirable that these are autonomous preferences. If 
this is the case, however, there has to be some normative difference between someone who votes 
on behalf of their autonomous racist views and someone who votes on behalf of racist views in a 
non-autonomous way. If the intrinsic view is right, the former is valuable in a way the second is 
not.  
One potentially relevant difference concerns legitimacy.28 If legitimacy requires that 
policies are based on the autonomous preferences of electors, then outcomes produced by non-
autonomous views would lack legitimacy. Such outcomes would not reflect the (real) preferences 
of the electorate.29 On this view, then, autonomous ignorant voting confers legitimacy on the 
outcome while non-autonomous ignorant voting does not. This is what makes autonomous 
ignorant voting valuable in a way that non-autonomous ignorant voting is not. 
This answer only seems to push the problem back one further. Even though an elector 
autonomously decides at random how to vote, the fact that she herself has made this decision 
confers legitimacy on the outcome. It is, prima facie, unclear why the autonomous preference to 
toss a coin confers legitimacy on the outcome while the non-autonomous preference to vote for 
candidate X does not.30 Defenders of the democratic value view who are concerned about 
legitimacy might agree that not all autonomous preferences are legitimacy conferring. This 
suggestion, however, implies that autonomous preferences are not, on this view, intrinsically 
important for legitimacy, which makes it more unclear what kind of value autonomy has on their 
view to begin with.  
Another possible reply from defenders of the democratic value view is that non-
autonomous voting presents a problem of over-representation that does not occur when electors 
vote for arbitrary reasons. If A is excessively influenced by B and A votes because of this 
influence, then A’s (real) preferences are not registered while B has her preferences registered 
                                               
28 Defenders of the democratic value view need not worry about legitimacy at all. This is a possible further position 
they might affirm.  
29 For a defense of this view, see Paulo & Bublitz 2019.  
30 The example of coin tossing comes from David Estlund. See Estlund 2008.  
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twice.31 With both morally arbitrary and ignorant, autonomous voting, A’s preferences are counted 
and no other elector has, qua their influence, had their preferences counted twice. 
While this replay points to something correct, the worry that B has her preferences counted 
twice is only circumstantially related to non-autonomous voting. It might be that B’s influence on 
A causes A to abstain from voting, for example. More importantly, if the worry is that some 
electors have their preferences counted more than once, then the concern is about unequal 
influence on political outcomes, not that some electors vote non-autonomously – and, if so, then 
the democratic value view has misidentified the normative core of the worry. 
Lastly, consider a related issue. External pressure can dissuade individuals from doing 
something they ought not to do. Consider Billy:  
The Autonomous Climate Change Denier 
Billy is a political activist. He spends large amounts of time and money on political 
issues. Billy is also a climate change denier. He believes that climate science is a 
conspiracy concocted by evil globalists. Billy wants to donate to political forces to 
politically and legally enforce climate denial. Billy has fostered his climate change 
activism through long hours of careful, reflective activity in which he has not been 
excessively influenced by any outside force. His denial is a product of his own 
autonomous agency. He wants to donate ten thousand dollars to this political goal. 
However, because such donations are public, Billy is compelled by the potential of 
social stigma and ridicule to not donate the money. His politically autonomous 
action has been thwarted by public opinion.  
If someone is of the view that it is morally problematic to enforce the political platform of 
climate change denial, then it is not clear that the influence of outside forces on Billy’s decision 
here is normatively troubling. Quite the contrary, external interference compels Billy to abstain 
from doing something that he ought not to do. If Billy is afforded an opportunity to donate the 
money without outside interference (e.g. donate anonymously), then Billy can act on his 
autonomous decision but he might do so towards improper ends. This is a clear instance of 
                                               
31 This issue of overrepresentation is described on page 6.   
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someone who foregoes acting on his own (autonomous) wants because of the pressure of public 
opinion and social convention. Billy is forced to consider his actions from the vantage point of 
‘the public’ and ‘being watched’ clearly constrains his behavior. While the democratic value view 
is right in suggesting that external pressure will constrain Billy’s autonomous decisions, such 
constraints, under circumstances of collective decisions, need to be problematic. At best, in the 
case of the influenced climate change denier, it is morally ambiguous whether this is so. This 
judgment changes if Billy is (somehow) forced to reveal his opinions or thoughts on climate 
change. It would be, prima facie, an encroachment on Billy’s autonomy if he cannot even form his 
own opinions without being sanctioned by external forces. However, this cannot easily be 
translated into an equal or similar value when we consider Billy’s participation in collective 
decisions. If he acts towards improper ends, it is not obvious that external forces compelling him 
not to do so are always troubling. This, again, speaks to a rather limited conclusion. Being able to 
act politically on autonomous decisions is not necessarily desirable, and being dissuaded, because 
of external forces, from acting on autonomous decisions is not necessarily troublesome.   
 The inference that I am problematizing is the move from suggesting that privacy is 
important for the autonomy (or development thereof) of individuals to it being valuable for 
democratic participation. When we move to collective political decisions, several further criteria 
are important for deciding whether participation is valuable. As mentioned, there are standards of 
being well informed, voting for good reasons, or working towards morally desirable ends. The 
point here is merely that the value of autonomy cannot (without problems) be extended to political 
participation because there are additional criteria of valuable participation that make it unclear 
what the value of autonomy is when these criteria are made apparent.   
Objections to the Institutional Value View  
So far, I have criticized the democratic value view on two grounds. I have argued that the 
epistemic and normative dimensions of the view suffer problems. I now move on to the 
institutional value view. As described earlier, this is the view that the democratic value justifies or 
is reflected in the practice of private voting. I argue that this view has serious problems. The central 
issue with the institutional value view is that it does not justify the contemporary use of the private 
ballot at all. I offer three arguments for this conclusion. (i) There is an arbitrary connection between 
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autonomy and private voting. (ii) Autonomy is compatible with public voting. (iii) Autonomy is 
compatible with (or even favorable of) optional privacy. Before moving on to (i), (ii), and (iii) it 
is important to mention that I assume that those who advocate the institutional value view think of 
‘private voting’ as referring to the secret ballot. However, the central idea that underlies (i), (ii) 
and (iii) is that the use of private ballots (ballots that afford electors privacy) is not identical with 
the secret ballot. There are several circumstances related to the secret ballot that are not justified 
by appealing to privacy. I explore these circumstances in (i), (ii), and (iii) below.  
(i) The arbitrary connection between Autonomy and Private Voting  
 The first problem with the institutional value view is that there is only an arbitrary 
connection between the value of autonomy and the practice of private voting. If the autonomous 
expression of electoral preferences is valuable it does not follow that this value should be expressed 
through the use of private voting. The question that faces this view is the following: why is 
autonomous judgment best expressed by this specific institution of voting, rather than a host of 
other circumstances that might be equally or more important for creating and maintaining 
autonomous judgment? For example, does the institutional value also provide support for the 
banning of certain political ads or campaigns? Does it prohibit political endorsements from 
influential individuals or organizations? Does it give certain rights to citizens that their political 
judgments remain un-influenced in other ways?  
Consider, for example: 
Electors’ Independence Day  
In the country of Democracia, two days before each general election media outlets are 
legally prohibited from airing political messages of any kind. People are also allowed to 
take one of these two days off from work. They are encouraged during their day off to think 
about their voting-choice. They can do so without the outside influence of mass media.  
If the institutional value view is concerned with having citizens express autonomous 
judgment, it is, prima facie, unclear why it does not justify Electors Independence Day instead of, 
or alongside measures such as voting in private. It might be that Electors’ Independence Day is a 
much more efficient way of achieving the goal of autonomous expression of political preferences. 
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Electors Independence Day allows electors to have considerable time for reflection before the 
election while the institutional value view highlights only the moment of casting the ballot. It is 
equally unclear why the institutional value view does not justify the host of other potential states 
of affairs that might be equally or more conducive to the expression of the autonomous judgments 
of electors.  
There are several reasons for not implementing all these different measures that would be 
conducive to the autonomy of electors. Perhaps it is too costly to have every elector take a day off. 
Perhaps some of the activities or prohibitions have very little effect on the formation of the political 
preferences of citizens. Perhaps it might be (practically) difficult to protect citizens from the 
influence of political pundits, campaigns, and organizations. It might also be that the privacy of 
the voting booth is the most effective and practically feasible option for maintaining autonomous 
judgment.32 This might be so. However, it is not obvious that it is so. And, even if it were obvious, 
why does the institutional value view not also justify these other ways of enabling the autonomous 
judgments of citizens? Even if private voting is the most effective, it would still be valuable to 
enhance the autonomy of citizens even further. Those who affirm the institutional value view might 
suggest that this is not a problematic implication of their view. They might agree that the view 
does imply that we should institute all these measures to protect autonomous political judgment, 
while also suggesting that there are overriding reasons not to do so. As such, they hold that 
Electors’ Independence Day is prima facie normatively warranted on their view.  
I do not think that this solves the issue that I raise. The examples I have brought up do not 
function as a reductio of the principle of autonomous judgment itself, but, rather, highlight that the 
institutional value view, prima facie, justifies all kinds of different empirical arrangements that 
will further autonomous judgment. The institutional value view tells us very little about why it 
should justify the specific institution of secret voting rather than other comparable initiatives.33 It 
                                               
32 Some may favor a prohibition of political advertisements or favor an increase in the regulation of social space such 
that electors are not as (perniciously) influenced as they are now. 
33 Some might additionally be worried about the way in which the institutional value view’s justification of the secret 
ballot is contextual and empirical. If it turns out, for example, that the banning of certain types of political campaigns’ 
ads is more conducive to autonomy than citizens voting in private, then the institutional value view will, prima facie, 
suggest the banning of such ads to be more important than voting in private. If it turns out that voting in private does 
little to secure the autonomous judgments of voters, then the institutional value view does little to justify it. See Lever 
2015 for an expression of this worry.  
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is a theoretical weakness of the view that it justifies a huge array of different options while leaving 
little opportunity to distinguish between which (if any or all) should be adopted.  
 It might be that the institutional value view does not think of privacy as an empirically 
necessary condition for autonomy. This is, for example, Brettschneider’s view.34 Rather than being 
an empirical proposition, a presumption of privacy is a sign of respect for the ability of citizens to 
exercise their autonomous judgment. Citizens are treated as autonomous when they are afforded 
the privacy of the voting booth.35 While this is a reason for Brettschneider (and anyone else who 
endorses the institutional value view on non-empirical grounds) to object to the idea that the 
institutional value can end up justifying a wide range of empirical circumstances, it only pushes 
the problem back further. Why not show this precondition or sign of respect by having some other 
configuration of circumstances? The institutional value view could just as well advocate Electors’ 
Independence Day as a way of treating citizens as autonomous self-rulers.  
 One might raise an epistemic objection to the above argument. Just because we do not know 
where to draw the line does not mean that there is no line to be drawn. This reply seems fair 
enough. However, it misunderstands the purpose of this initial challenge. By posing these 
questions, I do not assume that there is no line to be drawn. Instead, I am critical of those who do 
draw the line, namely those who propose that the justification for private voting lies in autonomous 
judgment. If we cannot know where the line is, then that equally goes for the institutional value 
view. 
(ii) Autonomy is compatible with public voting 
The second deficiency with the institutional value view is that it is compatible with public 
voting. What is important on the institutional value view is that privacy protects and secures 
autonomy in decision-making. This is, however, compatible with different forms of public voting. 
This is so because electors can vote in private but have their voting-choice become public post-
                                               
34 He writes: “Nothing in my claim relies on the suggestion that privacy is an empirically necessary condition for these 
capacities. Slave narratives, for instance, provide evidence of persons’ ability to develop such capacities despite their 
utter lack of freedom” (Brettschneider 2012, 76).  
35 Brettschneider 2012, 76. 
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election.36 Consider the kind of voting-system that Geoffrey Brennan and Phillip Pettit have 
suggested. They imagine a system in which each candidate or political party has a marked voting 
booth and electors have to go to these voting-booths to cast their ballots for that specific candidate 
or party.37 Under such a voting-scheme, voting takes place in private, but the voting-choices of 
electors are publicly observable. The issue here is that the institutional value view highlights the 
privacy dimension of the current voting-scheme rather than anonymity. However, these are distinct 
concepts. James Gardner has suggested that the difference is that “... privacy generally conceals 
that a thing has been done. Anonymity, in contrast, generally conceals only who has done a thing, 
not that it has been done.” (Gardner 2011, 939). To understand this distinction, imagine that A 
must make an important decision. She retreats to an uninhabited island to live uninterrupted for 
several days to ponder which decision she will make. This form of privacy is compatible with non-
anonymity. While A can make her decision in private, it might still, at some point, become known 
that it was A who made the decision. A’s claim to privacy in this regard is not necessarily a claim 
to anonymity. Conversely, A’s claim to anonymity need not entail a claim to privacy. For example, 
if A takes part in a demonstration wearing a disguise, A remains anonymous but she is not acting 
in private. Her action (taking part in the demonstration) is fully public, it is only her identity that 
is concealed. Relevantly, suggesting that it is the privacy-dimension of voting that is important for 
the autonomous expression of preferences does not therefore also entail that voting must be 
anonymous. The institutional value view is therefore compatible with public voting. Since it is 
compatible with public voting, the institutional value view does little to justify the current set-up 
of private, anonymous voting. It equally justifies any voting-scheme that incorporates the kind of 
privacy valuable for autonomy, including public ones. 
Some will object to this by saying that public voting (in the way mentioned) is still a threat 
to the autonomy of electors. Revealing voting-choices at any point will give way to attempts of 
illicit influences of different kinds, improperly influencing the autonomous voting-choices of 
citizens.38 So, the objection goes, if protecting autonomy – which is what the democratic value 
                                               
36 Dan Sturgis also makes this point in a different context. See Sturgis 2005. 
37 Brennan and Pettit 1990. 
38 Birch and Watt raise this objection. They are careful not to equate voting in private with voting anonymously. See 
Birch and Watt 2004, 65. 
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view is concerned with – is important, then that should speak both for the privacy of the vote and 
it should speak against public voting.   
While this objection might be right, the institutional value view would now endorse a 
different kind of view that is reliant on several more assumptions. It would now have to be the 
case that the ex-post reveal of voting-choices would undermine the autonomy of citizens. This 
requires additional evidence and argument on behalf of those who advance the institutional view. 
It is easy to imagine public forms of voting where the expression of autonomous preferences 
would, prima facie, not be a worry. It might be that voting-choices are made public so long after 
the election that they would have no (or very little) effect on the preferences of electors. Further, 
consider a system in which it costs money to see the register of voting-choices. If only a very few 
are able (or willing) to pay for access, it would have no (or very little) effect on the autonomous 
choices of electors. So, even if the institutional value view adapts in this way, it does not preclude 
the use of public forms of voting. 
(iii) Autonomy is compatible with (or even favorable of) optional privacy 
  Thirdly, the institutional value also does not justify mandatory privacy.39 If what is 
valuable is the ability to make up one’s own mind, then this would equally justify a system of 
optional privacy where citizens themselves decide whether or not to verifiably communicate to 
others how they’ve voted. There can be both veiled private booths like there are now and public 
forms of voting such that electors themselves can decide whether they want their voting-choices 
to be known publicly. Such an option would certainly be appealing for one prima facie reason, 
namely that it would offer electors themselves the choice of whether to signal their political 
preference (by voting) in public. Since optional privacy preserves the autonomy-enhancing 
circumstances of private voting while allowing those who wish to vote in public the opportunity 
to do so, it seems that the institutional value view is as compatible with optional privacy as it is 
with mandatory privacy. If this is so, the institutional value view does not justify the contemporary 
set-up of mandatory privacy rather than optional privacy. In fact, there are reasons why the 
institutional value view should favor optional privacy. If the institutional value view suggests that 
the autonomous preferences of citizens are important, it seems it should respect the autonomous 
                                               
39 Nissenbaum explicitly references the mandatory dimension of privacy. See Nissenbaum 2010, 176. 
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preference to vote in public. It seems odd to suggest that citizens should be able to express their 
own preferences while legally denying them the possibility to do so. Consider, further, that the 
expressive nature of voting is much stronger in public rather than private voting. If the expression 
of preferences is important, then allowing such preferences to be expressed in public should be 
deemed highly important on the institutional value view. It seems, then, that the institutional value 
view is, on balance, at least compatible with and (perhaps) even supportive of optional privacy 
rather than mandatory privacy.  
 One might object here that under optional privacy, citizens will have ways, and perhaps 
incentives, to intervene in the autonomous judgments of others. For example, A has an incentive 
to manipulate B to vote for A’s preference, since A is now able to verify whether B has voted the 
way A wants her to.40 All A has to do is to somehow make B take the option of voting in public. 
Because of this, optional privacy might prove to be a bad way of maintaining the autonomous 
judgments of citizens.  
 It is certainly possible that such outcomes are possible. However, if the view relies on the 
likelihood of this happening, the circumstances of the institutional value view would change 
substantially. For the view to work, it would now have to rely on the assumption that optional 
privacy is a worse system of maintaining the ability of citizens to vote based on their own 
autonomous judgments. It is not obvious that this is the case. At least some features of an optional 
system would enhance autonomy in ways that mandatory privacy does not. Voting in public might 
be appealing to some as it can function as a form of defiance or signal a form of opposition towards 
social trends or the current political climate. It can be a strong sign of autonomy as it would be a 
public way of showing one’s un-influenced political stance. It would also be an expressive act – 
signaling that one is not afraid to express one’s own political commitment in the face of conformist 
forces. This can be an effective and visually strong way of communicating to others the value of 
political autonomy – and, perhaps, inspire them to do the same. While the institutional value view 
might, on the balance of reasons, be suggestive of mandatory rather than optional privacy, the 
expressive advantages of publicity make it at least unclear whether this is the case. 
                                               




 It is important to notice that all of this applies regardless of whether the institutional value 
view suggests that autonomy justifies or is reflected in private voting. Even if one holds the latter 
view, these three points of criticism still apply. It is still the case that (i) judgment autonomy can 
be reflected by a host of other arrangements; (ii) that it is reflected in public ways of voting that 
are still private; (iii) that it is reflected (equally or better) in optional privacy. Therefore, the 
institutional value view is deficient regardless of whether it understands autonomy as justifying or 
being reflected in private voting.  
One might reformulate the institutional value view and think of it as a scale-view instead. 
At one end of the scale is the ideal voter. Let us call her Eve. Eve has acquired her political opinions 
after a critical examination of arguments and substantial amounts of self-reflection. She expresses 
her autonomous political judgments in her voting. At the other end of the scale is the citizen that 
has not developed any autonomous political opinions but merely relies, uncritically, on the political 
opinions of her surroundings. Let us call her Sandra. All the institutional value view has to do is 
to suggest that, on this scale, voting in private gets us closer to Eve than to Sandra. 
 The response to the scale-view consists of the same responses given throughout this paper. 
It is simply not clear, at least a priori, that the current form of mandatory, private voting always 
gets us closer to Eve than to Sandra. I have throughout the paper argued why this is the case. 
Second, it is not clear that Eve is even the appropriate kind of ideal for political arrangements.41 
And, third, if the scale-view is the best option, then all the preliminary questions are asked once 
again: if other kinds of institutional arrangements were more conducive to getting us closer to Eve, 
would they be justified according to the institutional value view? If private voting were, in fact, a 
worse way of getting to the ideal of Eve, would the institutional value view recommend 
abandoning or replacing it? 
Concluding Remarks   
 
I will end with some brief concluding remarks. The objective of this paper has been, almost 
entirely, negative. I have argued why some of the traditional views on the value of privacy in 
relation to democratic politics and the practice of private voting have some substantial flaws. Such 
                                               
41 At least, we would want her to display other virtues than being autonomous in her political participation.   
22 
 
criticism is important because these views are part of the intellectual resources that we draw on 
when we articulate the importance of the autonomy of electors and the protection of this autonomy. 
If these accounts have issues or flaws, then our thinking about these important issues will likely 
have issues and flaws. Understanding the limitations of our contemporary accounts is an important 
part of building stronger accounts. Little in this critique suggests that the autonomy of electors is 
not important or that institutions such as private voting are not an appropriate way of securing such 
autonomy. Rather, the point is that important parts of contemporary understandings of such privacy 
and its relation to voting do not justify why it is important or how its importance justifies the use 
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Not So Secret After All: How Big Data Threatens the Secret Ballot 
and What (not) To Do About It 
Abstract 
 
The amount of data about electors being collected and analyzed by political campaigns and private companies 
makes it possible to infer, with a rather high probability, how individual electors have voted in previous elections 
and referendums. In this paper, we show that this practice threatens the secret ballot. This is so even though the 
voting-choices of electors are not unveiled directly, but rather statistically inferred through Big Data Analytics. 
We discuss three possible ways to counter this threat and argue that there are good reasons to be hesitant to 
implement any of these solutions and any combination of them. We thus conclude that the threat posed by Big 
Data Analytics to the secret ballot remains. 
 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the 2016 US presidential election and the Brexit referendum in the UK, it 
came into public awareness that a company called Cambridge Analytica had cooperated with 
the Trump campaign and the Leave campaign, respectively, in order to individually target so-
called ‘persuadable’ electors through political marketing on social media. Huge amounts of 
data about millions of people were collected through Facebook, and Big Data Analytics1 
(BDA) was employed on this data, to find correlations that could be used to create political 
profiles on electors. These profiles were then used to determine which political advertisement 
was most likely to persuade each elector to vote in a certain way (Susser et al. 2018). There are 
several potential problems with how Cambridge Analytica and the political campaigns used 
personal data and BDA to influence the outcomes of these elections. One potential problem is 
that the Facebook users did not consent to their data being used for this purpose. Another 
potential problem is that the practice of targeting electors with tailored political advertisements 
while making sure they did not see advertisements from opponents, may have amounted to 
wrongful manipulation. However, there is also a third, largely unnoticed2 potential problem, 
namely that estimating with a rather high degree of probability how electors voted in previous 
elections and referendums3 threatens the secret ballot.  
                                               
1 We explain in section II what we mean by BDA.  
2 Rubenstein 2014, Moore 2019 and others have, however, paid some attention to this problem.  
3 Throughout the paper, we write about elections. All our points also apply to referendums, unless explicitly 
noted otherwise.  
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In this paper, we defend the view that BDA in fact threatens the secret ballot by 
estimating, with a rather high degree of probability, how electors have voted in previous 
elections. One plausible reason why this problem remains largely unnoticed in the literature is 
that BDA does not directly reveal electors’ voting-choices, but merely draws probabilistic 
inferences about them. On the face of it, it seems to make a relevant difference whether votes 
are revealed directly or through probabilistic inferences. To obtain an intuitive grasp of the 
difference, imagine that Billy looks into Smith's private medical records and discovers that 
Smith has diabetes. Billy has now come to know of Smith’s diagnosis. Now, imagine instead 
that Billy has hundreds of data-points about Smith and, based on these data-points, Billy infers 
that Smith has diabetes. The way in which BDA poses a threat to the secret ballot is like this 
second case.  
One central difference between direct observation and probabilistic inference is that in 
the latter case electors have what we term plausible deniability. Even if there is a ninety percent 
probability that Billy voted for the Republicans in the previous election, it is still possible for 
him to plausibly deny doing so. The condition of plausible deniability is not present if electors’ 
votes are revealed directly. For example, marked ballots would leave electors with no 
reasonable opportunity to deny their voting-choice.  
We try to show that pointing to plausible deniability is not sufficient to refute the view 
that BDA threatens the secret ballot. The shortage of literature on this threat means that there 
are few explicitly defended normative positions concerning the relation between voter secrecy 
and BDA. This also means that there are few suggestions as to how voter secrecy can be 
maintained in the era of BDA. At the end of this paper, we discuss several suggestions but 
argue that there are good reasons to be hesitant to implement any of them. 
The paper is structured as follows: In section I, we describe the most common worries 
about public voting. In section II, we explain what BDA is. In section III, we clarify how, and 
to what extent, BDA threatens the secret ballot. In section IV, we discuss solutions to the threat 
posed to the secret ballot by BDA. Finally, in section V we make a few concluding remarks.  
 
 
I The Secret Ballot  
Before we move on to our central task of showing how BDA threatens the secret ballot, we 
will briefly sketch out what we mean by ‘secret ballot’, and what the standard justification for 
the secret ballot is. By saying that the ballot is secret, we mean that it is impossible, or at least 
extremely difficult, for person X to know what person Y has voted without person Y 
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communicating how person Y voted to person X. We use the word ‘secret’ in a descriptive way 
as opposed to a normative way. When we say that BDA threatens the secret ballot, this does 
not imply that anyone is behaving wrongfully. When voting is not secret according to the above 
definition, we say that voting is public. Several distinct normative worries are associated with 
public voting. For example:  
 
A: Public voting makes it possible to coerce voters to vote in specific ways, or buy their 
votes (Justesen et al. 2017; Mares 2015, 3-4).  
B: Public voting makes it easier to manipulate voters through microtargeting or similar 
means (Susser et al. 2018)4.  
C: Public voting violates citizens' right to privacy (Lever 2007; 2015).  
 
The standard justification for the secret ballot is that it avoids some or all of the worries listed 
in A through C. Due to these worries regarding public voting, secrecy is often taken to be an 
integral part of the fairness and legitimacy of democratic elections. This view has been 
expressed by democratic theorist Robert Dahl, who has suggested that countries without secret 
ballot cannot be judged to have fair and free elections (Dahl 1998, 96). A similar verdict is 
reached by Dennis Thompson, who attributes the reduction of illicit voter influences to the 
success of the secret ballot (Thompson 2002, 66). The secrecy of the vote is also encoded in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 21, (3)5 states:  
The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall 
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.6  
As far as we know, among the countries which utilize voting as part of the political decision-
making process, only one country does not do so in secret – namely Nigeria (Azinge 1994). 
Upholding the secrecy of the ballot is thus almost universally viewed as a very important part 
of securing the procedural fairness and legitimacy of the democratic system. Although the 
standard view is that the ballot ought to be secret, a few scholars have expressed criticism of 
this way of voting (see Brennan & Pettit 1990; Sturgis 2005; Engelen & Nys 2013). Given that 
                                               
4 Susser et al. do not discuss open voting explicitly, but they describe how microtargeting based on Facebook 
data about e.g. people’s political views might affect the outcomes of elections. Microtargeting is the practice of 
collecting data about individuals, and then using these data to show individuals ads that are tailored – based on 
the individual’s preferences – to make each individual more likely to buy the product, vote for the party, or 
whatever the ad is about (see Borgesius et al. 2018).  
5 See https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ (Accessed March 5, 2020). 
6 Italics added. 
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the secrecy of the ballot is almost universally celebrated in the literature, that it is written into 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that almost all contemporary democracies 
allow or mandate electors to cast their votes in secrecy, it is very important to discuss any threat 
to de facto secret voting, like the one posed by the use of BDA.  
If BDA threatens the secret ballot, as we argue it does, then it is relevant to investigate 
whether the normative worries about public voting are also relevant here. Surprisingly, almost 
all of the worries are relevant (although not equally). We will discuss this in more detail in 
section III, but first, we will explain what BDA is, and how accurately it can predict how 
electors vote.  
 
II  Big Data Analytics 
Political campaigns are interested in knowing individual electors’ political preferences7 so that 
they can either better persuade them to vote in accordance with the campaign’s agenda (or at 
least not in accordance with opponents’ agenda), or better change their political platforms so 
they better reflect the preferences of electors. In order to obtain knowledge about individual 
electors’ political preferences, it is necessary to collect data about them. Although political 
campaigns may have collected data about electors for a very long time, two new features of 
electoral data collection can be identified: First, the data is often collected and processed 
digitally. Second, the amounts of data being collected and processed are substantial. Some of 
the data processing is done using advanced algorithms, which can be trained to find correlations 
in the datasets, which would be extremely cumbersome or impossible for humans to find 
manually. We count any such algorithm under the rubric of ‘BDA’. For present purposes, it is 
not necessary to dive into the technical details of how BDA works. It is sufficient to note that 
the algorithms can find statistical correlations in the datasets and perform accurate probabilistic 
inferences based on these correlations (Nickerson & Rogers 2014). Political campaigns use 
BDA to determine whom to target with political content leading up to elections. This is often 
done through so-called microtargeting, where individual electors are targeted with 
advertisements, often on social media, specifically tailored to their personal political 
preferences and the likelihood of persuasion (Papakyriakopoulos et al. 2018). 
                                               
7 Political preferences can be preferences about concrete policy proposals, preferences about certain ideological 
positions, preferences about certain party political alliances etc.; anything that political campaigns can use to 
better determine how electors will vote, and how they might be persuaded to vote according to the campaign’s 
agenda.  
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Due to the secret ballot, it is close to impossible for political campaigns to know with 
certainty how any individual elector – let us call him Smith – voted in the previous election. 
Instead, political campaigns rely on inferences based, inter alia, on data that is not necessarily 
itself political in nature. For example, the car Smith drives reveals a relatively accurate picture 
of Smith’s political preferences. If Smith drives a sedan, he is much more likely to have voted 
for the Democrats in the previous election, while he is much more likely to have voted 
Republican if he drives a pickup truck (see Gebru et al. 2017). Combinations of other types of 
easily available data points about Smith, such as ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, age, job, 
income, address, marital status, family size, language skills, and education level can reveal, 
with a very high degree of accuracy, how Smith voted in the previous election8. This is the case 
because certain demographic characteristics are highly correlated with certain voting 
behaviors. According to The Economist and YouGov, there is a 97 percent chance that an 
American voter has voted for the Democrats, if the voter in question fits the following criteria: 
Is a black male, who does not believe in reincarnation, is an atheist, is straight, is between 45 
and 64 years old, is not a regular churchgoer, is married, has children, has a college degree, 
earns $30,000-$64,000 a year, lives in a city in the Midwest and speaks Spanish9. The 
Economist has a tool on their website, where anyone with internet access can plot in certain 
data points about electors, and the tool will then give the probability of an elector with that 
description voting for, say, the Democrats (ibid.).10  
Note that the probability of 97 percent is reached by having access to a relatively small 
number of data points about an individual elector. Imagine how accurate the inferences can be 
if one has access to huge numbers of data points about individual electors like political 
campaigns do. The Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee 
each have more than 900 data points on every single American elector (Moore 2019). There is 
no reason to think that BDA will not become even more sophisticated and accurate as more 
data is collected and technology evolves and expands.  
                                               
8 Attributes like age and gender are also easily predictable based on e.g. web browsing logs (Hu et al. 2007), and 
attributes like gender, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, and ethnicity are highly predictable based on people’s 
Facebook ‘likes’ (Kosinski et al. 2012). Thus, with access to web browsing logs alone, it is easy to predict many 
of the attributes which again can be used to predict electors’ voting choices with high accuracy.  
9 See https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/11/03/how-to-forecast-an-americans-vote (Accessed 
March 9, 2020). This particular algorithm calculates the probability that American voters will vote in a 
particular way in the next election. This does not make a substantial difference, since, all else equal, it is harder 
to predict how people will behave in the future, than it is to determine how they behaved in the past.  
10 A similar tool has been developed by the New York Times. See 




III The Threat to the Secret Ballot 
This section is devoted to the task of showing exactly how BDA threatens the secret ballot. 
When we say that BDA ‘threatens’ the secret ballot, we mean it in a descriptive way. The secret 
ballot is threatened if someone forms a sufficiently strong epistemic relation to the fact of what 
another elector has voted. If the epistemic relation in question is, for instance, certainty or 
something close to it, then we say that the ballot is not just threatened, but revealed. We do not 
say exactly how accurate the inference must be to count as a threat or a revelation, respectively. 
Nothing in our argument hangs on this. But if an inference is as accurate as the ones that can 
be found on The Economist’s website, then we think it is fair to say that it amounts to at least 
a threat. As mentioned, the threat to the secret ballot posed by BDA concerns probabilistic 
inference rather than direct observation, as we saw in the earlier example with Billy and Smith. 
The idea is that if the accuracy of the inference is sufficiently high, then there is a threat to the 
secret ballot. The question that confronts us is the following: Does it make a relevant difference 
that BDA estimates people’s voting-choices qua probabilistic inference rather than directly 
revealing them?  
One prima facie relevant difference is that of plausible deniability. Imagine observing 
the votes of electors directly by the use of video cameras in the voting-booth, compared to 
inferring, through the use of BDA, what electors voted based on their demographic data. In the 
first case, electors have no room for plausible deniability. They cannot plausibly deny that they 
voted according to what the video cameras revealed. In the second case, voters can still 
plausibly deny their voting-choice, at least if the inference is not extremely accurate. In the 
case of observing how electors vote using video cameras, it seems that the ballot is 
straightforwardly revealed and not only threatened. The difference seems to be explained by 
the fact that video cameras directly observe how electors voted, which introduces a degree of 
certainty that is not present in the case of probabilistic inferences11. 
We contend, however, that BDA threatens the secret ballot, even if the electors in 
question do have plausible deniability. Imagine that someone puts one video camera in each 
voting booth. Imagine further that there is a 70 percent probability that the video cameras are 
                                               
11 What does the work here is the ability to link individual voters to their individual votes with a high degree of 
certainty. Directly observing the vote (as is the case with video cameras for example) is not the deciding factor. 
For example, if someone is in the possession of the DNA of voters they could analyze each ballot and find out 
who cast each vote. This process would, with a degree of certainty, link each voter to their specific vote. This is 
a clear revelation of the ballot, even though no one is directly observing how citizens voted. Interestingly, 
revelations of this sort have occurred in the past (Mares 2015, 2-4).  
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truthfully showing electors’ votes and a 30 percent probability that they are showing a fake 
video recording. Under such a scenario, plausible deniability is still upheld for all electors. 
They can plausibly deny that the recording is telling the truth about how they voted. Regardless 
of this, the secret ballot has clearly been threatened. One objection to this view is that electors 
do not have plausible deniability since there is only a thirty percent chance that the video 
cameras showed a fake recording. However, BDA can reach the same degree of probability. 
There is a difference between the case of installing video cameras in voting-booths, and the 
case of making probabilistic inferences about electors’ voting-choices. The difference is that 
in 70 percent of cases, the video recordings directly show electors’ true voting-choices, while 
probabilistic inferences, qua probabilistic, never directly show any elector’s true voting choice. 
However, in the case of the video cameras, each elector still has plausible deniability, because 
it is very difficult to know when the video recording is real and when it is fake. This shows that 
the secret ballot can be threatened, even if all voters have plausible deniability. Note, however, 
that even if we are mistaken, and the secret ballot is not threatened when electors have plausible 
deniability, it only shows that the secrecy of fewer electors’ votes is threatened. Many voters 
do not have plausible deniability, because the inferences like the ones that can be found on The 
Economist’s website are very accurate. If the accuracy approaches 100 percent, it is strange to 
say that that denial is plausible.  
The threat to a particular elector remains, even if BDA does not reveal whether or not 
that elector has voted. It is not necessary to reveal whether or not someone has voted. If by 
using BDA, it is estimated that there is, say, 90 percent probability that an elector voted for the 
Republicans, then there must also be at least 90 percent probability that the same elector voted 
simpliciter, since it is impossible to vote for the Republicans without voting simpliciter12. Even 
if this were not the case, in some countries it is easy to find out whether an elector has cast a 
vote or not (or at least whether or not the elector registered at the polling station). In the United 
States and the United Kingdom, it is a matter of public record whether or not citizens have 
voted in specific elections, and it is relatively easy to get access to these voter registration 
lists13.     
                                               
12 This is called the conjunction rule in probability theory (see Tversky & Kahneman 1983). According to this 
law, the probability of the conjunction of two events occurring cannot exceed the probability of one of the 
conjuncts occurring. Written formally: Pr(A&B)  Pr(A). This means that the probability of an elector voting 
for the Republicans must be smaller or equal to the probability of the same elector voting simpliciter.  
13 See https://www.coventry.gov.uk/info/8/elections_and_voting/765/registering_to_vote/7 (Accessed Feb 10, 
2020). In the United States there are even mobile apps which collect public information about whether electors 
have voted in previous elections or not. See https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/04/us/politics/apps-public-
voting-record.html (Accessed Feb 10, 2020).  
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Does it matter who has access to BDA models capable of making accurate inferences? 
In a traditional public voting system used by political representatives, people can check how 
individual representatives have voted on different legislative proposals. Even with the arrival 
of sophisticated BDA, this has not become the norm for citizens. Unlike the voting of 
representatives, the estimated voting-choices of citizens are only available to whoever runs the 
algorithms. Recall, however, that some estimated voting-choices are in fact publicly available, 
such as the ones that can be found on The Economist’s website. Nonetheless, the fact that some 
estimations of voting-choices are only available to a limited number of people should not invite 
any complacency about the threat to the secret ballot. Voter secrecy is not preserved just 
because information about the votes of the citizenry is only available to a small group of people. 
If a government tracks the voting-choices of its citizens, but keeps the information concealed, 
unavailable to the public or other non-state actors, this would still be a way of revealing the 
ballot. Likewise, even if the inferences drawn through the use of BDA are kept concealed in 
the top echelons of tech companies, this ought still to be considered a threat to the secret ballot. 
We see no reason to suppose that the threat to the secret ballot depends on how many, or who 
has access to the information. However, some of the worries about public voting might be 
worse if certain people rather than others have access to the information. For example, vote-
buying might, ceteris paribus, be worse if a rich person has access to the information than if a 
poor person does.  
Not all the worries about public voting that we outlined in Section I (in A through C) 
should concern us in the context of inferring voting-choices, due to how BDA threatens the 
secret ballot. Take, for example, all the worries in A. One of these worries is vote-buying. For  
someone to engage in vote-buying, she will need some way to ex-post verify that the vote she 
has bought has been cast in the way that was agreed to14. BDA inferences do not reveal votes 
in a way that makes it possible for vote-buyers to check if their investment has been successful. 
BDA can be used to predict who is likely to vote X, which makes it reasonable for a vote-buyer 
in favor of Y to pay the elector to vote Y. But there is no way to check whether the elector 
actually voted Y, and if BDA is used to predict this, then the same BDA model will still predict 
that the elector voted X. As such, the normative worry concerning the buying of votes might 
not be prevalent because of the way in which BDA ‘reveals’ votes15.  
                                               
14 Plausible deniability can also be applied in this case. Due to the inferential nature of BDA, it is possible for 
electors to plausibly deny their voting-choice. This means that there is less incentive for would-be bribers, vote-
buyers and coercers to engage in such acts.  
15 The same reasoning applies to worries like voter coercion.  
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There is, however, a related worry that does apply in the context of estimating votes 
using BDA, namely the worry that there will be an increase in cases where electors are coerced 
or bribed to abstain from voting. The practice of bribing people to abstain from voting is often 
called ‘negative vote-buying’ (Morgan & Vardy 2010). Imagine that the Democrats estimate 
that there is 90 percent probability that a particular elector will vote for the Republicans. It is 
now possible for the Democrats to coerce or bribe the Republican elector to abstain from 
voting, since the Democrats can check, either by stalking her or by getting access to voter 
registration lists, whether the Republican elector votes or not. In many states, individuals, non-
profit organizations and political parties can pay to get access to voter registration lists. It costs 
$136,671 for a political party to get access to all the available data16. It would thus be relatively 
cheap for vote-buying Democrats to verify whether their investment was successful.  
Instead of engaging in negative vote-buying, the Democrats can also attempt to make 
it more difficult for the Republican elector to cast her vote, by e.g. providing inadequate voting 
facilities in neighborhoods with a high density of Republican electors. Of course, all of this 
would also be possible without BDA, but BDA does, all else equal, make it easier for the 
Democrats to know who the Republican electors are. In addition, concerning negative vote-
buying, BDA can also be used to predict at which price each voter is likely to agree to abstain 
from voting.  
All the worries in B and C still apply (to varying degrees) in the context of estimating 
voting-choices using BDA. For example, consider the worry in B that individual electors will 
be targeted based on probabilistic inferences about their participation in previous elections.  
Inferring how electors have previously voted makes it easier to know whom to target with 
political advertisements that are specifically designed to persuade electors to vote differently. 
This worry is not only present but amplified in the context of using BDA. This is so because 
BDA can not only be used to estimate how electors have voted in the past, but also which 
electors are likely to vote differently if shown the right political advertisements. If we are 
worried about issues of manipulation and political targeting as a result of public voting, then 
we should probably worry even more about the way in which BDA can estimate the voting-
choices of electors.  
The worry in C – that public voting violates electors’ privacy since voting is a legitimate 
private concern – is also relevant in the context of predicting voting-choices using BDA. If 
BDA inferences can reach a high degree of accuracy about something that is a legitimate 
                                               
16 See http://voterlist.electproject.org/full-list-purchase-facts-and-info (Accessed March 5, 2020).  
10 
private concern, then it seems that the use of BDA inferences is at least a threat to privacy. We, 
therefore, take it that anyone who objects to public voting on privacy-related grounds will also 
object to BDA inferences about voting-choices for the same reasons. 
We have now seen what the threat posed by BDA to the secret ballot consists in, and 
how some of the worries related to open voting are also relevant for this threat. We will now 
consider three possible solutions to the problem at hand. Despite their intuitive appeal, 
however, we will argue that there are good reasons to be hesitant to implement them. 
 
 
IV Possible Solutions 
In the previous section, we saw that the use of BDA to infer how people have voted poses a 
threat to the secret ballot. In order to avoid – or at least limit – this threat, several solutions 
might be considered17. We will go through three solutions in turn, and for each of them explain 
why we should be very hesitant to implement the solution in question. Some of the objections 
we will raise to the solutions are efficiency objections, which means that they explain why it is 
likely that the solution in question will not be effective. Other objections are moral objections, 
which means that they explain why implementing the solution in question would be morally 
objectionable, even if the solution were efficient.  
 
Solution 1: Prohibition of Data-Sharing  
One possible solution is to prohibit the sharing of certain types of data about oneself that make 
it possible to draw inferences about voting preference. This solution can be expressed as 
follows:  
  
Solution 1: Prohibit by law the sharing of certain types of data/information about 
oneself that make accurate inferences of voting-choices possible18. 
 
                                               
17 Many additional solutions could be considered. For example, as Martin Moore has discussed, perhaps 
political campaigns should be forced to reveal which data they collect, and for what purposes (Moore 2019, 
103). However, as Moore points out, this might in itself jeopardize the secrecy of voting. In addition, unless this 
solution is combined with limitations on data collection or the use of algorithms, it cannot block the threat to the 
secret ballot. Simply revealing which data is collected and for what purposes does not in itself prevent 
inferences about electors’ voting-choices, especially if they are made based on publicly available data.  
18 Andrea Sangiovanni has recently hinted at something along these lines, although his suggestion seems to be 
to prohibit only the selling of personal data by private companies in order to ‘bias elections and other political 
outcomes’ (Sangiovanni 2019, 215).  
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The idea is that by prohibiting the sharing of the types of data/information that make accurate 
inferences about voting-choices possible, it would be much harder to threaten the secret ballot. 
If it is harder to threaten the secret ballot, then presumably it is also less likely that the worries 
about open voting would become real. Thus, it appears that we have at least a pro tanto reason 
to implement the solution.  
 
Objection 1: A powerful moral objection to Solution 1 is that it significantly limits the freedom 
of expression. If you are not allowed to share certain data/information about yourself with 
others, then your freedom of expression has been limited. This is not just a trivial limitation. If 
one is not allowed to share data/information about oneself that makes accurate inferences of 
voting-choices possible, then there are a great many data/information that one is not allowed 
to share. For example, to draw accurate inferences about voting-choices, one can use 
data/information about electors’ political preferences, such as support of certain policies on 
social media, participation in certain demonstrations, etc. An implication of Solution 1 is that 
you would be prohibited from expressing your political views, sharing with others that you 
have participated in a political demonstration, and so on. In fact, you would be prohibited from 
campaigning for the party or candidate that you support, since doing so involves sharing data 
about your support of that party or candidate.  
Even if we allow the sharing of ‘political data/information’ for the reasons pointed out 
above, the sharing of many other types of data/information would also be prohibited under 
Solution 1. Data about age, income, gender, race, religion, etc. highly correlate – at least in 
combination – with certain political views, so you would also be prohibited from sharing these 
types of data/information. This would be absurd since some of the data/information are shared 
with others whenever we walk down the street, or casually talk to others.  
Note that one of the worries about open voting is that it makes it easier to 
problematically manipulate electors. If this is a serious worry, it seems that implementing 
Solution 1 to avoid the worry is counterproductive. The use of BDA indeed makes it easier to 
manipulate electors by profiling them and creating echo chambers on social media, so that 
Republican electors, for instance, are not exposed to the views of Democratic electors. 
Presumably, one of the problems with this practice is that electors will not make sufficiently 
informed and elaborated decisions about who they vote for since they might have voted 
differently if they had been exposed to opposing political views. However, if this is a problem, 
then it seems that implementing Solution 1 would only make the problem worse. Think of John 
Stuart Mill’s defense of freedom of expression. Mill’s idea was that being informed about 
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opposing views plays an important role in people’s ability to form true beliefs and opinions 
(Mill 1985, 83-84). But under Solution 1, electors would have a hard time being informed about 
opposing political views, since the opponents would be prohibited from sharing their political 
views. Thus, if better informed and elaborated voting-decisions is what we want, then we 
should be very hesitant to implement Solution 1.  
 
Solution 2: Prohibition of Certain Algorithms 
Perhaps the objection raised to the previous solution can be avoided if instead of prohibiting 
the sharing of certain data/information, we prohibit the use of certain BDA algorithms. The 
solution can be expressed as follows:  
  
Solution 2: Prohibit by law the use of BDA with electors’ voting-choices as target 
attributes. 
 
By having voting-choices as a target attribute, we simply mean that the BDA model is trained 
on a specific dataset to find correlations between voting-choices and other attributes, like 
income or age19. The idea is that by prohibiting the use of BDA specifically in the context of 
drawing inferences about electors’ voting-choices, it will become much harder to threaten the 
secret ballot. While Solution 1 is extremely drastic and goes directly against the right to 
freedom of expression, Solution 2 seems at least prima facie more plausible.  
 
Objection 1: We take the main objection to Solution 2 to be the following. Prohibiting voting-
choices as target attributes still makes it possible to use BDA to draw accurate inferences 
concerning certain attributes that correlate highly with voting-choice, for example the political 
affiliation of citizens. Political information is not limited to how citizens vote. For example, 
citizens often reveal themselves what their political affiliations are. BDA uses such information 
to create the same kinds of voter profiles as are created when BDA uses voting-choices as their 
target attribute. Information about the political preferences of citizens is therefore still 
attainable regardless of whether voting-choices themselves are incorporated. This is important, 
in part, because political profiles can give information about one’s likely voting-choices. Even 
though Solution 2 suggests that BDA may not be used to infer individuals’ voting-choices, 
                                               
19 This solution would prohibit a large part of what political scientists do. However, we could easily imagine a 
system where scientists could apply for exemptions for specific scientific projects or something similar.  
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political profiles can still give strong indications of how individuals have voted. A self-
described long-time Democrat is, all else equal, more likely to vote for the Democrats than for 
the Republicans in the upcoming election. As political information about electors is already out 
there and readily available, it is difficult to see how Solution 2 would do much to combat it. 
One might revise the solution such that it prohibits BDA from using any kind of political 
affiliation as the target attribute. However, data about political affiliation has already been 
collected and systematized. It would probably at this stage be difficult to even decide which 
kind of data one might categorize as political affiliation. As correlations can be found between 
political preferences and age, internet habits, choice of car, etc., one would have to prohibit the 
use of such seemingly trivial data if one wants to prohibit using information which can be 
indicative of political preferences.  
Notice that political profiles (based on something other than voting-choices) can also 
give rise to some of the central worries about open voting discussed throughout this paper, such 
as manipulation and negative vote-buying. Consider manipulation as an example. The worry is 
that BDA can, by using vast amounts of complex data, infer what the political preferences of 
citizens are. This makes it possible for individuals or companies to know which electors to 
target with particular political ads, when to do so, and how to do so. Solution 2 does not prohibit 
such practices as it only prohibits using voting-choices as a target attribute, which does not –
by itself – alleviate this kind of worry.  
 
Solution 3: Not For Profit  
We have seen that there are reasons to be skeptical of implementing Solution 2. But perhaps a 
less radical version of Solution 2 is more acceptable. One solution could be to limit the 
incentives to engage in the production of inferences, by prohibiting for-profit use of BDA with 
electors’ voting-choices as target attributes. The solution can be expressed like this:  
 
Solution 3: Prohibit by law for-profit use of BDA with electors’ voting-choices as target 
attributes. 
 
Solution 3 is a less drastic version of Solution 2 since it only prohibits doing what Solution 2 
prohibits, for profit. Since the BDA inferences about voting-choices are often carried out by 
for-profit organizations like Cambridge Analytica, perhaps we can block the threat to the secret 
ballot by taking money out of the equation. Prima facie, this allows us to not overregulate BDA, 
while still avoiding at least a big part of the threat to the secret ballot.  
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Objection 1: Solution 3 would prohibit companies like Cambridge Analytica from engaging 
in the practice of drawing inferences about electors’ voting-choices using BDA. However, if 
Solution 3 is implemented, there is no reason why political campaigns would not just collect 
their own data, and use BDA to draw their own inferences about electors’ voting-choices. The 
reason why political campaigns hire for-profit companies like Cambridge Analytica to do the 
job for them is that such companies have products that are ready to be implemented. It is 
presumably cheaper, and perhaps more efficient, for the political campaigns to hire Cambridge 
Analytica to do the job than it is for the political campaigns to do it themselves. But that does 
not imply that the campaigns cannot or will not draw the inferences themselves if for-profit 
companies will no longer do it because of a prohibition against it. The incentives involved are 
so strong that the effects of implementing Solution 3 seem likely to be relatively small, and 
would only last for a relatively limited period.  
In addition, even if Solution 3 is implemented, it seems likely that many for-profit 
organizations would simply violate the prohibition. The incentives for violating the prohibition 
are strong, both for the for-profit organizations and for the political parties, especially 
considering that gaining political power is one way of credibly reducing the risk of being 
punished for violating the prohibition. So, Solution 3 would likely have very little effect since 
either 1) the for-profit organizations would comply with the prohibition, while the political 
campaigns would start engaging in inferring voting-choices themselves, or 2) the for-profit 
organizations would not comply with the prohibition since the incentives for violating the 
prohibition are so strong. Either way, the effects of the prohibition would likely be very limited.  
 
 
Objection 2: Let us consider another objection to Solution 3. Presumably, Solution 3 would 
only be implemented in a situation where Solution 1 or Solution 2 is not already in place. 
Otherwise, Solution 3 would be redundant, since the conduct it seeks to prohibit would already 
be prohibited. So, a proponent of Solution 3 would need to argue why a prohibition of that 
conduct for profit should be implemented, while a prohibition of the same conduct simpliciter 
should not be implemented20. However, this violates the following principle: If you may do X 
                                               
20 A proponent of Solution 3 might also be a proponent of Solution 1 or Solution 2, so she need not argue that 
Solution 1 or Solution 2 should not be implemented. However, for now we bracket the possibility of combining 
solutions, but return to it in section V.  
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for free, then you may do X for money (see Brennan & Jaworski 2015).21 While this principle 
is not universally accepted, it can at least function as a guideline for evaluating whether or not 
it is permissible to sell something on a market. Using it as a guideline is a way of establishing 
a burden of proof. For example, if it is morally permissible to do something for free, then it 
gives us a prima facie reason to think it is permissible to do it while also making a profit. If it 
is permissible to do it only when not attempting to make a profit, then we need reasons as to 
why the for-profit element introduces badness into the transaction. This seems to us to be a 
reasonable starting point, since it is plausible that if a particular transaction is impermissible, 
then the impermissibility relates to circumstances which are independent of the for-profit 
element of the transaction. So, let us apply this to the case of the BDA.  
Imagine a scenario in which it is permissible to make inferences about voting-choices. 
If – contrary to what actually happened – electors willingly, and fully informed, give a company 
like Cambridge Analytica access to their data with the sole purpose of making inferences about 
voting-choices, then, provided others are not harmed in the process, it is hard to see why they 
should not be allowed to so in a setting where the company attempts to turn a profit. Regardless 
of whether or not the company attempts to make a profit or not, some of the worries about 
public voting are still relevant. Think, for example, of negative vote-buying and manipulation. 
These practices are possible regardless of whether the company attempts to make a profit or 
not. If manipulation and negative vote-buying are the main worries, then it seems that 
prohibition of certain types of manipulation and negative vote-buying is the way to go, rather 
than implementing Solution 3.  
One might also offer another, closely-related reason as to why only for-profit use of 
BDA to make the inferences should be prohibited: the biggest threats come from for-profit 
companies and by prohibiting for-profit use of BDA to make the inferences one would 
effectively reduce the potential for harmful outcomes. Such an argument does not suggest that 
any kind of badness is introduced into the transaction because money is involved; rather, it 
suggests that by keeping money out of the equation, problematic outcomes do not materialize22. 
One problem with this – assuming that the empirical assumption is true – is that there is a risk 
that the law becomes over- or underinclusive. It might be overinclusive in the sense that some 
                                               
21 Note that this principle does not imply that things like child pornography may be bought and sold. The 
principle only says that if you may do X for free, then you may do X for money. The reason why you may not 
buy and sell child pornography is that you should not have it in your possession in the first place.  
22 This argument does not show that there is anything intrinsically bad about the for-profit element of the 
transaction, it merely suggests that there is an empirical correlation between worrisome practices and companies 
which attempt to turn a profit by engaging in such practices.  
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for-profit use of BDA to make the inferences would be morally permissible, for example, if it 
is used to increase minorities’ ability to engage in strategic voting. On the other hand, it might 
be under-inclusive in the sense that some non-profit use of BDA to make the inferences would 
be morally impermissible, for example, if the political campaigns begin to make the inferences 
themselves and use them to manipulate electors (as described in the previous objection).  
 
 
V  Combining Solutions 
While we should be hesitant to implement any of the solutions separately, perhaps we should 
consider implementing some of the solutions in combination. However, combining the 
solutions would have no significant additional effect. To see why consider first what would 
happen if Solution 1 were implemented in combination with any of the other solutions. Solution 
1 says that certain types or amounts of data should not be allowed to be shared. In this case, it 
is hard to see what it would add if Solution 2 or Solution 3 were also implemented. If Solution 
1 is implemented, it would have no significant additional effect to also prohibit the use of 
algorithms that are supposed to be trained on those data. And, if it would have no significant 
additional effect to prohibit the use of such algorithms, it would also not have a significant 
additional effect to prohibit the use of such algorithms for profit.  
Likewise, if Solution 2 were implemented first, it would have no additional effect to 
also implement Solution 1 or Solution 3. If the algorithms are not used, simply having the 
datasets would pose no threat to the secret ballot. And, if the algorithms are not used, then it 
follows that they cannot be used for profit either. It thus appears that combining the solutions 
would not make them any more effective than they would be if they were implemented 
separately.  
One might object that if we implemented Solution 3 first, then adding Solution 1 or 
Solution 2 would have an additional effect. This is of course true. If conduct X is first prohibited 
for profit, and then conduct X is prohibited simpliciter, then, of course, the prohibition of X 
simpliciter has an additional effect. But if we want to implement Solution 1 or Solution 2 in 
addition to Solution 3, then there is no reason to implement Solution 3 in the first place. Adding 
Solution 1 or Solution 2 to Solution 3 has no significant effect that simply implementing 
Solution 1 or Solution 2 separately, to begin with, would not have.  
We have now seen why combining the solutions would not make them more efficient 
than they are individually. However, the fact that a solution is inefficient does not show that 
the solution in question should not be implemented. The fact that a law does not completely 
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solve the problem it is supposed to solve is normally not sufficient to make that law unjustified. 
Think for example of laws against drunk driving. Such laws are specifically designed to prevent 
dangerous driving, but many types of dangerous driving are not covered by laws against drunk 
driving. But this does not in itself make laws against drunk driving unjustified. However, 
Solution 1 and Solution 3 are also questionable on purely moral grounds and not just because 
they are unlikely to solve the problem they are supposed to solve.  
 
VI  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have tried to show how the practice of making probabilistic inferences about 
electors’ voting-choices using BDA threatens the secret ballot. When the secret ballot is 
threatened, some of the worries about open voting become relevant, such as worries about voter 
coercion, manipulation and violations of privacy. We have argued that the threat remains, even 
if all electors have plausible deniability. To avoid this threat, several solutions might be 
implemented. We have discussed three such solutions, and we found that we should be very 
hesitant to implement any of them. Even if our objections to each of the solutions are correct, 
it does not follow that none of the solutions should be implemented. It could be, for example, 
that the combination of two or more of them would be justified. We have tried to show why 
this is not the case. Solutions that we have not considered may, of course, be justified, but until 
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